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World Council for the Cedars Revolution

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Home arrow News Content arrow Blog arrow Blog Items arrow Intelligence arrow Japan: Secret Syrian-Iranian-NKorean missile-test fails, kills 20 Syrians - Complete Intel File
Japan: Secret Syrian-Iranian-NKorean missile-test fails, kills 20 Syrians - Complete Intel File PDF Print E-mail
Written by AP / UPI / NTI / Wisconsin Project / Agencies   
Saturday, 15 August 2009

Image

SEOUL, Aug. 14 (AP) - (Kyodo)—North Korea, Syria and Iran have test-fired new short-range ballistic Scud missiles they jointly developed but the test in Syria in May resulted in failure, diplomatic and military sources said Friday.

Test-firing of new Scud missiles by N. Korea, Syria, Iran fails+ 
Aug 14 05:44 AM US/Eastern
 
SEOUL, Aug. 14 (AP) - (Kyodo)—North Korea, Syria and Iran have test-fired new short-range ballistic Scud missiles they jointly developed but the test in Syria in May resulted in failure, diplomatic and military sources said Friday.

A Western diplomatic source familiar with relations between the three countries said two missiles were launched from southwestern Syria in the second half of May. One of them strayed off its projected course and part of the missile landed in a market in Manbij near the border with Turkey in northern Syria, leaving many people dead and injured, the source said.
 
Military authorities closed the area to recover the remains of the missile and told local residents there had been a gas explosion, imposing strict domestic censorship on the matter, the source said.

There is information suggesting more than 20 people were killed and over 60 injured, according to the source.

The other missile is believed to have flown in a northeastern direction and may have landed in a border area with Iraq, the diplomatic source said.

A Middle Eastern military source watching the Syrian situation said the test-launch ended in failure due to a problem with the missile's guidance system.

Another source, meanwhile, said that only one missile had been launched and that it flew in a northeastern direction, questioning whether there was another missile that landed in Manbij.

The test underscores the cooperation between North Korea, Syria and Iran in improving Scud missiles, originally developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The missile test almost coincided with North Korea's second underground nuclear test on May 25. In April, North Korea said it launched a rocket to put a satellite into orbit but many countries saw it as a cover for testing long-range ballistic missile technology.

In the joint development of the new-type Scud by the three countries, North Korea is believed to be engaged in engine development while Syria and Iran are involved in the development of warheads and guidance systems.

The Western diplomatic source said the two test-fired missiles were the Scud-D now under development with a range of about 700 kilometers and had warheads different from each other.

The test-firing was led by North Korea, with engineers from Ryonhap-2 Trading Co., which is believed to be engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction, the source said.

At the time of the test-firing, there were also several Iranian experts engaged in the development of Iran's own ballistic missile program as well as supervising figures from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

North Korea has said Syria and Iran should take responsibility for the failure, and investigations are now under way, led by Syria's Scientific Studies Research Center, the source said.

Iran is believed to be financially supporting the joint development on condition that the developed technology is provided to the country, the diplomatic source said.

The missile test -- led by North Korea in a location in Syria with financial support from Iran -- shows a pattern similar to that observed in the suspected nuclear reactor construction in Syria.

In 2007, Israel bombed a facility in Syria where a nuclear reactor was believed to be being constructed with the help of North Korea. In a Swiss newspaper article in March, a former senior Germany defense ministry official said the suspected nuclear reactor construction was financially backed by Iran.

The Middle Eastern military source said the test-fired missiles were a reformed version of the Scud-B with a range of about 300 kilometers.

North Korea test-fired new Scud missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4 but it is unknown whether they were the same as the two missiles test-fired in Syria.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9A2J4300&show_article=1

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A Russian missile program in Syria

 

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Report: Missile landed in Syrian market

Published: Aug. 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM

DAMASCUS, Syria, Aug. 15 (UPI) -- Part of a Scud missile jointly developed by North Korea, Syria and Iran landed in a Syrian market in May, killing more than 20 people, a source said.

The missile, one of two developed by the three countries, strayed off course and landed in the market in Manbig, near the border with Turkey in northern Syria, Kyodo News reported, quoting a Western diplomatic source.

Military officials, who blocked access to the area to recover what was left of the missile, told residents there had been a gas explosion, Kyodo said. More than 60 people were injured, the news service reported.

A Mideastern military source said a problem with the guidance systems caused both missiles to go astray.

The other missile may have landed in a border area between Syria and Iraq, the diplomatic source said.

The launches were from southwestern Syria.

Kyodo reported the three countries are cooperating in trying to improve Scud missiles, developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

© 2009 United Press International

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/08/15/Report-Missile-landed-in-Syrian-market/UPI-49681250310757/

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Unconfirmed report: 20 dead in Syria missile blast
Posted: 15-08-2009 , 11:26 GMT
 
A Western source told Japan's Kyodo News that part of a long range Scud missile jointly developed by North Korea, Syria and Iran landed in a Syrian market in May, killing some 20 people. The missile, one of two, strayed off course and landed in the market in Manbig, near the border with Turkey in northern Syria.

Syrian security officers, who blocked access to the area of the blast, told locals there had been a gas explosion, Kyodo said. More than 60 people were wounded, the news agency reported.

http://www.albawaba.com/en/countries/Syria/251950
 
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Scud missile test by NKorea, Syria, Iran fails August 14th, 2009    PTI

Seoul: North Korea, Syria and Iran test-fired two new short-range Scud missiles they jointly developed but the test was not only a failure but also left many people dead and injured, a Japanese media report claimed on Friday.

Quoting a Western diplomatic source familiar with ties between the three countries, Kyodo News said two missiles were launched from southwestern Syria in the second half of May.

One of the missiles strayed off its projected course and part of it landed in a market in Manbij near the border with Turkey in northern Syria, leaving many people dead and injured, the report quoted the source as saying.

Military authorities closed the area to recover the remains of the missile and told local residents there had been a gas explosion, imposing strict domestic censorship on the matter, the source said.

There is information suggesting more than 20 people were killed and over 60 injured, the report said.

The other missile is believed to have flown in a northeastern direction and may have landed in a border area with Iraq, the diplomatic source said.

A Middle Eastern military source watching the Syrian situation said the test-launch ended in failure due to a problem with the missile's guidance system.

The test underscores the cooperation between North Korea, Syria and Iran in improving Scud missiles, originally developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/latest-news/scud-missile-test-nkorea-syria-iran-fails-384

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Japan: Secret Syrian-Iranian-NKorean missile-test fails, kills 20 Syrians
DEBKAfile Special Report

August 15, 2009, 1:45 PM (GMT+02:00)

Japanese intelligence has learned that in late May, Iran, Syria and North Korea secretly test-launched in southern Syria a new short-range ballistic missile developed jointly by Pyongyang, Tehran and Damascus as a substitute for the outdated Scuds still in use in their armed forces, DEBKAfile's military sources report. In May, several new missiles were flown from North Korea and Iran to the Damascus military airfield and thence to Syria's southeastern missile-testing site at Jebel Druze near the small town of Salakhand.

After two weeks' preparation, two of the new projectiles had their first trial-launch - and failed with disastrous results.

DEBKAfile's sources report that they targeted an uninhabited desert area in the North, 500 kilometers away, just south of Ayn Diwar and east of Al Qamishli not far from the Syrian-Turkish-Iraqi border intersection.

(It was here that Syria and Iraq, with Russian help, interred Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction in 2001.)

However, one of the missiles strayed 350-400 km west of its projected course, indicating a problem with its guidance system. It exploded in the center of the small town of Manbij north of Aleppo near the Turkish border, killing at least 20 people, injuring 60 and badly damaging the market town.

The second missile exploded in mid-course in the South, over the north of the town of Abu Kamal and 200 kilometers from its launching site. Syrian military authorities closed the area around the stricken town of Manbij for more than a month, attributing the disaster to a gas explosion.

Japanese intelligence sources, who are anxiously tracking the growing missile collaboration between North Korea, Iran and Syria, do not name the failed new missile, but DEBKAfile's military sources suggest it was a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) propelled by solid fuel with a range of 800-1,000 kilometers and fitted with a warhead containing between 800 kilos and one ton of explosives. This would be an improvement on most of the three nations' short-range missiles which are powered with liquid fuel.

http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=6222

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North Korea Providing Missile Technology to Iran and Syria
By Bona Kim, Intern [2009-03-05 17:11 ]    
 
According to a new report, North Korea has managed to export more than 1,000 Scud missiles to Middle Eastern countries in spite of international nonproliferation efforts, and is a key player in a system of mutual military cooperation among developing nations.

The 2009 report by the Independent Working Group on Post-ABM Trea¬ty Missile Defense and the Space Relationship (IWG), titled “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century,” which was released in January of this year, reviews the threats posed by North Korea and other nations, and the reality of nuclear proliferation today.

According to the IWG report, North Korea has been deemed to be on the “second-tier proliferator” level, which refers to states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities that trade among themselves in order to bolster their communal nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.

The relationships between such developing countries may pose substantive threats. The 2009 report states that North Korea is believed to have greatly aided in the construction of the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria, a development that Israel felt was sufficiently threatening that an airstrike was used to destroy it in 2007, is estimated to have exported an estimated 1,000 “Scud” missiles to the Middle East region, and is believed to be currently offering technologies associated with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) to states including Syria and Iran. North Korea is also alleged to have sold missiles to Pakistan in exchange for nuclear technology. The report states firmly, “In addition to missiles, North Korea is now able to export fissile materials, or even assembled nuclear devices, posing an additional and unacceptable threat to the United States.”

States such as North Korea and Iran are working hard to acquire, or in some cases already possess, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the means to de¬liver them, the reported notes. North Korea already possesses several nuclear weapons and has made major advances in the develop¬ment of its ballistic missile capabilities. The Kim regime is reportedly moving towards deployment of new land- and sea-based ballistic missiles able to car¬ry nuclear warheads, whilst acting as a key proliferator of WMD/ballistic missile know-how as well as technologies and components.

It is said that North Korea’s missile exports, which net around $1.5 billion a year, constitute one of its largest single sources of revenue. Pyongyang has received extensive assistance from China in developing its missile program, including the “Taepo-Dong 2,” and from Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who has provided technical assistance and components for manufacturing high-speed centrifuges, according to the report. The report also states that North Korea is known not only to have purchased high-speed centrifuges from the Kahn network, but is believed to have also purchased nuclear weapons blueprints in 2008 which would enable swift advances in Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warhead programs. This could give the North the ability to build a miniature nuclear warhead with which it could arm a type of missile capable of reaching the continental United States.

Former Under Secretary of State John Bolton is quoted in the report as saying, “It is clear that Iran and North Korea are inter¬ested in ballistic missiles not as an interest but as part of an offensive capability… It is unlikely that either will willingly give up their nuclear programs. It is in both of their interests to hold on to their capabilities as long as possible. For North Korea, the program helps ensure that Kim Jong Il’s corrupt regime stays in power… Just as both nations will continue working on their nuclear and ballistic missile pro¬grams, the U.S. must diligently work on its own efforts to de¬fend against them, including the development of a robust Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability.”

As a response to other state’s offensive nuclear and conventional programs, the IWG report recommends that U.S. BMD programs be bolstered by funding directed at sea- and space-based defensive capacity, that a space-based missile defense test be carried out within three years and that the rapid development and deployment of all aspects of missile defense be made an “urgent national priority.” 

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=4665

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Missile Collaboration Between North Korea and Iran Goes Back Years
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
By Patrick Goodenough, International Editor

Ahead of North Korea’s planned missile launch, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis destroyer USS John S. McCain leaves a naval port in Busan, South Korea on Monday, March 30, 2009, ahead of North Korea’s planned missile launch. (AP Photo) (CNSNews.com) – Iran has denied reports that Iranian missile experts are cooperating with North Korea as it prepares for its anticipated long-range missile flight, but the two regimes are known to have a long record of collaborating in the missile field.

Pyongyang’s announcement that it intends to send a communications satellite into orbit during a five-day window beginning on Saturday has ratcheted up tensions in the region. Japan, whose main island of Honshu lies under the projected flight path, is deploying missile defense systems and two U.S. warships with missile-interception capabilities are also in the area.

North Korea told international aviation and maritime authorities that its Kwangmyongsong-2 (“bright star”) satellite will be carried into space by a launcher it calls Unha-2, which U.S. experts say is believed to be derived from the long-range Taepodong-2 missile. The Taepodong-2 has never been successfully flight tested, but in theory is capable of reaching Alaska.

(North Korea claims to have sent Kwangmyongsong-1 into orbit in 1998, although no evidence was ever found. Instead, the U.S. and others believe that launch to have been a test of an intermediate-range Taepodong-1 ballistic missile which overflew Japan before ditching in the Pacific Ocean.)

The U.S. and Japan say that launching a rocket – whether as a satellite launch attempt or a ballistic missile flight test – will violate U.N. Security Council resolutions.

“I don’t know anyone at a senior level in the American government who does not believe this technology is intended as a mask for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates told Fox News in an interview on Sunday.

As the Japanese parliament on Tuesday unanimously passed a resolution urging North Korea not to go ahead with the launch, Prime Minister Taro Aso said that if it did, Japan would take the issue to the Security Council.

Earlier, North Korea warned through its official media that if its “satellite” launch is raised by the Security Council, then the six-party talks over its nuclear weapons program would “rupture” completely. It also threatened to take unspecified “stronger measures.”

The last time North Korea fired missiles, in mid-2006, the Security Council passed a condemnatory resolution. Three months later Pyongyang tested a nuclear device.

The planned launch comes just two months after Iran launched a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket, the Safir-2, successfully putting a small satellite into orbit. In doing so it not only joined the exclusive club of nations boasting that ability but also, according to experts, demonstrated significant progress towards an intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

North Korean officials reportedly witnessed the Iranian launch, and a Japanese newspaper reported this week that a 15-strong Iranian team is now in North Korea, where they are expected to observe the early April launch.

The Sankei Shimbun said the Iranians, including senior officials from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, had been in North Korea since the beginning of March.

The Tehran-based entity, which is responsible for Iran’s ballistic missile program,  has been listed by the U.S., British and Japanese governments for proliferation activities, and since as early as April 2000 has been subjected to U.S. sanctions for cooperating with North Korea in violation of missile export controls.

The Iranian Embassy in Tokyo issued a statement calling the Japanese report “politically-motivated” and denying any missile or military cooperation between Iran and North Korea.

But as long ago as the early 1990s, missile collaboration was underway. When North Korea in May 1993 tested its medium-range Nodong missile, Iranian experts attended, according to media reports at the time. Iran subsequently developed the Shahab-3, testing it in 1998 and 1991 with North Koreans this time reportedly observing.

Although then Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani insisted the Shahab-3 was “entirely” Iranian-made, scientists said the missile, whose range of at least 620 miles threatens Israel as well as U.S. forces in the Gulf, was based on the Nodong (as was Iran’s earlier Shahab-2 essentially the same as an earlier North Korean Scud missile, the Hwasong-6).

Unclassified CIA reports to Congress on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technology have over a number of years noted a longstanding Iran-North Korea relationship in developing ballistic missile technology.

The reports identified North Korea as a key provider of missile technology, naming Iran as well as Syria, Pakistan and Libya, among its customers.

In Pakistan’s case, South Asian security analysts believe North Korea provided missile technology in return for nuclear know-how supplied by the black-market network run by A.Q. Khan. The exposure of the Khan proliferation activities in 2004 and Libya’s decision the previous year to shut down its WMD and missile programs deprived North Korea of customers – and major sources of hard currency.

By 2006, the CIA was reporting that Iran and Syria remained the countries of principal concern with regard to sales of North Korean missile technology.

In July of that year, after North Korea fired a Taepodong-2 – which aborted 40 seconds after launch – as well as several Nodongs and short-range Hwasongs, administration officials told U.S. lawmakers that Iranians had witnessed the launches.

Because North Korea has successfully tested a nuclear device – and because Iran is suspected to have similar ambitions – the two regimes’ development of missiles capable of carrying payloads long distances is a significant security concern.

The chairman of South Korea‘s Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Kim Tae-young, said last October that North Korea may be working on developing a nuclear warhead light enough to be carried on a missile.

Defense Intelligence Agency director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee in a prepared statement this month that “North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.”

Gates told Fox News that while the U.S. believes that to be North Korea’s long-term intent, “I personally would be skeptical that they have the ability right now to do that.”

http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=45885

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updated 10:35 p.m. EST, Tue February 24, 2009

Syria set up missile facility at suspect nuclear site

Story Highlights
The disclosure was the first time Syria has described the facility it has at Dair Alzour

Syria's Ibrahim Othman did not say when the facility was built or if it is operational

Syria has faced questions over whether a nuclear facility exists at the site

The site was bombed by Israeli aircraft in September 2007


(CNN) -- Syria's nuclear chief told members of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency Tuesday that his country has built a military missile facility at a site where traces of uranium have been detected in the past, a source who attended the meeting told CNN.

The disclosure by Ibrahim Othman to members of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency was the first time Syria has described the type of military facility it has at the Dair Alzour site, the source said.

Othman did not give details about when the facility was built or whether it was operational. He revealed the nature of the facility when asked if Syria had a nuclear facility at the site, the source said.

Syria has been repeatedly questioned over whether a nuclear facility exists at the site, which was bombed by Israeli aircraft in September 2007.

Syria says the missiles that destroyed the building at the site were the source of the uranium particles, according to an IAEA report issued last week. Israel has rejected Syria's claims.

The agency said the uranium particles "are of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material" and that "there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles."

But, "the presence of the uranium particles," site imagery and procurement information "need to be fully understood."

Syria needs to provide more information and documentation about "the use and nature" of a building that was bombed and its procurement activities, the report said. And, Syria "needs to be transparent by providing access to other locations alleged to be related" to the site.

In the report, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei also urged Israel and other states to make any relevant information available to the agency and agree to the IAEA sharing the information with Syria.

In November, the agency asked Israel to provide information in response to Syria's claims that its munitions could have been the source of the uranium particles.

Israel said in a December 24 letter "it rejects Syrian claims on the matter" and that "Israel could not have been the source of the uranium particles found on the site of the nuclear reactor."

Syrian authorities have reacted angrily to accusations they were building a nuclear reactor. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moualem suggested that any trace of uranium unearthed at the military site in eastern Syria came from Israeli bombs.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/02/24/syria.nuclear/

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Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act Sanctions (INKSNA)

The United States imposes sanctions under various legal authorities against foreign individuals, private entities, and governments that engage in proliferation activities.

The Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation leads an interagency determination of sanctions pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), which provides for penalties on entities and individuals for the transfer to or acquisition from Iran since January 1, 1999, the transfer to or the acquisition from Syria since January 1, 2005, or the transfer to or acquisition from North Korea since January 1, 2006, of equipment and technology controlled under multilateral control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement). INKSNA also provides for sanctions for the transfer of equipment or technology having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. This category includes:

(a) Items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists but falling below the control list parameters, when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems,

(b) other items with potential of making such a material contribution, when added through case-by-case decisions, and

(c) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists.

Announcements of such sanctions determinations are printed in the Federal Register and can be accessed through the Government Printing Office web page. Copies of relevant statutes can also be accessed via the same site as well as via the Library of Congress's Congressional Service. The Federal Register notices are the official notifications for all nonproliferation sanctions determinations. Links to those notices found on this page are updated as appropriate, but the Federal Register is the only official and complete listing of nonproliferation sanctions determinations.

http://www.state.gov/t/vci/inksna/index.htm

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DATE=1/12/05

TYPE=CORRESPONDENT REPORT
TITLE= US / SYRIA / MISSILES (L-ONLY)
In-Depth Coverage NUMBER=2-321711
BYLINE=DAVID GOLLUST
DATELINE=STATE DEPARTMENT

HEADLINE: US Opposes Russian Missile Sale to Syria

INTRO: The United States Wednesday registered its opposition to a reported pending sale of advanced Russian surface-to-surface missiles to Syria. Such action could lead to U.S. sanctions against Russian exporters. VOA's David Gollust reports from the State Department.

TEXT: Syria has long had a large arsenal of Soviet-era Scud ground-to-ground missiles. But news reports from Russia say Moscow is ready to sell the Damascus government a vastly updated version of the Scud -- the Iskander or S-S-26 missile -- that would be capable of pinpoint strikes against targets within a 300 kilometer range, which would include all Israeli territory.

There is no indication that such a deal has been consummated, and at a press briefing here, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher called reports about the prospective scale speculative. However, he made clear the United States opposes in principle all arms sales to Syria, because of that country's presence on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism:

/// BOUCHER ACT ///

"We're seen reports of the sale. The U.S. policy on this is very clear. We're against the sale of weaponry to Syria, the sale of lethal military equipment to Syria, which is state sponsor of terrorism. We think those kinds of sales are not appropriate. The Russians know about this policy. They know about our views."

/// END ACT ///

Mr. Boucher said Russian entities involved in such a sale would be subject to U.S. sanctions under a law aimed at curbing the flow of arms to countries on the terrorism list.

The comments came as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was completing a round of high level talks with a meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Spokesman Boucher said he did not know whether the issue of the reported Syrian missile deal came up in discussions with Mr. Ivanov, but said even if it didn't, Moscow is well-aware of the U.S. position on the issue.

News reports say senior Israeli officials have consulted with both the Russian and U.S. governments to express their concern about the prospective deal.

Moscow was a major arms supplier to Syria during the Cold War era, and its cash-strapped military industry is said to be keen to make the new sale to help keep development and production of the S-S-26 missiles going.

U.S. sanctions would basically forbid a Russian missile exporting firm from doing business with the U.S. government or acquiring advanced American technology. (Signed)

NEB/DAG/KBK/KL
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North Korean Missile Exports

The Risk Report
Volume 2 Number 6 (November-December 1996)

During the past decade, U.S. intelligence has watched North Korea conduct a booming missile trade with Iran, Egypt and Syria. Washington is now urging Pyongyang to put the brakes on its missile program, and to halt all missile-related exports to the Middle East.

One of Washington's biggest concerns is the transfer of production technology. "It's one thing to give a man a fish, it's another to teach him how to fish," a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. Another U.S. official who tracks the spread of missiles says that it is increasingly difficult to know exactly what technology is being transferred to whom. "North Korea's missile trade is like a localized cancer that starts to spread," he says, "first you see the missile sales, but then it spreads to services and production technology and becomes harder and harder to track."

Since the late 1980s, North Korea has sold hundreds of Scud-type missiles and Scud production technology to Iran, Syria and Egypt. Pyongyang is now actively marketing its latest missile, the Nodong-I, to these same countries. The breadth and depth of these sales can be difficult to track. "We see Scud and Nodong marketing all the time, but sometimes we don't know what version of the missiles is being offered," a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. Scud B-s can carry nuclear and chemical warheads 300 kilometers, Scud-Cs can fly 500 kilometers, and the Nodong-I can fly 1,000 kilometers.

U.S. officials especially want to stop North Korea from selling the Nodong-I. Testifying before Congress in 1993, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Director James Woolsey warned that with the Nodong, North Korea could reach Japan; Iran could reach Israel; and Libya could reach U.S. bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean region. In other words, Pyongyang's continued missile proliferation would threaten both American and allied security interests.

But getting North Korea to kick its missile habit will not be easy. Its exports to Iran, Egypt and Syria now bring in foreign exchange and bartered goods that Pyongyang desperately needs to support a steadily shrinking economy. "We are at the beginning stages of our missile dialogue," explains a U.S. official, "and naturally they want compensation for anything they don't do."

Egypt

Egypt owes almost all of its progress in missiles to North Korea. After more than 15 years of help from Pyongyang, Cairo can now produce its own version of the Soviet Scud-B. Cairo is also developing a more advanced Scud-C version that could threaten all of Israel and target cities in Libya, Syria and Sudan.

Earlier this year, U.S. intelligence detected several shipments of North Korean missile supplies to Egypt. According to a CIA report quoted in the Washington Times in June, Pyongyang has made at least seven shipments of ingredients for Scud-C missiles, including steel sheets and other materials and equipment. According to U.S. officials, Egypt is rapidly approaching success on the Scud-C. "It's safe to assume that Egypt has successfully enhanced the range..." a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. The transfers took place in March and April and the CIA was quoted as saying that the imports "could allow Egypt to begin Scud-C series production."

Iran

Iran has been the main customer and financier of North Korea's missile effort. During the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-1980s, Tehran quickly depleted its small supply of Soviet-made Scuds purchased from Libya. In search of a new supplier, Iran found North Korea. Tehran agreed to help finance Pyongyang s missile effort in exchange for Scud technology and an option to buy North Korean Scuds as soon as they dropped off the production line.

Iran got its first Scud-Bs in late 1987 and by February 1988, approximately 100 missiles had been delivered. Press reports in 1991 claimed that Iran had then ordered an additional 200 Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs. U.S. intelligence started to discover shipments of Scud-Cs from Pyongyang to Iran in early 1991, and in May 1991, Iran flight-tested what U.S. intelligence identified as a North Korean version of the Scud-C that flew 500 kilometers. In 1995, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released comments by the CIA to the effect that Iran had received at least four Scud TELs from North Korea. General Binford Peay, chief of the U.S. Central Command, said in April 1996 that Iran has also tried to buy a number of Nodong missiles from North Korea.

In addition to finished missiles, U.S. officials believe that Iran has also received a Scud factory and test facility as part of the deal. "Iran wants their own stuff now, to avoid dependence on outsiders for weapon supplies," a State Department official tells the Risk Report. North Koreans reportedly helped build a large missile test facility at Emamshahr and a tracking facility at Tabas.

In addition to the imports, Iranian scientists and technicians have also enjoyed direct access to missile plants in North Korea. The director of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) visited North Korea in March 1993 just prior to the first Nodong missile test in May. The former commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, General Robert W. RisCassi, believes that the Nodong test may have been more a demonstration for foreign observers than a full evaluation of the missile's technical performance. In February 1994, the North Korean air force commander led a delegation, which included military and nuclear experts, to Iran.

Syria

North Korea's missile exports to Syria also worry U.S. officials, though most of the missile-related technology for Damascus is now being routed through Iran, a U.S. official tells the Risk Report.

In the late 1980s, Syria was looking for a partner to supply new surface-to-surface missiles and to help upgrade the Syrian arsenal. Syria first approached the Soviet Union, but was turned down. Damascus then turned to Pyongyang. Syria has since contracted to buy more than 150 North Korean Scud-Cs. In 1991, North Korea delivered an estimated 24 Scud-Cs and 20 mobile launchers, and in March 1992 shipped some unknown quantity of additional Scuds to Syria through Iran. Syria flight-tested Scud-C missiles in July 1992, in mid-1994, and in the summer of 1996. Israeli and Western officials also report that Syria is now building its own Scud-C missile factory with North Korean help.

Libya

Libya too is interested in North Korea as a missile supplier. Libya would like to acquire both Scud-Cs and the Nodong-I. According to press reports, Tripoli has already negotiated to buy the Nodong and is bargaining to buy the technology to produce it in Libya. In return for the imports, Libya would help finance North Korea's missile effort. U.S. officials say there is "active cooperation" between North Korea and Libya that bears watching closely, but they believe that Libya is still a long way from success. "Libya is lame when it comes to missiles--anything they get ends up rusting in the desert," says one U.S. official.

Potential for U.S. sanctions

Under the 1990 U.S. Missile Control Act, the President can impose sanctions when he determines that an organization has sold missiles or missile-related equipment or technology to a buyer that does not adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime, an effort by more than 30 countries to curb missile-related exports. U.S. sanctions can apply to a foreign exporter or importer acting wholly outside the United States.

If a company knowingly contributes to missile development in a non-MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) country, the United States may ban the company's sales to the United States for at least two years if the contribution was substantial; ban the company from buying items on the U.S. Munitions List, which includes conventional arms and most missile-related components, for two years or more; or ban U.S. missile-related exports to the company for two years if the company sold less sensitive items. By definition, U.S. penalties apply to all subunits of a penalized entity.

U.S. agencies are now debating whether there is enough evidence of missile trade between Egypt and North Korea to impose penalties under U.S. law. So far, Washington has been loath to punish a friendly country such as Egypt. "Like China, Egypt is a very tough call because of its close relationship with the United States," a U.S. official tells the Risk Report. "We probably won't see anything move on this for a year," another official says, "first we have the November elections, then new political appointments, and then we may get around to discussing events that happened last year."

Though Washington has never penalized Egypt, the State Department has sanctioned North Korea, Syria and Iran for engaging in "missile proliferation activities." In 1992, the United States imposed two-year sanctions against North Korea's Lyongaksan Machineries and against the Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Credit Corporation. Sanctions were also imposed against Syria's Scientific Research Center (CERS) and Syria's Ministry of Defense, as well as Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. In May 1996, Washington imposed two-year sanctions against North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau) and against Iran's State Purchasing Office and Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics.

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Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
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Syria Missile Development - 1997

The Risk Report
Volume 3 Number 2 (March-April 1997)

Today, Syria has one of the largest arsenals of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East, including hundreds of Scud missiles that can carry nuclear or chemical payloads to targets throughout Israel. Last year, Israel's leading newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, reported that an Israel Defense Forces document predicts that by the end of the millennium Syria will have nearly 80 surface-to-surface missile launchers and roughly 1,000 missiles, including Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, SS-21s and FROG-7s.

Though the Israeli estimate may inflate Syria's missile prowess, Israel does have reason to worry. U.S. officials believe that Syria has an advanced chemical and biological weapon program. In any future conflict, Israel must plan for Syrian missiles to be tipped with poison gas. "The Syrians see their missiles and chemical weapons as a strategic counterweight to what they perceive as Israel's nuclear weapon capability." There is also the possibility that Syrian missiles could strike Israel's nuclear reactor near Dimona.

Damascus is determined to acquire or build its own missiles that can reach all of Israel and also threaten the capitals of Turkey and Iraq. "The Syrians want the capability to produce ballistic missiles locally," a U.S. official tells the Risk Report, "but so far their ambition has exceeded their grasp." With its weak industrial base and stagnant economy, Syria must rely on imports from North Korea to build liquid-fuel Scud missiles, and imports from China to develop larger, more accurate solid-fuel missiles that could fly 600 kilometers. Another official who analyzes missile proliferation concurs: "Syria has a fairly rudimentary infrastructure. It's not as good as Egypt or Iran, but they are certainly ahead of Libya." U.S. analysts say that there is a shortage of qualified engineers and missile technicians in the Syrian military.

Throughout the 1970s and '80s, Syria relied heavily on the Soviet Union for missile supplies and training. But since the end of the Cold War, Damascus has turned to North Korea and China to buy missiles and the factories to produce them in Syria. U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that Damascus is now ready to mass-produce Scud-Bs that fly 300 kilometers.

Soviet FROG-7

When Syria's President Hafez al-Assad assumed power in November 1970, he immediately began to strengthen military relations with the Soviet Union. One of the immediate results was the purchase of Syria's first surface-to-surface missile, the FROG-7 (Free Rocket Over Ground). Within a year, Syrian technicians were invited to the Soviet Union to train on the FROG system. The FROG is an unguided, solid fuel missile with a maximum range of about 70 kilometers. It can be fired from mobile launchers and can be equipped with either a high explosive or a tactical nuclear warhead weighing 450 kilograms.

According to a 1985 study by Joseph Bermudez for the U.S. Marine Corps, the Soviet Union first shipped a half dozen transporter erector launchers (TELs) and a half dozen reload vehicles in 1972. By early 1973, an additional six TELs and six reload vehicles were sent. And by the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Syrians had assumed complete operational control of the missiles.

Bermudez reported that during the 1973 war, Syria launched FROG missiles at the Ramat David air base in Northern Israel, Megiddo Airfield, Izhak ben Yaakov Airfield, and Northern Command Headquarters (in the mountains near Zefat). The missiles carried high explosive warheads, operated at maximum range, and missed virtually all their targets. Only one or two FROGs hit the Ramat David air base. The others hit civilian settlements around the air base, including Nahalal, Gevat, Yif'at, Migdal Ha'Emeq and Kefar Barukh. Syria first deployed the missiles just 3,000 meters from the Israeli border, but withdrew them to hardened positions in the mountains around Damascus after Israel's counter attack on October 11-12. In all, Syria fired about 25 FROG-7s, of which only two or three caused any significant military damage (two are believed to have been duds, and two or three others flew off course and landed in Jordan).

Soviet Scud-B

The FROG's poor performance led Syria to start looking for better missiles. Within a year, Moscow had agreed to replace the FROGs Syria had used in combat, and also agreed to provide Scud missiles. In 1974, a group of Syrian officers went to the Soviet Union for Scud training, and by the beginning of 1976, the Soviets had shipped a dozen Scud launchers and their support equipment.

The Soviet Scud-B is a single-stage missile that is liquid-fueled, inertially guided, and can carry a 770-860-kilogram payload up to 300 kilometers. The Soviets intended it to deliver nuclear warheads, which explains its low accuracy (CEP--circular error probable, a measure of missile accuracy--is 930 meters when fired to its full range).

It is uncertain how many Scud-Bs the Syrians now have. Syria has passed on some of the Scud-B missiles it got from the Soviet Union to Iran. The number of operational TELS in Syria is also uncertain. Intelligence analysts say it is difficult to distinguish TELs (both with and without missiles) from reload vehicles (both with and without missiles) and replacement missiles. The Middle East Military Balance, an annual survey of military capabilities published by Israel's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, estimates that as of 1994 Syria had 18 FROG-7 launchers, 18 Scud-B launchers and 7 or 8 Scud-C launchers. The TELs, along with their missiles, are reportedly stored in caverns in the mountains outside Damascus. It can take 24 hours to prepare a Scud for launch, and up to 60 minutes reaction time after it arrives at its presurveyed launch site.

Soviet SS-21

When Syria was defeated during the June 1982 fighting with Israel in Lebanon, Damascus blamed Soviet weaponry. Within a year, the Soviets had agreed to supply Syria with the SS-21, the first delivery of this missile outside Warsaw Pact countries. The missiles were shipped in October 1983. The mobile, single-stage, solid-fuel SS-21 "Scarab" can deliver nuclear, chemical or conventional payloads up to 120 kilometers. It is relatively accurate, with a CEP of approximately 300 meters, making it more accurate than the FROG-7. The SS-21's flight time is between 3-7 minutes and its launcher can be reloaded in 15 minutes.

In 1988, Syria asked the Soviet Union for its more capable and longer-range, solid-fuel SS-23 "Spider" missile, which the Soviets had designed to replace the 1960s-vintage Scud. The SS-23 was designed to fly 500 kilometers, is more accurate than the Scud, and has a shorter refire time. Under the INF Treaty signed by Moscow in December 1988, however, the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate its SS-23 missile and not to transfer it to other countries.

North Korean Scuds

After Damascus was turned down on the SS-23, it went looking elsewhere for supplies and found a willing partner in North Korea. Press reports, citing Israeli intelligence, say the Syrians began discussing a missile deal with North Korea in late 1989, but that the financial package could not be worked out until an influx of hard currency made it possible. Operation Desert Storm provided the needed windfall. In exchange for its participation in the coalition against Iraq, Damascus received about $1 billion in aid from Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich gulf states.

Since 1991, Syria has reportedly contracted to buy more than 150 Scud-Cs from North Korea. The Scud-C is a liquid-fuel missile that was first tested by North Korea in 1991 and can fly approximately 500 kilometers. In 1991, North Korea delivered two dozen Scud missiles and 20 mobile launchers to Syria, and in March 1992 shipped some unknown quantity of Scuds, including Scud-Cs and missile components, to Syria through Iran. In August 1992, Israeli intelligence reported that Syria had tested two missiles believed to be North Korean-made Scud-Cs.

By April 1993, a report in Jane's Intelligence Review estimated that Syria "currently possesses about 250 Scud-B and C missiles (including up to 60 Scud-Cs and about 24 -36 transporter erector launchers)." And in August 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accused North Korea of shipping more Scuds to Syria that summer. Rabin said that Russian planes had delivered the missiles. In December 1993, Clinton Administration officials confirmed that a private Russian airline company had transported special truck chassis that are frequently used as mobile missile launchers from North Korea to Syria. The U.S. had asked Moscow not to allow the planes to fly, but was rebuffed.

In mid-1994 and again in the summer of 1996, Syria flight-tested missiles believed to be North Korean-made Scud-Cs. Although U.S. intelligence will not reveal the exact number of Scuds Syria now has in its arsenal, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Toby T. Gati confirmed in his February 1997 testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Syria had acquired "500-kilometer Scud-Cs from North Korea."

Israeli and Western officials also report that Syria is now building its own Scud-C missile factory with North Korean help. One senior U.S. official tells the Risk Report that he is "confident that there has been no Scud-C production yet, and it is not as clear whether they have completed any Scud-Bs through they probably will soon."

U.S. sanctions

The United States has penalized both Syria and North Korea for their missile trade. Under U.S. law, the President can impose sanctions when he determines that an organization has sold missiles or missile-related equipment or technology to a buyer that does not adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an effort by more than 30 countries to curb missile-related exports. U.S. sanctions can apply to a foreign exporter or importer acting wholly outside the United States. By definition, U.S. penalties apply to all subunits of a penalized entity.

In July 1992, the U.S. State Department imposed two-year sanctions against Syria's Scientific Research Center (CERS) and Syria's Ministry of Defense for engaging in "missile proliferation activities." Sanctions were also imposed against North Korea's Lyongaksan Machineries and the Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Credit Corporation and Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics.

Chinese M-9

Over the years, Syria has been looking for a missile that can fly far enough to target military sites and cities throughout Israel but would not have to be launched close to the Israel-Syria border, where it would be vulnerable to preemptive air strikes.

In 1988, Damascus thought it had found the perfect candidate--China's M-9 (Dong Feng-15) missile that can fly 600 kilometers. The M-9 is China's first indigenously built, single-stage, solid-fuel, land-based missile. It was first tested in 1989, and can fly farther and is more accurate than North Korea's Scud-C. Because it uses solid fuel, it also can be launched faster.

In July 1988, the Los Angeles Times first reported that China had agreed to sell its M-9 missile to Syria. Citing a U.S. official, the report said that China would supply an unspecified number of the missiles to Syria by 1990. To date, however, there have been no reports of deliveries.

U.S. officials tell the Risk Report that Beijing has agreed not to export its M-series missiles. One official responsible for tracking missile sales says: "There is a firm belief that there is no longer any contract for the M-9." But it is unclear whether Beijing thinks it has made a promise. In June 1991, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman categorically denied that China had supplied any missiles to Syria, but refused to answer questions about the possibility of future sales. The following month, Chinese premier Li Peng, speaking at a press conference, stated that "I can definitely say that China had not sold any [ballistic] missiles to Syria."

Because of U.S. pressure, Beijing may not be shipping finished M-9 missiles to Syria, but Chinese companies continue to ship missile-related components and production technology. In January 1992, U.S. officials said China had delivered ingredients for making solid fuel missiles. The New York Times reported that Beijing had shipped 30 tons of chemicals (ammonium perchlorate) used to make solid-fuel missile propellant and had plans to ship an additional 60 tons. Subsequent press reports indicated that two missile plants were under construction in Syria: one in Hama and a second in Aleppo. One of the reports said the plants were designed to produce missile propellant--one for liquid fuel and one for solid fuel. Scud missiles are liquidfueled; the Chinese M-9 is solid-fueled.

Syria is also cooperating with Iran on solid fuel technology, according to U.S. intelligence. In November 1996, the Washington Times reported that according to a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report entitled "Arms Transfers to State Sponsors of Terrorism," Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) sold Syria equipment to develop solid propellant rocket motors. Iran and Syria were also said to be cooperating on a program to convert Syrian Scud-Bs to longer range Scud-Cs.

A U.S. official is skeptical about Syria building its own solid fuel missiles. "They can only do a knock-off program, copying others' missiles. I can see them building Scuds as long as they can import key components such as guidance packages," he tells the Risk Report. The official points out that Syria has no systems integration capability to handle missile modifications and that it will be easiest for Syria just to assemble or copy North Korean or Chinese missiles exactly as they are.

http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html

Copyright © 2003 - 2009
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
1701 K Street, NW, Suite 805 Washington, DC 20006
tel: 202-223-8299 fax: 202-223-8298

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Syria Missile Milestones - 1972-2005

The Risk Report
Volume 11 Number 5 (September-October 2005)

1972: Syria obtains FROG-7 missiles, launchers and reload vehicles from the Soviet Union.

1973: Syria launches FROG-7 missiles at Israeli airbases during the October war, with little success.

1976: The Soviet Union supplies Syria with a dozen Scud-B launchers.

1983: The Soviet Union supplies Syria with the 120-kilometer range, single-stage SS-21 Scarab missile.

1988: Syria attempts to import the Soviet-made SS-23 missile, which the Soviets designed to replace the aging Scud-B, but the Soviets deny the request.

1991: China reportedly agrees to sell Syria medium-range M-9 missiles, while North Korea reportedly ships two dozen Scud missiles and 20 mobile launchers to Syria.

1991: Syria's chief of staff reportedly visits Teheran to conclude negotiations between the two countries on building a factory in Syria for joint development and production of surface-to-surface missiles.

1992: China reportedly ships 30 tons of ammonium perchlorate, used to make solid-fuel rocket propellant, to Syria.

1992: A second shipment of North Korean Scud-C missiles and missile components are delivered to Syria via Iran.

1992: Israeli intelligence reports that Syria tested two North Korean Scud-C missiles.

1992: U.S. State Department sanctions two North Korean and two Syrian entities, including the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS) for engaging in "missile technology proliferation activities."

1993: U.S. officials confirm that a private Russian airline company transported special truck chassis that are frequently used as mobile missile launchers from North Korea to Syria. The U.S. asks Moscow to stop the shipments but is rebuffed.

1994: Syria flight tests North Korean Scud-Cs.

1996: According to a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) report, Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) sold Syria equipment to develop solid propellant rocket motors, probably for its solid-fuel missile program. Iran and Syria were also said to be cooperating on a program to convert Syrian Scud-Bs to longer range Scud-Cs; Syria reportedly tests a 600-km range upgraded version of the Scud-C.

January 1997: It is reported that U.S. Navy Aegis-equipped cruisers have monitored Scud missile test launches into the eastern Syrian desert.

April 1997: Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai reportedly claims that Syria is producing VX nerve agent with Russian assistance and is in the initial stages of preparing missile warheads for delivery.

September 1997: U.S. officials believe Syria will begin producing chemical bomblets for Scud-C ballistic missiles "within months." It is also believed that the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) is close to completing an underground facility, modified with Russian assistance, to build Scud missiles.

April 1999: The United States imposes sanctions on three Russian companies - Tula Design Bureau, Volsk Mechanical Plant, and Tsniitochmash - for supplying anti-tank weapons to Syria. The Russian government was also determined to have been involved, but was not sanctioned.

October 1999: The Syrian military reportedly conducts a live chemical weapon bombing test, possibly demonstrating that Syria can use chemical munitions on both aircraft bombs and ballistic missiles.

May 2000: According to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Syria has received Scud-D missiles from North Korea. The missile has a range of 400 miles, which would enable Syria to target Israel from deep inside Syrian territory.

June 2000: Ha'aretz reports that China is helping Syria and Iran build a factory to make missile engines, guidance systems and solid propellant.

September 2000: The Israeli media reports that Syria successfully test-fired a Scud-D missile.

December 2001: The U.S. National Intelligence Council reports that Syria has achieved Scud-type missile production using locally manufactured components and has developed chemical warheads to arm these missiles.

June 2002: Syria is preparing to begin serial production of an extended-range version of the Scud-C short-range ballistic missile, according to a media report citing U.S. and Israeli defense officials. The report cites Israeli defense officials as saying that Syria could produce as many as 30 new extended range missiles per year.

October 2002: Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, announces before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Russia has halted plans to sell Igla (SA-18) surface-to-air missile systems to Syria "at Israel's request." He says that Israel voiced concerns to Russia that the missiles might be obtained by Hezbollah militants.

July 2003: An Israeli defense official claims that Syria has at least 100 long-range ballistic missiles equipped with VX nerve gas aimed at Israel, according to Ha'aretz.

September 2003: U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, testifies that Syria has several hundred Scud-type and SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles and is "believed" to have chemical warheads. He states that Syria is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile programs and that North Korea and Iran have been "prominent" in supplying Syria's "recent" ballistic missile efforts. He also states that Syria can deliver the nerve agent sarin by ballistic missile.

January 2004: Syrian planes flying humanitarian aid to earthquake-stricken Iran returned to Damascus with missiles and other weapons destined for the Lebanese group Hezbollah, according to unidentified Israeli sources.

November 2004: The CIA releases its semi-annual report on arms proliferation, which states that Syria continues to depend on North Korean entities to help its liquid-propellant missile program and continues to manufacture liquid-propelled Scuds. The report also notes that Syria is developing longer-range missiles with assistance from North Korea and Iran.

January 2005: The Russian periodical Kommersant reports that Russia has plans to sell Syria the Iskander-E tactical missile system, which has a striking accuracy of "an order of magnitude less" than the 2 m accuracy of the Iskander-M. The solid-fuel 280 km-range, 480 kg-payload Iskander-E missile is equipped with autonomous inertial guidance and an optical seeker and can deliver cluster, blast fragmentation, and penetration warheads, according to its manufacturer KB Mashynostroyeniya.

January 2005: Syrian President Bashar Assad denies reports that Russia intends to sell Syria Iskander-E and SA-18 missiles.

January 2005: Following Syrian President Bashar Assad's visit to Moscow, Russia forgives 73% of Syria's debt, reducing the amount owed to $3.616 billion, and enters into a military cooperation agreement.

March 2005: It is reported that Russia has agreed to sell Syria Igla (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles in the vehicle-mounted Strelets configuration.

April 2005: Russian President Vladimir Putin is quoted in a translation of the Russian periodical Itar-Tass as saying that "Our military intended to supply Syria with the Iskander missiles with the range of over 900 km. I banned deliveries of these missiles." He also emphasizes that Russian short-range missiles sold to Syria "will not fall into terrorist hands."

May 2005: Israeli officials reveal that Syria has test-fired three Scud-type missiles, one of which broke up over Turkey. Israelis suggest that the missile tests were part of a program using North Korean technology and designed to deliver air-burst chemical weapons.

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Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
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tel: 202-223-8299 fax: 202-223-8298

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Missile Overview

 

Over the past 30 years, Syria has aggressively sought to acquire advanced ballistic missile systems through imports and domestic production. Syria began importing ballistic missiles in the mid-1970s and has been focused on creating an indigenous ballistic missile production capability since at least the late 1980s. Currently, it is believed that Syria possesses one of the Middle East's largest collections of surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems, which are able to deliver conventional and unconventional warheads to a number of Syria's regional neighbors. Syria is also believed to maintain a capacity to produce liquid-fuel missiles at present, as well as a program geared toward developing a solid-fuel missile production capability.

Syria's earliest known efforts to acquire a ballistic missile capability began after the country's 1973 war against neighboring Israel wherein Syria's inaccurate long-range artillery rocket systems were shown to perform poorly in combat. Syria subsequently focused on achieving better strategic parity with Israel and increasing the overall sophistication of its military hardware, including through the purchase of advanced surface-to-surface guided missiles. Syria was especially motivated by its desire to gain the ability to strike targets throughout Israel from fortified missile sites set deep within Syrian territory.

Overall, Syria's missile program goals were realized as a result of cooperation with various foreign governments that were willing to provide missile transfers, training, operational support and production assistance. In addition, regional alliances have allowed Syria to obtain the financial resources necessary to invest heavily in military upgrades and more advanced missile systems. As a result, Syria is now able to produce liquid-fueled Scud missiles in its own facilities. Moreover, Syria with the aid of foreign governments continues work towards developing the indigenous capability to produce a solid-propellant rocket motor. From a nonproliferation standpoint, Syria's missile capabilities are troubling given the chemical and possibly biological weapons programs that many analysts allege that Syria currently maintains.

History

Syria's import of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets, as well as its ensuing missile production efforts, may be divided into three broad chronological categories: the Early Years (1960s-1970s) when Syria gained its first systems as a client-state of the Soviet Union, the Next Wave of Expansion (1979-1987) in which Syrian military expansion was again aided by the Soviet Union, and the era of New Relationships wherein Syria collaborated with countries such as China, North Korea, Iran and Russia beginning in 1988, and extending to contemporary times. This latter phase may itself be subdivided into import and production phases. Overall, the development of these capabilities has proceeded in a progressive fashion, whereby Syria has sought to augment its delivery system programs consistently over time. The array of successes and difficulties related to the development of Syria's ballistic missile and long-range artillery rocket programs have been influenced over the years by a number of important factors. These include, but are not limited to:

Syria's relationships with foreign countries, notably those with weapon systems to export or other military aid to impart.
The effectiveness of international pressure in influencing Syria's relations with foreign partners.
Syria's ability to obtain the financial resources necessary to fund its weapon acquisition programs.
Syria's strong desire to balance against regional adversaries, especially neighboring Israel which has long maintained demonstrative military superiority over Syria.
The Early Years: Syria and the Soviet Union (mid-1960s and 1970s)

A weak economy as well as a lack of a strong industrial or technical base led Syria to forge a client-state relationship with the Soviet Union during the mid-1960s, which in turn provided Syria access to a wealth of Soviet weaponry and technical expertise. Following his country's crushing military defeat to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day war (in which Israel occupied the Golan Heights from Syria), Syrian President Nureddin al-Attassi became particularly focused on improving his nation's military strength. Al-Attassi's successor, President Hafez al-Assad, continued these efforts after rising to power in 1970, as he sought to enhance the sophistication of Syria's weaponry in preparation for an imminent war with Israel.

Overall, Syria received a steady flow of assistance from the Soviets that included arms and equipment, as well as military training and a regular stationed corps of Soviet advisors in Syria. In the early 1970s, President al-Assad was able to acquire long-range artillery rockets—the FROG-7s—from the Soviets. The FROG (Free Rocket over Ground) was Syria's first surface-to-surface delivery system capable of transporting conventional warheads over distances up to 70km. The Syrians fired approximately 25 of these rockets into Israel during their October 1973 war, although only a small percentage struck their intended targets. This poor performance of the FROGs in combat, combined with Syria's ultimate defeat to the Israelis in the war, led the Syrians to pursue more sophisticated weaponry from the Soviets immediately following the cessation of hostilities with the Israelis.

According to reports, it took little time for the Soviet Union to acquiesce to Syrian appeals for qualitatively more useful weaponry. Among the voluminous post-war shipments from the Soviets, Syria received its first ballistic missiles—the Soviet-made Scud-B. Information about the quantity of Scud-Bs received by Syria from the Soviet Union has remained scarce over the years. Estimates of the numbers of Scud-Bs shipped to Syria during the 1970s range up to 200 missiles.

Far less vague, however, is that by 1974, Syria was expending huge portions of the country's annual domestic budget on military procurements. Soviet military aid also increased dramatically throughout the 1970s with thousands of Soviet military advisers, technicians and instructors regularly stationed in Syria. Trips by President Hafez al-Assad to Moscow were commonplace in this decade, as were other high-level diplomatic exchanges that were geared towards negotiating new arms deals. Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Libya provided financial support to Syria's missile and weapon purchases, while Syria's massive arms buildup also caused the country to fall into heavy financial debt to the Soviet Union.

The Next Wave: Syria and the Soviet Union (1979 to 1987)

By the end of the 1970s, a new crisis was brewing between Syria and Israel as reports began to emerge that Syria was looking to transfer its Soviet-made SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles into neighboring Lebanon. Such a move would have ended an implicit Israeli-Syrian arrangement whereby Syrian troops were permitted to penetrate unchallenged into neighboring Lebanon in return for, among other things, Syria's exclusion of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Lebanon. While it was not immediately clear that Syria would indeed transfer its SAMs to Lebanon, festering distrust and animosity grew between the two countries. This led Israeli and Syrian fighter jets to clash on numerous occasions in the skies over Lebanon, the result of which was the glaring reality that Israel's military hardware continued to outclass that of the Syrians.

Consequently, and as the potential for the outbreak of full-scale armed conflict loomed on the horizon, the period between 1979 and 1987 marked a new wave of military expansion wherein Syria sought to achieve a better strategic balance with Israel. Overall, Syria's defense spending by 1980 accounted for more than half of that nation's total annual budget. Syria still received advanced Soviet weaponry, including the Soviets' newest air-to-air missiles as well as the AT-4 (Spigot) anti-tank missile that reportedly had not previously been delivered outside the Warsaw Pact.

By April 1981, the conflict between Israel and Syria increased in intensity as new reports surfaced suggesting that Syria had indeed installed anti-aircraft missiles in Lebanon. With the region on the brink of war, the United States dispatched special envoy Philip Habib to engage in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East in the hopes of diffusing the situation. Habib helped to engineer a tense stalemate for a time, although it was peppered with incidents wherein Syrian SA-6 missiles were fired at Israeli aircraft conducting reconnaissance missions over missile sites in Lebanon. The stalemate crumbled in June 1982, however, as Israeli forces destroyed or severely damaged more than 30 Syrian SAM batteries in Lebanon. Combat between Israeli and Syrian forces persisted through the summer and fall of 1982, while the Soviets continued to provide arms and equipment re-supplies along with ongoing on-site assistance by the growing numbers of Soviet military experts embedded with Syrian troops.

In early 1983, Syria received new air-to-air missiles and SAM-5 batteries from the Soviets which were reportedly installed in Syria and manned by Soviet crews. Syria also allegedly moved its missiles not yet destroyed by Israeli attacks back into Syrian territory, although by the fall of 1983, new reports emerged of Syrian SAM-9s being positioned in Lebanon. In December, the United States conducted its own attacks on Syrian antiaircraft missile sites in Lebanon, which Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger described as a "defense measure" to protect U.S. peacekeepers' reconnaissance flights. Meanwhile, Israeli bombardments of Syrian anti-aircraft missile positions in Lebanon continued, although the attacks diminished after a large number of missiles and troops were repositioned to within Syrian territories in June 1985.

Within this overall tense environment, the Soviets began shipping more advanced SS-21 ballistic missiles to Syria by the fall of 1983. The transfer of SS-21s to Syria was the first such deployment of this solid-fuel Soviet missile outside the Warsaw Pact. Several Syrian tests of this new 70km-range missile occurred in October 1983, and it is estimated that Syria ultimately received at least several dozen SS-21s but possibly up to 200 such missiles.

Buoyed by their success in gaining this new system, Syria also attempted to obtain from the Soviets their 900km range Scaleboard SS-12 and their shorter-range SS-23. Moscow allegedly refused both requests in 1986 and 1987 due to the constraints of the INF Treaty which it had recently signed. Given the Soviets' unwillingness to provide new missile systems to Syria, and the reported lack of success related to Syrian attempts to extend the range of their Scud-B arsenal, Syria looked elsewhere for new missile capabilities.

New Relationships: Syria and China, North Korea, Iran and Russia (1988 to Present)

By the late 1980s, Syria's attempts to build up its ballistic missile capability were stymied. Syria's longtime military benefactor, the Soviet Union, was unable to provide the more advanced, longer-range systems that Syria sought in order to attain the capability to strike various points in Israel from deep within Syrian territory. This, in turn, led Syria to engage with other nations about new ballistic missile transfers.

Indeed, by 1988 Syria was negotiating with China for the purchase of M-9 solid-fueled missiles with a range up to 600km. The two countries successfully negotiated a deal to send M-9s to Syria in 1989, although at the time, the M-9 was still in development in China. Meanwhile, as details of the Syrian-Chinese agreement became public, the United States rebuked China and initiated a flurry of diplomatic activity to try to prevent any such missile transfer. Ultimately, these U.S. efforts appeared to cause the Chinese to shy away from their plans to sell M-9s to Syria.

As a result, Syria next approached North Korea about ballistic missiles sometime in 1989. Syria reportedly sought to purchase more advanced ballistic missiles from North Korea as well as gain assistance in developing an indigenous missile production capability in Syria. And yet, Syria remained an underdeveloped third world country lacking the resources to fund these expensive acquisitions outright. Syria's lack of hard currency thus prevented its plans with North Korea from immediately moving forward. Financial difficulties also reportedly prevented Syria from manifesting a major arms deal that it had negotiated with Russia in the early 1990s, which was reportedly to include long-range missiles as well as SA-10 and SA-11 missiles.

Soon thereafter, however, Syria did gain the means to return to its plans with North Korea due to a $2 billion compensation package provided to Syria by Saudi Arabia in return for its support of the 1990-91 coalition efforts to oust Iraq from Kuwaiti lands, as well as due to financial assistance provided by Libya. Syria reportedly then contracted with North Korea for the purchase of 150 Scud-C missiles and related equipment, with long-term deliveries set to continue until at least 1995. These Scuds, a modified version of the Scud-B that are capable of delivering conventional or chemical warheads and traveling up to 500-600km, were reportedly part of a larger deal wherein North Korea agreed to build two missile assembly and electronics facilities in Syria—one in Aleppo and one in Hama. In July 2007, an explosion in Aleppo may have resulted from attempts to attach a chemical warhead to a Scud-C. [1]

Deliveries of Scud-Cs from North Korea to Syria may have occurred on several occasions throughout 1991, with North Korean ships sailing in circuitous routes to avoid international detection, and with countries such as Iran, Yugoslavia and Cyprus acting as transshipping hubs. Syria conducted flight tests of the Scud-C in late July 1991, and the missiles were believed to have become operational in Syria in 1992. Meanwhile, worries about Chinese-Syrian dealings re-emerged as U.S. intelligence reported in April 1991 that China was selling, or was about to sell, ballistic missiles to Syria. By the summer, the George H.W. Bush administration in the United States stated that the Chinese were planning to sell M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan and Syria. Further reports surfaced in September 1991 alleging that Western intelligence personnel had seen 24 M-9 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker headed to China on 15 November 1991—the first official U.S. visit to China since Tiananmen Square in 1989—where he was said to have extracted a commitment from the Chinese not to sell M-9 missiles to Syria. By the end of November, however, new reports surfaced that the Chinese had secretly agreed to assist the Syrians in manufacturing their own M-9 missiles—a side stepping of the agreement with the United States not to sell M-9s to the Syrians outright.

Work in the meantime was underway by 1992 on two Syrian missile plants, geared to produce Scuds, and possibly M-9 missiles. North Korea provided an array of support and building assistance to these Syrian efforts, as well as delivery of missile-production and assembly equipment, some of which had been transshipped through Iran. Iran also participated in Scud-C tests with Syrian and North Korean personnel. Chinese assistance has been reported, including through the 1992 shipment of ammonium perchlorate, an ingredient for a solid-fuel missile project.

In ensuing years, Syria continued work on its indigenous missile production capability, while also maintaining a flow of imports into the country. Syria conducted missile tests—at least once in conjunction with Iranian counterparts—and sent its missile technicians to North Korea for ongoing technical training. In addition, Syria received technical assistance from other countries, including Russia with whom Syria has established rising military ties, and China from which Syria reportedly received sensitive guidance equipment from a missile production firm and another load of raw material, notably 10 tons of powdered aluminum for use in its missile production endeavors. Moreover, Syria allegedly provided North Korean missile technicians with information and a sampling of the Soviet-made SS-21 solid-fuel missile system.

In the late 1990s, the United States charged that Syria was cooperating with Iran on solid-fuel missile technology and adapting Scud-Bs to longer range Scud-Cs. Then, by 2000, unsubstantiated reports suggest that North Korea delivered 50 Scud-D missiles and seven TELs to Syria, although it is possible that at least some of these missiles were procured by Syria on behalf of other countries in the region. Nonetheless, possession of the 700km-range Scud-D allows Syria to strike any point in Israel from deep within own borders. Reports suggest that Syria flight-tested a Scud-D that year. In 2001, Israel also claimed that Syria launched an unknown Scud model from its Aleppo missile production facility.

In late 2004 Syria began approaching Russia about a possible sale of the highly advanced Iskander-E (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) Tactical Missile System. [2] The Iskander system fires a short range (280 km) surface-to-surface solid fuel propelled ballistic missile intended to engage point and area targets. [3] The transfer would have fallen within the Missile Technology Control Regime's range guidelines, but several other factors led to increasing pressure on Russian authorities from the U.S. and Israel to reject the Syrian overtures. The fact that the Iskander-E is propelled by solid fuel would have significantly reduced launch times versus Israeli territory. Further on, the missile's speed, sophisticated maneuvering capabilities, and decoy equipment would have greatly increased the chances of the Syrian military to overcome Israel's Arrow-Homa missile defense system, shifting the regional strategic balance in favor of Syria. These concerns and the increasing pressure from American and Israeli officials ultimately led President Putin to veto the sale of the Iskander system to Syria in February 2005. [4]

Two months later though, Russia announced it would sell Syria 9M39 Igla (NATO reporting name SA-18 Grouse) short range anti-aircraft missiles in a deal worth $100 million [5] The Igla missiles were delivered in a carrier-mounted configuration known as the Strelets (Archer), consisting of a round launch pod with two ready-to-fire missiles in launch tubes, an additional four ground modules, and a control and communications system with a fire-control unit. [6] Despite strong concerns by American and Israeli officials the Putin government decided to go through with the sale. The Russian Ministry of Defense supplied the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) with precise specifications of the Strelets, stressing the short range (5km) of the system in an attempt to alleviate Israeli concerns. Russian military specialists also visited Israel to convince IDF authorities that the Strelets cannot be converted to a man-portable air defense system, given Syria's record of supplying Hezbollah with military equipment. [7]

In May 2005 Syria test-fired one Scud-B (300 km range), and two Scud-D (700 km range) missiles. According to Israeli sources the missiles were designed to deliver chemical warheads, while Syrian opposition sources claimed that additional equipment for the missile tests had arrived on a Russian freighter two months earlier, and that Russian military personnel oversaw the test launches on Syrian territory. [8] One of the Scud-D missiles broke up over Turkish airspace, showering debris on several Turkish villages. [9]

Evidence that Syria continues to advance its missile technology and capabilities was revealed in May 2006 in a de-classified report to the United States Congress. The report indicates that for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004, "Syria continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability." The report also states that Syria's liquid-propellant missile program continues to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance, and that "Syria was developing longer range missile programs, such as the Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran."[10]

In December 2006 Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad visited Moscow, and reportedly inquired about a potential sale of the S-300PMU-2 Favorit (NATO reporting name SA-20 Gargoyle) air defense system [11]. This version of the S-300 series has an improved range of 200 km and is capable of engaging enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles flying from 10 m to 27 km above earth at speeds up to 10,000 km/h. [12]. Syria's interest in acquiring an S-300 system apparently goes back to 1999 [13]

On January 22, 2007 Syria again test-fired a Scud-D short range ballistic missile. The missile was not tested to its maximum range of 700km, and was tracked by Israel's Arrow-Homa Missile Defense System. Sources in the Israeli military said that the missile did not show significant changes from the ones launched in 2005, and that the test was most likely intended to improve the accuracy of the Syrian produced Scud-D variant based on the North Korean Hwasong 7 [14]

During a period of heightened tension in April 2007 between Israel and Syria, Israeli media commentators alleged that Iran will soon begin supplying the Syrian Navy with C-802 Noor anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), an Iranian produced variant of the Chinese YJ-82. [15] [16] The Syrian Navy currently only has two Osa I and eight Osa II outdated missile patrol boats aquired in the 1970s, each equipped with four SS-N-2 Styx ASCMs. [17]

Similarly, Syria has shown interest in procuring around 50 units of the Russian produced Pantsyr S-1E (NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound) short-range air-defense system. [18] The mobile Pantsyr system combines two 30mm anti-aircraft guns and 12 surface-to-air missiles, and is currently in the final stages of testing by Russian armed forces. [19] In April 2008, a Syrian delegation arrived in Tula, where KBP produces the Pantsyr to inspect the system. [20]

Sources:
[1] Robin Hughes, "Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria," Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 September 2007
[2] Jeremy M. Sharp, "Syria: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, updated 1 May 2008.
[3] Lee Kass, "Syria after Lebanon" The Growing Syrian Missile Threat," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, www.meforum.org.
[4] Lee Kass, "Syria after Lebanon" The Growing Syrian Missile Threat," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, www.meforum.org.
[5] Alex Vatanka and Richard Weitz, "Russian Roulette: Moscow seeks influence through arms exports," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 January 2007.
[6] "Russia to supply Igla SAMs to Syria," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, April 2005.
[7] "Russia is not selling short-range ballistic missiles to Syria," Pravda, 29 April 2005.
[8] Alex Kogan, "The Secretive Syrian-N.Korean alliance," The Jerusalem Post, 18 September 2007.
[9] Alon Ben-David, "Syria test fires 'Scud D' missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 February 2007.
[10] "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January-31 December 2004," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13 May 2006.
[11] "Syria Seeks Russian Missile Deals," Jane's Missile and Rockets, 1 March 2007.
[12] "S-300PMU2 Favorit SA-20 GARGOYLE," Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org.
[13] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War" Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[14] Alon Ben-David, "Syria test fires 'Scud D' missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 February 2007.
[15] Alex Fishman, "The Syrian Quick Move Nightmare," Yedi'ot Aharonot, 8 April 2007.
[16] "Iran Providing Syria New Missile Boats, Hundreds of Missile," Channel 2 Television, Open Source Document KPP20070507735013, 7 May 2007.
[17] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War" Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[18] Robin Hughes, "Iran set to obtain Pantsyr via Syria," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 May 2007.
[19] Miroslav Gyürösi, "Details emerge of Pantsir-S1E hybrid air defence system," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 March 2008.
[20] "Syria is getting Russian air-defense system," Reuters, 15 April 2008.


  Updated November 2008
 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Missile/index.html 
------------------------------------------------------------

Missile Chronology

1955-1981


Between 1955 and mid-1965
The Soviet Union finalizes military aid accords with Syria and 16 other less developed countries.
—Central Intelligence Agency, "The Soviet Program of Military Aid to Less Developed Countries," 1 September 1965, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/>.
Post mid-1965
Syria is one of six nations that together represent approximately 93 percent of the total military support offered by the Soviet Union. This support includes the introduction of Soviet military technicians in Syria and training programs in the Soviet Union for Syrian military personnel.
—Central Intelligence Agency, "The Soviet Program of Military Aid to Less Developed Countries," 1 September 1965, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/>.

1967-1973
Syria embarks on a program to expand its military and the sophistication of its weaponry, leading up to its 1973 attack on Israel.
––Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

13 July 1969
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev formally accepts Syrian President al-Attassi's invitation to visit Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 July 1969.

13 March 1970
Israel reports renewed action on the Syrian and UAR fronts.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 March 1970.

21 March 1970
Moshe Dayan says that Israel will eliminate adversarial surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the region before they become operational, notwithstanding any potential consequence to Soviet technicians or operators at the sites.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 21 March 1970.

27 June 1970
Intensive fighting continues in the Golan area. Syria reports downing 11 Israeli jets, while Israel claims to have shot down 4 Syrian jets.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 27 June 1970.

November 1970
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad assumes power and immediately begins to strengthen Syria's military relations with the Soviet Union.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

November 1970-1971
President Assad purchases Syria's first surface-to-surface missile (SSM), the FROG-7 (Free Rocket over Ground). The FROG is an unguided, solid-fueled missile that travels up to 70km. It may be equipped with either a high explosive or a tactical nuclear warhead. Syrian technicians are also invited to the Soviet Union to train on the FROG system.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.
6 December 1970
Syrian President Assad praises his country's military and promises their forces will be strengthened. He allegedly intends to dispatch military personnel to the Suez Canal, where Soviet and Egyptian missile technicians are located, for training in the operation of Soviet SAM-2s and SAM-3s. Reports indicate the USSR will install SAMs in Syria in order to pressure a settlement that includes an Israeli capitulation of the Golan Heights.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 6 December 1970.

27 January 1971
The Israeli Knesset confirms reports that Syria requested and obtained missiles from the Soviet Union. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan says that Soviet-made SAM-2s are being installed in Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 27 January 1971.

1972
The Soviet Union ships six transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and 6 reload vehicles to Syria.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

10 May 1972
Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko arrives in Syria for a four-day visit. The Syrians reportedly lobby for an upgraded defensive network that includes SAM-3s.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 May 1972.

16 May 1972
Tass reports that the Soviet Union will supply Syria with additional weapons according to an agreement signed recently in Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 May 1972.

23 May 1972
A Soviet report says that US President Richard Nixon seeks to illicit Soviet restraint with regard to its plans to provide weapons to Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 23 May 1972.

13 September 1972
US officials allege that the USSR and Syria have settled on a security arrangement which permits the Soviets to install and use naval facilities at Syria's Latakia and Tartus ports in exchange for the Soviets providing advanced air-defense missiles and jet-fighter aircraft to Syria. The proposed MIG-21 fighters and SAM-3 missiles are meant to improve Syria's ability to protect its territory from Israeli air strikes.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 14 September 1972.

26 November 1972
Reports indicate that Syria's President Assad has asked the Soviets to consider a Syrian appeal for SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles. The Soviets are reportedly hesitant to acquiesce, however, because creating new SAM-3 sites will require sending large numbers of Soviet pilots and technicians to Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 November 1972.

8 January 1973
Israeli fighter bombers attack targets and radar stations in the Latakia port area of Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 June 1973.

Early 1973
The Soviet Union ships another six transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and six more reload vehicles to Syria.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

Early 1973
Syria receives its first shipment of FROG missiles from the Soviet Union.
––Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

7 June 1973
Syria says that Israeli fighters have been driven away from the coastal area between Tartus and Latakia by Syrian MIGs and ground defensive fire.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 June 1973.

8 June 1973
Sources say the Syrians have been replacing radar stations that were destroyed in January by Israeli air attacks. Sources also report that Soviet-made SAM-2s and mobile SAM-6s have been introduced recently around Damascus and other vital areas in Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 June 1973.

28 June 1973
Syrian Defense Minister and Deputy Commander in Chief Major General Tlas travels to the USSR with a delegation to discuss furthering cooperative efforts.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 30 June 1973.

29 June 1973
Defense Minister Tlas leads a Syrian military delegation to Hanoi. The Syrians solicit North Vietnamese military advisers with expertise in guerrilla warfare and the use of Soviet-made SAMs.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 30 June 1973.

12 September 1973
An Italian military source says that the two missiles fired on an El Al Airlines plane at Rome's Fiumcino airport are Soviet-made and of the SAM-7 type used only by the Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian armies. Syria, Iraq and Egypt each deny providing arms to the Arabs who fired the missiles at the plane.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 September 1973.

13 September 1973
Syria reports that its jets clashed with a total of 64 Israeli jets over three hours along the Syrian coast between Latakia and Tartus. The Israeli jets were reportedly investigating the strengthened Syrian air-defense system. The Syrian military communiqué also says that five Israeli planes were shot down and eight Syrian planes were damaged.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 14 September 1973.

October 1973
The Syrians have reportedly assumed full operational control of the FROG-7s imported from the Soviet Union. During the Arab-Israeli war which begins on 6 October, the Syrians launch FROG missiles at Israeli sites, including the Ramat David air base, the Megiddo Airfield, and the Northern Command Headquarters in northern Israel. The missiles reportedly miss all of their intended targets, and in some cases hit civilian encampments. The Syrian military's experiences with the FROG missiles are their first bona fide opportunity to appreciate the advantage of such stand-off delivery vectors. In total, Syria reportedly launches approximately 25 FROG-7s.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," Special Report from Middle East Defense News, Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992.

6 October 1973
Heavy fighting breaks out between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights and between Israel and Egypt along the Suez Canal.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 7 October 1973.

6-7 October 1973
Missiles fired from Syria hit the town of Migdal Ha'Emek in Israel.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 October 1973.

7 October 1973
Syrian military command says its pilots, naval vessels and ground fire caused the downing of 10 Israeli planes and 2 helicopters.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 7 October 1973.

8 October 1973
A military analysis of the war concludes that the Israeli Air Force is attempting to eliminate Syrian SAM sites.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 October 1973.

8 October 1973
Israel claims it has achieved dominance over the skies of battle and crippled Syrian air defenses. Israel reportedly eliminates most of the SAM sites recently set up by the Syrians along a ceasefire line in the Golan Heights.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 October 1973.

8 October 1973
Western diplomatic sources in Beirut assert that Syria may have shot down 30 Israeli planes using mostly SAM-6 missiles since fighting began on 6 October. Syria says it has shot down a total of 105 planes.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 9 October 1973.

8 October 1973
Israel launches a counteroffensive that includes attacks on missile sites deep inside Syria. Israel also says it downed three Syrian Sukhoi-20 fighter bombers, which is the first reported detection of these advanced Soviet planes in the region.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 9 October 1973.

9 October 1973
A Soviet-made FROG-7 missile fired from Syria hits the Israeli Givat kibbutz. No injuries are reported as all the residents were in shelters when the missile hit.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 October 1973.

9 October 1973
Israeli air attacks on sites in the central Syrian city of Homs are linked to Syrian FROG-7 attacks on Israeli civilian sites over the past three days.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 October 1973.

9 October 1973
Israeli Major General Yariv acknowledges that Israel lost many airplanes as a result of Syrian and Egyptian missile attacks but says few were overcome in aerial combat.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 October 1973.

9 October 1973
US military officials note that unlike during the 1967 war, Israeli forces are now confronted with greatly enhanced air-defense systems which incorporate SAM-2, SAM-3 and SAM-6 missiles supplied by the Soviet Union.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 October 1973.

10 October 1973
Israeli military command announces the sinking of two Syrian missile boats during an attack on the Syrian port of Latakia.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 October 1973.

10 October 1973
US officials allege that the Soviet Union is airlifting military re-supply equipment to Syria and Egypt from Hungary. Sources say that approximately 30 planes were seen arriving at Syrian airports since October 9.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 October 1973.

10 October 1973
US and British military sources say that Soviet re-supply efforts to Syria and Egypt may tilt the war in the Arabs' favor. They anticipate that Soviet deliveries of SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles are most vital as they could hamper Israeli air strikes.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 October 1973.

10 October 1973
The Soviet leadership reportedly sends a communiqué to Arab governments encouraging them to support Syria and Egypt in battle against Israel. The communiqué also states that the Soviets are providing "all types of assistance" including Soviet experts, arms and ammunition.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 October 1973.

11 October 1973
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban tells the UN Security Council that many Israeli civilian villages have been struck by Syrian FROG missiles.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 October 1973.

12 October 1973
Israel says its missile boats sank two Syrian missile boats during combat off the Syrian port of Tartus overnight. Syrian reports say that three Israeli boats were sunk in the encounter, but Israel reports that all of its crafts returned to their bases.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 October 1973.

12 October 1973
The Soviet Union alleges that Israel attacked and sank a Soviet merchant ship in the Syrian port of Tartus. An Israeli representative says the Soviet ship was damaged due to a naval battle between Syria and Israel.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 October 1973.

13 October 1973
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir alleges that the USSR has airlifted more than 120 shipments of weapons to Syria, Iraq and Egypt since the start of the war on 6 October. In addition, Israeli estimates suggest that half of the Syrian air force has been destroyed, along with most of Syria's radar defense systems and military airfields.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 14 October 1973.

13 October 1973
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger urges the USSR to demonstrate restraint in rearming Arab states, which Pentagon officials say is continuing throughout all hours of the day. The Pentagon estimates the Soviets have sent more than 2,000 tons of armaments since 9 October and that shipments of anti-aircraft missiles have taken the greatest toll on Israel's military.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 14 October 1973.

15 October 1973
US and other military sources say that large amounts of Soviet supplies are arriving in Syria by sea through the ports of Latakia and Tartus.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 October 1973.

18 October 1973
US officials say that Israeli jets battled with aircraft operated by North Koreans today. They also allege that there are North Vietnamese accompanying Syrian military forces as advisers related to air-defense and artillery units. Pentagon sources also say that Soviet shipments to the region include its new SAM-7 missile system.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 19 October 1973.

22 October 1973
The Soviet Union appears to be demanding cash for military supply shipments, causing Syria and Egypt to turn to wealthy Arab nations for financial assistance. Reports indicate that Abu Dhabi is seeking nearly $200 million in loans from Western banks in order to help fund the war efforts.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 22 October 1973.

30 October 1973
US officials say that Israel missed several dubious signals of an impending attack from Syria and Egypt, including the 1972 construction of a line of SAMs near both the Syrian and Egyptian ceasefire lines with Israel. Reports indicate that prior to the onset of the war, advisers from the Soviet Union persuaded Syrian and Egyptian military leaders that they could only hope to launch a successful, large-scale ground attack under the shield of missiles.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 31 October 1973.

12 December 1973
NATO military experts have concluded that the Soviet anti-tank missiles and new anti-aircraft missiles used by Syria during the war fared beyond expectation and that NATO is currently without a reliable response to them.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 October 1973.

1974
Based on the poor performance of its FROG missiles during the Arab-Israeli war, Syria seeks to upgrade its missile arsenal. Moscow agrees to restock the FROG missiles Syria used in combat last year, and in addition, to supply Syria with Scud missiles. Syrian officers reportedly travel to the Soviet Union to be trained in the operation of Scud missiles.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

4 February 1974
Syria's overall budget for 1974 is estimated to be $1.7 billion with defense expenditures representing $400 million of the total budget. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is reportedly requiring that Syria pay cash for arms and equipment to replace that lost during the October war. In turn, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Libya and Algeria are providing Syria and Egypt with financial aid for the purchase of weapons.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 4 February 1974.

1 April 1974
Two Soviet merchant ships are unloading MIG-23s in Syria, according to Israeli intelligence. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan says that these jets are more advanced than the MIG-21s currently in Syria and this will impact the air power balance in the region. In addition, he says that a Cuban brigade of nearly 3,000 men has been transferred to Syria. Dayan also says that Soviet pilots are no longer deployed in the Middle East.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 April 1974.

24 April 1974
Journalists in Damascus report seeing an Israeli plane shot down after an apparent missile hit.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 25 April 1974.

1 May 1974
US military experts say that Syria, along with Israel and Egypt, shot down many of their own aircraft during the October war using surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Syria reportedly shot down almost 20 of the Soviet-made MIG jets provided to it by Iraq.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 May 1974.

6 August 1974
Israeli leaders assess that the Soviet Union has supplied Syria with more than $2 billion in modern armaments in the last 20 months and that this has produced a considerable change in the balance of power in the region. Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres tells the Israeli parliament that increased Soviet shipments to Syria include Scud ground-to-ground missiles. He also says that the Syrian Air Force is now 25% stronger than it was at the start of the October 1973 war and the Syria's anti-aircraft missile defense system has grown by approximately 20%.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 August 1974.

28 August 1974
France decides to sell arms to Syria and other Middle East nations without previous restraints meant to protect against arms transmissions to battlefront nations.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 28 August 1974.

4 October 1974
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon says that recent arms shipments from the Soviet Union to Syria cannot be regarded as defensive arms since some of it, such as the mid-range missiles and MIG-23 fighter planes, can reach every one of Israel's cities.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 5 October 1974.

16 November 1974
Reports indicate that weapons are being unloaded off of 20 Soviet ships in Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 November 1974.

16 November 1974
Israeli and Western military sources say that Israel's ability to destroy Soviet-made Scud missile batteries in Syria is a major military factor in terms of any renewed hostilities in the Middle East. US intelligence sources judge that the Israelis believe they are able to destroy the missiles.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 November 1974.

4 December 1974
Arab diplomatic sources say that a number of Middle East governments, including Syria, have received assurances from the Soviet Union that they will be supplied with nuclear weapons if it is proven Israel possesses them. The sources also allege that Syrian specialists have been trained in arming Soviet-made missiles with nuclear warheads.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 4 December 1974.

17 December 1974
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres says that Soviet military personnel are operating Syrian SAM batteries near Damascus and that there are approximately 3,000 Soviet soldiers in Syria. He also estimates that the Soviets have shipped Syria at least 300 jet fighters, including 50 MIG-23s, along with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and SAMs.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 18 December 1974.


1975-76
North Korea acquires approximately 24 to 56 FROG-7B (9M21E Luna-M) artillery rockets from Egypt. Syria may have been involved in this transfer or may have separately transferred a small number of FROG-7Bs.
--Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 6.

6 January 1975
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres alleges that Palestinian troops with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles are moving from Syria into southern Lebanon.
—"Israelis cross into Lebanon," Facts on File World News Digest, 11 January 1975.

 

25 January 1975
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tells Le Monde that the Russians have given Syria all the assistance they have requested.
—"Egypt; Precise," The Economist, 25 January 1975.

27 January 1975
The Saudi king visits Syria and watches a demonstration of Soviet arms at an air base. The king reportedly gives Syrian President Assad a billion dollars to use to purchase more arms.
—"Newsletters: Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 27 January 1975.

5 February 1975
The Arab League's Joint Defense Council discusses the potential for Syria to provide Lebanon with technical assistance for the operation of Soviet-made anti-aircraft missiles, but no final decision is made.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 7 February 1975.

7-9 February 1975
Syria allegedly supplies Eritrean guerrillas with Soviet-made rockets and anti-aircraft missiles.
—"Eritrean warfare continues," Facts on File World News Digest, 15 February 1975.

24 March 1975
The House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on the Middle East made a trip to the Middle East last month, which reportedly has led its members to conclude that Syria now possesses more major weapons than was the case at the beginning of the October 1973 war.
—"Mideast Balance," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 March 1975.

23 April 1975
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad announce a joint committee to promote integrated military, political and diplomatic plans against Israel.
—"Egypt, Syria unify stand," Facts on File World News Digest, 3 May 1975.

24 April 1975
Syria and Jordan are reported to have reached an agreement establishing joint land and air military commands. The Soviets reportedly guarantee the Jordanians they will receive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as part of the Soviet's backing of these joint command centers.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 25 April 1975.

25 April 1975
An Israeli official says it is likely that the Soviet Union and Syria offered to supply Jordan with SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile systems as part of a joint command deal.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 April 1975.

30 April 1975
Jordanian King Hussein says there is no truth to the reports that Syria and Jordan agreed to a joint military command the previous week.
—"U.S. to sell Jordan missiles," Facts on File World News Digest, 10 May 1975.

28 May 1975
Responding to reports of a new Libyan arms deal with the Soviet Union, Egyptian President Sadat complains that the Soviet Union has refused to sell such modern equipment to both Egypt and Syria.
—"Soviet-Libyan arms deal," Facts on File World News Digest, 31 May 1975.

15 June 1975
US military analysts say that a joint military command between Jordan and Syria might include the transfer of Soviet-built SAMs and anti-tank weapons from Syria to Jordan.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 15 June 1975.

23 June 1975
Newsweek reports that Syrian President Assad went to Amman last week. It is also reported that Syrian anti-aircraft missiles have been moved in order to better protect Jordan's air space.
—Arnaud de Borchgrave, "The PLO's Ebb Tide," Newsweek, 23 June 1975.

11 July 1975
Jordanian King Hussein says that he is purchasing advanced US weaponry for his military in order to defend Syria against any flanking maneuver by Israel that may run through Jordan.
—Juan De Onis, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 July 1975.

17 July 1975
Some Western diplomats reportedly fear that Saudi Arabian weapons will be provided to Syria in the event of any new Arab-Israeli war.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 17 July 1975.

20 July 1975
US and Israeli officials are paying special heed to a new rapprochement between Syria and Jordan, which includes the recent creation of a joint high command to synchronize their mutual military, political, economic and cultural policies.
—Terence Smith, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 20 July 1975.

21 July 1975
Members of the US Congress are concerned about the prospective sale of a $350-million air-defense system to Jordan due to the potential it will be used as protection for Syrian forces in future confrontations with Israel. Congressional critics of the arms deal say that Jordan would have entered the 1973 war against Israel if it possessed long-range missiles like those in this proposed package. Any congressional veto of the $350-million project must occur prior to 30 July.
—"Mideast Arms," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 July 1975; "Congress fires on arms exports," Business Week, 11 August 1975.

27 July 1975
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres and other Israeli military officials point out that Syria and other Arab nations have improved their military prowess since the October 1973 war due to arms shipments from the Soviet Union and the United States.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 27 July 1975.

3 August 1975
Syria reportedly moves troops to the Iraqi border and anti-aircraft batteries to the Tabqa dam in central Syria.
—Juan De Onis, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 3 August 1975.

9 August 1975
The Syrians have reportedly offered to provide Jordanian King Hussein with Russian SAMs and relevant operational training in the event that the American Congress refuses to greenlight the 14 batteries of Hawk ground-to-air missiles which he seeks. The US administration believes that Jordan will purchase Soviet-made missiles from Syria if the Hawk deal is disallowed.
—"Jordan: Not From Russia," The Economist, 9 August 1975; "Congress fires on arms exports," Business Week, 11 August 1975.

22 August 1975
A Syrian-Jordanian communiqué is released suggesting that Jordan might request Soviet arms due to US congressional reluctance to endorse the proposed air-defense system sale to Jordan.
—Bernard Gwertzman, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 24 August 1975.

8 September 1975
An analysis concludes that Arab nations have received a combined total of approximately $10 billion in arms and military equipment from the USSR, including missiles for supersonic warplanes.
—"Breakthrough in Mideast – U.S. Takes on Controversial Role," U.S. News & World Report, 8 September 1975.

10 September 1975
Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin says that Soviet sway in the Middle East is dropping and this will cause them to offer increased support on extremists in the region. Rabin adds that the Soviets are already providing both Syria and Libya with modern equipment, including MIG 25s and SAMs.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 September 1975.

17 September 1975
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres calls on the US to provide Israel with new missiles to counterbalance those that the Soviets are providing to Syria and other Arab countries. Peres says that Israel needs the Lance and Pershing missiles to deter the Soviet FROG and SS-1C Scud missiles in Syria. However, senior US Defense Department officials are expressing worry that new missile deals with Israel will provoke a more intensive arms race in the Middle East. It is expected that if Israel is cleared to receive the Pershing, the Soviet Union would in turn be pressured by Arabs to provide the new Soviet SS-12 Scaleboard missile.
—"Sinai pact documents made public," Facts on File World News Digest, 20 September 1975; "Defense Concern," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 September 1975; "Missile medley," The Economist, 27 September 1975.

October-December 1975
Syria test fires ground-to-ground missiles and conducts military maneuvers in Syria and Jordan.
—Milton R. Benjamin, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Jay Axelbank and Lloyd H. Norman, "Hatchet Men," Newsweek, 1 December 1975.

Early October 1975
Syrian President Assad travels to Moscow. Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas stays in Moscow after President Assad leaves in order to hammer out details of a military assistance program. The key element of the deal is reportedly increasing the number of Soviet military advisers in Syria.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 17 July 1975.

9 December 1975
Syrian President Assad visits Jordan.
—Flora Lewis, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 19 January 1976.

26 October 1975
Israeli and US military officials are concerned that Syria is receiving more advanced arms deliveries and an increased number of military advisers from the Soviet Union. It is feared that the Soviets are intent upon making Syria a predominant military power in the region. The Syrians are reported to have received 45 MIG-23s, nearly 75 MIG-21s and 15 SU-7 ground-attack planes. An Israeli estimate also claims that Syria has received 40 SAM ground-to-air missile batteries from Moscow.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 October 1975; "From the Capitals of the World," U.S. News & World Report, 8 December 1975.

17 November 1975
Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi says that Iran provided some financial assistance to Syria in the past year.
—"Interview with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi," Business Week, 17 November 1975.

26 November 1975
According to Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres, Syria test fires a Scud.
—"Israeli Charges U.S. Has Yet to Fulfill All Promises of Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 December 1975.

Mid-December 1975
Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres says that there are approximately 1,000 Soviet-made Scud and FROG missiles in the Middle East.
—"Israeli Charges U.S. Has Yet to Fulfill All Promises of Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 December 1975.

24-31 December 1975
Syrian and Jordanian army units undertake joint maneuver in order to test their defensive responses to a potential Israeli offensive strike against Damascus. This is the first major Syrian-Jordanian operation since the two agreed to a joint military command almost a year ago.
—Flora Lewis, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 19 January 1976.

25 December 1975
US Representative Robert Leggett discusses plans to sell Israel F-15 fighter jets to counter Soviet-made MIG-23s, as well as the MIG-25 interceptor and reconnaissance planes that are being flown in Syria by Soviet pilots.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 25 December 1975.

18 January 1976
US and Israeli military officers say that Israel's acquisition of four Grumman E-2C Hawkeye advanced radar surveillance planes from the United States will be particularly effective for detecting missile launchings, especially ground-to-ground missiles.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 18 January 1976.

Early 1976
The Soviet Union ships 12 Scud launchers to Syria.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

8 February 1976
The Director General of the office of the Prime Minister of Israel says that the Soviet Union is trying to slant the military balance of power in the Middle East against Israel mainly by arming Syria, Libya and Iraq.
—Amos Eiran, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 8 February 1976.

7 March 1976
Israeli sources estimate that there are currently nearly 350 Soviet-made Scuds in Arab possession, with most of those reportedly in Syria. A senior Israeli defense official is reported to estimate that Arabs have a 12-to-1 superiority ratio against Israel in all types of missiles, a 10-to-1 superiority ratio in surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, a 13-to-1 superiority ratio in airbases, and a 3-to-1 superiority ratio in tanks and aircraft. US military analysts agree that Syria is better armed now than at the start of war in 1973.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 7 March 1976.

4 April 1976
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat blames Syria for the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon and claims that Syria provides arms for both sides there.
—Flora Lewis, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 5 April 1976.

1 June 1976
Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Syria for talks with government officials.
—James M. Markham, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 June 1976.

4 June 1976
Syrian MIGs fly over Beirut.
—Henry Tanner, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 4 June 1976.

4 June 1976
Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin says the talks conducted during his four-day visit in Syria have deepened relations and collaboration between the two nations. A Soviet-Syrian communiqué is released, emphasizing continued Soviet assistance geared towards improving Syria's defensive capabilities.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 5 June 1976.

11 June 1976
Syria does not react to Soviet criticism of its incursion into Lebanon, which appears in a statement issued by Tass.
—James F. Clarity, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 June 1976.

12 June 1976
The Cairo daily newspaper Al Akhbar says Syria is attacking Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon using Soviet equipment.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 June 1976.

12 June 1976
US and Israeli officials say that Syria may be spending up to $1 million each day to sustain its military forces in Lebanon. The Syrians reportedly requested financial assistance from the Soviets but were denied.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 June 1976.

2 October 1976
Reports indicate that President Assad has rebuffed Soviet leader Brezhnev's direct request that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon. An aide to President Assad says that this difference of opinion has not harmed Soviet-Syrian relations, and he is unable to confirm reports that the Soviets warned they might reduce military assistance to Syria.
—James F. Clarity, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 October 1976.

4 October 1976
Syria is spending a reported $800 million annually on defense and military expenditures. This spending accounts for at least one-third of Syria's national budget.
—James F. Clarity, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 4 October 1976.

26 November 1976
Sources say that Syria has transferred SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft guns into Lebanon. The missiles reportedly remain in eastern Lebanon.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 November 1976.

4 March 1977
US intelligence sources believe that Syrian President Assad is attempting to diminish Syria's reliance on sophisticated arms from the Soviet Union without causing a complete stoppage of supply shipments from there. Assad is now reportedly purchasing military equipment including anti-tank missiles from France. Intelligence officials also report a significant decrease in Soviet military personnel in Syria over the past several months. Whereas there were some 3,500 Soviet advisers in Syria after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, US intelligence reports now calculate that there are only 1,800 advisers in the country.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 4 March 1977.

4 March 1977
US President Jimmy Carter says that he has been in contact with the Soviet Union, Germany, France and Great Britain about trying to curtail the excessive amount of weapons being sold around the world. Carter mentions that leaders of countries in the Middle East told US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance last month during his visit to the region that they are spending too much money on arms.
—"Carter Reports Favorable Response On Efforts to Reduce Arms Sales," Washington Post, 6 March 1977.

19 April 1977
Syrian President Assad meets with Soviet leader Brezhnev in Moscow.
—Christopher S. Wren, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 19 April 1977.

24 April 1977
Sources say that the Soviet Union and Syria agreed to improve their strained relations during President Assad's recent visit to Moscow. They also agreed that Syria will continue to receive Soviet shipments of arms and related equipment.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 24 April 1977.

9 May 1977
Israel is outfitting its jet fighters with a long-range television-guided missile intended to defeat the Soviet-made SA-6 anti-aircraft missile installations operated by Syria and other Arab nations.
—"Israel Equips Fighters With New Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 May 1977.

26 May 1977
Kuwaiti officials confirm that Kuwait will purchase arms from the Soviet Union, including the SA-7 shoulder-fired missile and the FROG surface-to-surface missiles. They also confirm that Syria will assist Kuwait in the operation and maintenance of this new equipment.
—Thomas W. Lippman, "Kuwait Buying Soviet Arms for Cash, Not Ideology," Washington Post, 26 May 1997.

2 June 1977
Following President Assad's trip to Moscow in April, the Soviet Union has reportedly recommenced its arms shipments to Syria. The number of Soviet military advisers in Syria is now approximately 2,000.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 June 1977.

15 August 1977
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas is reported to have concluded a $500-million arms deal during a recent trip to Moscow. Syria will reportedly receive the most up-to-date MIG-23 jet fighters as well as sophisticated missiles.
—"Latest U.S. Peace Effort – Will It Save Egypt's Sadat?" U.S. News & World Report, 15 August 1977.

2 October 1977
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that 1976 saw Soviet deliveries of military arms and equipment to third world nations grow to their largest level since the Soviet Union provided arms to Arab countries after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Arms shipments to Syria during the year, however, are reported to have dwindled.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 2 October 1977.

Early November 1977
Israel receives its first US-made Harpoon anti-ship missiles, which reportedly eclipse the aging stock of Soviet-made Styx missiles that are carried aboard Syrian missile boats.
—"New Missiles for Israel," Newsweek, 7 November 1977.

15 November 1977
It is reported that Somalia has received Soviet arms from Syria in the past.
—David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Applauds Somali Decision To Expel Soviets," Washington Post, 15 November 1977.

1 December 1977
US intelligence sources say that President Carter's attempts to curtail Soviet arms shipments to third world countries have failed. Instead, the Soviet Union has reportedly sped up its military sales, especially in the Middle East where, according to US and NATO analysts, it is expected to take advantage of the current divide in the Arab world.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 1 December 1977.

31 December 1977
Syria's President Assad is said to be planning a new military buildup in order to better his position vis-à-vis Israel. He reportedly asked the Soviet Union for new weapons in recent days and is preparing to send a military delegation to Moscow.
—Don Oberdorfer, "Middle East: Stunning Changes, But Much Yet to Do," Washington Post, 1 January 1977.

1978
According to a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, there are 2,580 Russian and East European advisors, technicians and instructors in Syria.
—Fred S. Hoffman, Associated Press, 18 October 1979.

1978
Israel assails West Germany for failing to stop the delivery of missile systems made by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) to Syria. The West German government argues that MBB only supplied constituent parts to Euromissile, a subordinate to France's Aerospatiale firm, which in turn assembled and shipped the missiles in a venue outside the control of the German government.
—John Tagliabue, "West Germany Debates Role of Arms Industry," New York Times, 11 August 1980.

3 January 1978
The London-based Arabic language newspaper Al Manar reports that the Soviets intend to supply Syria with "a giant air defense umbrella" which will include air-to-ground missiles of the sort not currently installed in the region. Citing unnamed sources, the paper also alleges that Soviet technicians are already working to set up and run the system in Syria.
—Associated Press, 3 January 1978.

8 January 1978
In response to Egypt's peace overtures with Israel, Syria is expected to receive a large shipment later this month of Soviet military equipment, including sophisticated air-defense missiles. Diplomatic sources in Damascus say the missiles are a modified version of the SAM-6 which now includes an enhanced guidance system capable of prevailing over Israel's jamming techniques.
—"Syria Reportedly Will Receive Advanced Soviet Missile, Tanks," Washington Post, 9 January 1978.

11 January 1978
The US State Department confirms that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide increased military aid to Syria.
—Associated Press, 11 January 1978.

25 January 1978
Syria says one of its main concerns is fortifying its military in order to create a strategic balance with Israel.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 25 January 1978.

6 February 1978
Newsweek reports that since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Syria has received at least $1-billion in MIG and Sukhoi planes, Scud-B missiles, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and other weaponry.
—Kim Willenson, Lloyd H. Norman, William E. Schmidt and Milan J. Kubic, "The Newest Arms Race," Newsweek, 6 February 1978.

8 February 1978
Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori says Israel is greatly concerned by West Germany and France's recent sales of missile systems to Syria.
—Associated Press, 8 February 1978.

11 February 1978
During a meeting between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli opposition leader Shimon Peres, Peres communicates his dismay about the recent missile sale to Syria by a French firm that is producing the missiles together with a West German company.
—Michael Getler, "Sadat Meets Peres: Says Peace Drive Regains Momentum," Washington Post, 12 February 1978.

15 February 1978
Responding to the United States' plans to sell sophisticated fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, Israel expresses concern that the planes might be transferred from Saudi Arabia to hostile states in the region such as Syria.
—Richard L. Homan, "U.S. Offers to Sell 3 Mideast Nations $5 Billion in Jets," Washington Post, 15 February 1978.

23 February 1978
Soviet leader Brezhnev and Syrian President Assad conclude two days of talks in Moscow. Western diplomats construe Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov's presence at the meetings as a sign that Soviet military assistance to Syria was discussed.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 23 February 1978.

13 March 1978
After a bloody weekend attack by insurgents on sightseers in Israel, civilians from southern Lebanese cities are reportedly fleeing their homes in fear of retaliation by Israeli forces. Syrian peacekeeping forces operating in Lebanon since 1976 are reportedly moving big guns and missile batteries into the coastal areas 25 miles south of Beirut.
—Larry Thorson, Associated Press, 13 March 1978.

14 March 1978
An interview with Syrian President Assad is published wherein he says Syria is an independent, nonaligned country that is not seeking Soviet military assistance.
—James Barrett Reston, New York Times, 14 March 1978.

19 March 1978
President Assad says that Syria's airspace is open to any Arabs and any military equipment seeking to enter Lebanon and fight against the Israeli military there. Reports indicate that Syria has agreed to permit Iraq to ship arms and supplies through Syria to PLO forces in Lebanon.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 18 March 1976; Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 19 March 1978.

19 June 1978
The Israeli military estimates that Syria possesses 70 SAM missile battalions.
—David A. Brown, "Israelis Intensify Readiness Training," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 June 1978.

17 July 1978
Lebanese President Elias Sarkis reportedly has given permission to Syria to install ground-to-air missiles in Lebanon.
—"What brings Lebanon back to the brink," Business Week, 17 July 1978.

22 July 1978
Sources in Damascus say that Syria is providing arms to Eritrean forces trying to gain independence from Ethiopia, a nation that receives massive military aid from the Soviet Union.
—Associated Press, 22 July 1978.

31 July 1978
The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports that in 1976, Syria spent $873 million—14% of its gross national product—on military expenditures.
—Katherine Johnsen, "Arms Exports Increase 60% in Decade," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 31 July 1978.

26 August 1978
Syrian soldiers arrest citizens in east and north Lebanon near Syrian-controlled anti-aircraft missile batteries. The Associated Press reports that this is the first time the Soviet-made SAM missiles are reported to be operating by Syrians inside Lebanon.
—Associated Press, 26 August 1978.

31 August-1 September 1978
Syria moves anti-aircraft equipment into parts of eastern Lebanon.
—"Israel, Syria Trade Warnings," Facts on File World News Digest, 8 September 1978.

31 August 1978
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan tells members of his staff that the current "creeping occupation" of Syrian forces in Lebanon may result in the installation of Syrian surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and Soviet technicians alongside Israel's border.
—William Claiborne, "Dayan Intensifies Israeli Warnings Over Lebanon," Washington Post, 1 September 1978.

4 September 1978
Syrian air defenses are reportedly reinforced as Syrian troops install anti-aircraft artillery in the Lebanese town of Chtoura.
—"Israel, Syria Trade Warnings," Facts on File World News Digest, 8 September 1978.

6 September 1978
The Voice of Lebanon Christian radio station claims that Soviet technicians are helping Syrian forces to install anti-aircraft and ground-to-ground missile launchers in eastern and northern Lebanon.
—The Associated Press, 6 September 1978.

20 September 1978
Israeli UN Ambassador Yehuda Blum alleges that Palestinian terrorists operating in Lebanon are supplied and trained by the Soviet Union. Blum also says that the Soviets channel weapons to these Palestinians through Syria.
—Cynthia Stevens, Associated Press, 20 September 1978.

2 October 1978
Jordanian newspaper El Rai reports that a Syrian military delegation is currently in Moscow trying to strike a new weapons deal. The Syrians are allegedly asking for MIG-27 fighter jets and other advanced weapons, including missiles.
—Elias Antar, Associated Press, 2 October 1978.

5 October 1978
Syrian President Assad arrives in Moscow to negotiate an arms purchase and receive Moscow's support to try to upset the Camp David peace agreements between Israel and Egypt. Soviet leader Brezhnev met President Assad at the airport in Moscow.
—Associated Press, 5 October 1978.

6 October 1978
Tass reports that Moscow has promised new support to Syria and other Arab nations who oppose the Camp David agreements. Also, a Syrian-Soviet joint communiqué is released to announce that both parties have agreed to "relevant decisions" about more Soviet arms assistance for Syria.
—"Soviets Pledge More Arms to Syria," Facts on File World News Digest, 13 October 1978.

29 October 1978
Increased Soviet military shipments to Iraq and Syria are reported to have been made conditional on cooperation between the two countries.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 29 October 1978.

31 October 1978
Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres expresses concern about the influx of Soviet weapons into the Middle East.
—Associated Press, 31 October 1978.

16 November 1978
The Arab Organization for Industrialization is formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and is based on a plan to manufacture advanced weapons in Egypt. US and West European sources say that this move may ultimately entice other Soviet armament clients away from the USSR, although some US arms manufacturers say the new Arab organization is inexperienced in weapons production and thus may falter beneath their excessive expectations.
—Drew Middleton, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 November 1978.

27 November 1978
Sources in Damascus say that Syrian President Assad will travel to Hungary and then possibly Moscow in an effort to settle a dispute with the Kremlin. The sources say Syria is at odds with Moscow over a repayment schedule for prior arms purchases, as well as the amount and quality of new weapons the Soviets will sell to Syria in the future. Another reported cause of tension is based in Assad's desire to buy more advanced weaponry from European sources in order to diversity his military assets. There have also been reports that some Syrian military officials have criticized the paucity and slowness of Soviet spare parts shipments.
—George A. Krimsky, Associated Press, 27 November 1978.

29 November 1978
The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa reports that Syrian President Assad has on three occasions rejected Soviet demands to sign a treaty of alliance. As a result, the Soviets allegedly told the Syrian leader that while Syria is a friendly nation to the Soviet Union, it is not an ally. As a friend, the Soviets reportedly said, Syria may only pay cash in US dollars for its arms purchases and the prices have gone up. A British journal also reports the Soviets have insisted that they authorize any use of weapons supplied by them to Syria in the future and that Soviet experts be assigned to each Syrian unit receiving new Soviet-made weaponry.
—"Foreign news reports on Soviet-Syrian relations," Xinhua News Agency, 13 December 1978.

11 December 1978
Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein arrives in Moscow in a visit some sources suggest is aimed at rectifying troubled Syrian-Soviet relations. The visit reportedly comes amid rumors that Syria's President Assad cancelled a planned trip to Moscow because the Soviets denied additional arms until he agrees to sign a bilateral friendship treaty.
—Associated Press, 11 December 1978.

1979-1983
Syria embarks on a second wave of military expansion in the effort to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel.
––Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

9 January 1979
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas is reportedly in Moscow to seek a larger supply of Soviet weaponry.
—"Syrian, Iraqi Presidents to Meet to Bolster Ties," Washington Post, 10 January 1979.

24 March 1979
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko arrives in Damascus for discussions with Syrian President Assad.
—Associated Press, 24 March 1979.

12 March 1979
A right-wing radio station in Beirut reports that Syria is transferring Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into Lebanon in response to stepped up Israeli air strikes in that country.
—Associated Press, 12 May 1979.

24 May 1979
According to Voice of Lebanon radio, Syrian MIG-21 fighter jets flew over Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley in order to protect ground-to-air missile bases from Israeli warplane attacks.
—Associated Press, 24 May 1979.

6 June 1979
The Cairo weekly Akhir Sa'ah reports officials in Syria and Iraq are pressuring resistance organizations in Lebanon to disarm Palestinians there. According to the newspaper, Syrian forces recently confiscated 800 Soviet Grad missiles within that context.
—"Palestinians to Evacuate Tyre and S. Lebanese Villages," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 June 1979.

23 June 1979
Libyan leader Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi flies to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Assad about increasing Libyan assistance vis-à-vis Syrian defenses against Israel. Western diplomats suggest this assistance would include financing for new Syrian weapons purchases from the Soviet Union.
—Associated Press, 23 June 1979.

27 June 1979
Syrian and Israeli fighter planes engage in two dogfights over southern Lebanon. This is Israel's first use of the American-made F-15 Eagle, which outclasses Syrian MIG-21s confronted in today's battle.
—Associated Press, 27 June 1979; Associated Press, 28 June 1979; Fred S. Hoffman, Associated Press, 28 June 1979.

28 June 1979
Syria reportedly elevates its entire air-defense system to high alert status.
—Associated Press, 28 June 1979.

5 July 1979
Western military analysts say that Syria's decision to use its less advanced MIG-21 jet fighter in the recent dogfights with Israeli planes over Lebanon reflect a conscious decision to prevent escalation of hostilities to a larger level. Analysts also say there is no indication that Syrian forces are readying their SAM-6 missile batteries in Lebanon, which seems to be another sign that the Syrians are not interested in more intense engagements with the Israelis.
—Edward Cody, "Syria to Challenge Israeli Jets Over Lebanon," Washington Post, 6 July 1979.

13 July 1979
Libyan leader Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi says he will replace Syrian planes lost in recent dogfights with Israel. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Qabas also says that Qadhdhafi has pledged to send ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles to the Syrians for use in southern Lebanon.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 July 1979; Associated Press, 18 July 1979.

19 July 1979
Israeli Air Force Commander David Ivri says that Israel is not engaged in a war with Syria now, but that tensions will escalate if the Syrians introduce anti-aircraft missile batteries into Lebanon.
—"Lebanon: In Brief," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 July 1979.

22 July 1979
According to a Voice of Lebanon radio broadcast, Syria has set up SAMs in the Urqub region and around the Qualyat airfield in Akkar.
—"Lebanon: In Brief," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1979.

27 July 1979
Lebanese radio reports that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have attacked parts of southwestern Lebanon where Syrian forces maintain control. These attacks come amid other radio reports in recent days that the Syrians have completed three defense systems in the region, including trenches for anti-aircraft missiles.
—"Lebanon: In Brief; Reports of Israeli Shelling," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 July 1979.

6 September 1979
Libya gives Syria four MIG-23 jet fighter planes to replace the four MIG-21s lost during dogfights with Israeli planes in June.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 6 September 1979.

19 September 1979
Syrian and Israeli jets duel over southern Lebanon. Israeli newspapers report that the Syrians used air-to-air missiles in the encounter.
—Associated Press, 24 September 1979.

24 September 1979
Syrian and Israeli jets sparred over Lebanon in the most active air battle between the two in three months. Israel reports shooting down four Syrian MIG-21 jet fighters. The Israeli jets were reportedly on a routine reconnaissance mission looking for Palestinian guerrilla strongholds.
—Associated Press, 24 September 1979; "Israelis Down 4 Syrian Jets," Facts on File World News Digest, 5 October 1979.

24 September 1979
At a news conference, the Israeli head of intelligence, Joshua Sagi, says that he does not believe the Syrians will bring SAMs into Lebanon.
—"Syrian-Israeli Air Battle Over Lebanon," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 September 1979.

8 October 1979
Syrian fighter planes shoot down an unmanned Israeli spy plane. An Israeli military commander says that the reconnaissance plane was investigating "a massive buildup of Soviet military equipment near the city of Homs" in western Syria.
—Louis Fares, Associated Press, 8 October 1979.

8 October 1979
The Syrian government announces that President Assad will travel to Moscow later in the month.
—Louis Fares, Associated Press, 8 October 1979.

11 October 1979
Palestinian sources report that Syrian and Israeli jets exchanged fire over Lebanon today.
—Associated Press, 11 October 1979.

15 October 1979
Syrian President Assad arrives in Moscow for talks with the Soviet leadership about modernizing the Syrian air force. This visit follows recent Syrian-Israeli dogfights in which Syrian jets were demonstrably outgunned by the Israeli's American-made planes.
—Associated Press, 15 October 1979.

17 October 1979
Syrian President Hafez Assad and a delegation including Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas flew to Soviet Armenia today following talks in Moscow which reportedly netted increased Soviet arms shipments. Tlas will reportedly return to Moscow after the trip to Armenia so as to conduct more detailed military discussions with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov.
—Associated Press, 17 October 1979.

26 October 1979
Syrian officials say that President Assad's recent trip to Moscow has successfully thawed Syrian-Soviet relations, placing them on a more positive footing and generating new pledges from the Kremlin to help modernize the Syrian military forces. The Soviets have reportedly promised to supply Syria with MIG-25s and other up-to-date arms. Syrian Defense Minister Tlas reportedly remains in Moscow where he is working out the details for forthcoming military deliveries.
—"Syrians, Soviets End Rift; New Arms Pledged," Washington Post, 27 October 1979; Christopher S. Wren, New York Times, 4 November 1979.

3 December 1979
The Soviets have reportedly written off Syria's $500-million debt for past arms shipments.
—"Mecca and the Gulf," Newsweek, 3 December 1979; "Assad Gets Soviet Arms Pledge," Facts on File World News Digest, 9 November 1979.

Early 1980s
It is believed that Iran facilitates the passage of, and/or pays for, North Korean-built Scud-C missiles to Syria.
––William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 336.

27 January 1980
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko begins a three-day visit to Damascus during which he provides reassurance of Moscow's friendship. He also tells Syrian President Assad that the Soviet Union may provide Syria with more modern weapons, including MIG-25 aircraft and ground-to-air SAM-6s and SAM-9 missiles.
—Associated Press, 28 January 1980; Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 29 January 1980; "Moscow's Moslem friend," The Economist, 2 February 1980; "Syria and Israel; Watching," The Economist, 9 February 1980

21 February 1980
Syria announces its intention to increase defense spending to a sum greater than half of its total budget.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 21 February 1980.

8 March 1980
The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa reports that a team of Soviet military officials arrived in Damascus recently to begin training Syrians to fly MIG-25 jet fighters and other military equipment. The agency also reports that the Soviets recently delivered modern FROG missiles to Syria. A network of these missiles, aircraft and tanks is now installed around Damascus and along the Syrian border with Israel.
—"Soviet experts in Syria," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March 1980.

26 March 1980
The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan reports that the number of Soviet experts in Syria has increased to more than 12,000. Sources say the Soviets will stand by the Assad regime amid reports that reactionary right-wing forces may try to overthrow the government. The newspaper also says that Syria is rife with heavy Soviet weapons, including in particular networks of anti-aircraft missiles.
—"In Brief: General; Increased number of Soviet personnel in Syria," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 March 1980.

16 April 1980
Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Libya and the PLO announce their formation of a joint military force to be headquartered in Syria.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 16 April 1980.

11 June 1980
A Kuwaiti newspaper reports that the Soviet Union plans to provide Syria with heavy modern weaponry worth $3 billion at no charge and forgive Syria of 80% of its current debts.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 June 1980.

24 August 1980
Syrian army artillery and missile wings conduct tactical exercises in conjunction with the air force.
—"In Brief: General; Syrian military exercise," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 August 1980.

27 August 1980
Syria conducts air force exercises during which it displays for the first time one of the most advanced air-to-air missiles in the Soviet arsenal. Syrian officials say that Syria is the first nation outside the Soviet Union to possess this new sophisticated missile.
—"Six New Israeli Settlements, Saudi Arabian Military Equipment," Associated Press, 27 August 1980.

10 September 1980
Syria and Libya announce the "economic, political and military" merger or their two countries in a joint communiqué. Syrian President Assad and Libyan leader Moammar Qadhdhafi promise to meet in a month to create a common government. Israeli Prime Minister expresses concern that these plans may lead to some Libyan weapons being relocated to Syria. Arab press reports, meanwhile, speculate that this new union will lead President Assad to travel soon to the Kremlin in order to request more arms, including MIG-25 jets and advanced SAMs.
—Louis Fares, "Libya and Syria Join to Fight Israel," Associated Press, 10 September 1980.

16 September 1980
Libyan MIG-23 fighters attack an American Boeing 707 airplane loaded with electronic reconnaissance gear flying in international air space 200 miles off the Libyan coast over the Mediterranean Sea. The American plane's pilots do not see the Libyan jet fighters, but they report hearing the pilots receiving instructions in Syrian to fire air-to-air missiles.
—William Safire, "Looking For Trouble," New York Times, 25 September 1980.

21 September 1980
An American C135 eavesdropping aircraft with one F-14 fighter jet as an escort is confronted by four Libyan Mirage fighter jets off the coast of Libya. Two other nearby US F-14s scramble to protect the C135, which escapes the face-off. Intercepts from the engagement reveal that the Libyan jets are receiving instructions in Syrian from ground commanders, which confirms that the Libyan jets are piloted by Syrians.
—George C. Wilson, "U.S. Fighters Chase Libyan Warplanes in Patrol Confrontation," Washington Post, 26 September 1980.

5 October 1980
Syrian naval forces, joined by air force and air-defense forces, participate in tactical exercises in Latakia. The naval units rehearse missile attacks using both their main and secondary live weapons. The air-defense forces fire missiles against air and naval targets.
—"In Brief: General; Syrian joint exercises," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 October 1980.

8 October 1980
The Soviet Union and Syria are expected to sign a friendship treaty in Moscow. Syria's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam said yesterday that the treaty is stronger than Moscow's standard friendship and cooperation agreement.
—Bernard D. Nossiter, "Syria and Soviet Set to Sign Pact Today," New York Times, 8 October 1980.

9 October 1980
Syrian armed forces carry out a tactical exercise with one of its missile launching units.
—"In Brief; Missile unit's exercise," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 October 1980.

10 October 1980
Syria and the Soviet Union sign a friendship treaty.
—Drew Middleton, "Influx of Arms Caused by War Worries Israel," New York Times, 2 November 1980.

10 October 1980
Amid escalating tensions and attacks between Iraq and Iran, Pro-Iraqi sources in Beirut and Israeli radio monitors indicate that Libya and Syria are airlifting arms and ammunition, including SAM-7 heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, to Iran using flight paths which run across Soviet territory. Sources also allege that a Marxist Palestinian guerrilla group is sending volunteers through the Soviet Union to Iran in order to operate Soviet-made SAM missiles being supplied by Libya and Syria.
—Nicolas B. Tatro, "Iranian Jets Hit Iraqi Cities, Libya Supports Iran," Associated Press, 10 October 1980; Fraouk Nassar, "Libya First Arab State to Offer Public Support for Iran," Associated Press, 10 October 1980.

11 October 1980
Iraq breaks off diplomatic relations with the "treasonous" Libya and Syria, while claiming to possess clear evidence that both Syria and Libya have established an airlift route between Tehran, Damascus and Tripoli.
—Steve K. Hindy, "Iraqis Warns to Evacuate Dezful, Ahwaz," Associated Press, 11 October 1980.

13 October 1980
Iraqi newspaper Ath-Thawrah reports firm proof that Syrian jets are transporting Soviet-made weaponry to Iran, including Strela missiles.
—"Ath-Thawrah on Syrian Arms Shipments to Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 October 1980.

17 October 1980
Baghdad radio says that Syria has sent more than 2,000 Syrian soldiers to fight for Iran against Iraq. Many of the soldiers reportedly have been sent as volunteer experts to oversee anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile bases.
—"Iraqi Commentary on Syrian Aid to Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 October 1980.

22 October 1980
Middle East defense analysts predict that Syria will soon make major arms purchases form France as well as the Soviet Union. In addition, reports among Arab governments anticipate that at least one-third of Libya's $1.6-billion support for new arms purchases may be used to procure Crotale anti-aircraft missiles and other French military equipment.
—John K. Colley, "France busy selling more arms to Arabs in Mideast," Christian Science Monitor, 22 October 1980.

Late October 1980
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas and a military delegation are in Moscow to negotiate a new arms package.
—"The changing shape of arms and oil deals," Business Week, 27 October 1980.

2 November 1980
Israeli analysts believe that Syria's army and air force will soon receive arms at least as good as that currently possessed by Israel. It is also expected that Syria will take delivery of the most advanced conventional weapons in the Soviet arsenal, including Scud-Cs with a 450-mile range, and that more Soviet experts and instructors will arrive in the country.
—Drew Middleton, "Influx of Arms Caused by War Worries Israel," New York Times, 2 November 1980.

10 December 1980
The official Baath Party newspaper in Syria, At-Tahir, discloses that Iranian officers are in Syria to train mercenaries and to oversee arms shipments to Iran. It also reports that two passenger airplanes make daily trips to Iran to deliver large amounts of arms and equipment, including SAM-6 and SAM-7 missiles.
—"Syrian Aid to Iran: Qadhafi and Asad," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December 1980.

10 December 1980
The official Baath Party newspaper in Syria, At-Tahir, reports that Libyan leader Qadhdhafi has refused to pay large sums of money he committed to Syria during a past meeting with Syria's President Assad in Tripoli. Qadhdhafi reportedly says that while he is willing to purchase new weapons for Syria, he will not, as previously agreed, pay off bills for weapons purchased in the past.
—"Syrian Aid to Iran: Qadhafi and Asad," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December 1980.

20 April 1981
Sources in Lebanon report that Syrian peacekeeping troops fired Soviet-made missiles and rockets at Phalangist-controlled areas of Beirut, north of the capital in the port of Jounieh, and in the mountains northeast of Beirut in the Keserwan region. The Syrian attacks are reportedly in response to the deaths of three Syrian soldiers.
—William Claiborne, "Israel Bombs Lebanon After Strike on Gaililee," Washington Post, 20 April 1981.

29 April 1981
Witnesses report the introduction of SA-2 and SA-6 missiles in the region after being driven in from Syria overnight, as well as the appearance of two Israeli jets overhead at day break, ostensibly to photograph the new missile sites. The SA-6 missiles are in some cases still seated on tracked vehicles as they are being moved into highly visible, freshly created earthworks along with radar trucks, according to reporters on the scene. Saudi Arabian officials claim that Soviet experts are working with the Syrians in Lebanon. The deployment of these missiles seems in response to Israel's shooting down of two Syrian helicopters in eastern Lebanon yesterday. Analysts believe that Syria's introduction of the missiles into Lebanon ends the reported implicit arrangement that allowed Syrian troops to penetrate into Lebanon in return for, among other things, keeping out ground-to-air missiles.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Syria Installs New Missiles in Lebanon; SA2, SA6 Batteries Escalate Conflict With Israeli Forces," Washington Post, 30 April 1981; Jonathan C. Randal, "Open Deployment of Missiles By Syria Seen as a Message to Israel," Washington Post, 1 May 1981; "Soviet missiles in Lebanon?" Christian Science Monitor, 1 May 1981.

30 April 1981
US officials express concern after intelligence reports indicate that Syria has moved Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into eastern Lebanon. Many in the United States expect that Israel will attack these SAM missile sites, which will likely lead to an escalation of tensions between the two countries. Many top-level US administration officials reportedly say that they believe Israel must be discouraged from acting to destroy the Syrian missiles, so as to contain the conflict. Israel, meanwhile, issues a warning to Syria, but Prime Minister Menachem Begin says he does not expect the confrontation will lead to a war between Israel and Syria.
—Dan Oberdorfer, "U.S. Presses Soviets to Defuse Lebanon Crisis," Washington Post, 30 April 1981; Lou Cannon, "U.S. Bids to Curb Israeli Escalation Of Lebanon Strife; U.S. Makes Effort to Restrain Israel in Lebanon Fighting," Washington Post, 1 May 1981; William Claiborne, "Israel Expresses Caution on SAMs But See No War," Washington Post, 1 May 1981.

1 May 1981
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin denies reports that Soviet officers have entered Lebanon with Syrian missile units.
—Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig to Discuss Missile Worries at Rome Parley," New York Times, 2 May 1980.

4 May 1981
US President Ronald Reagan asks Israeli Prime Minister Begin for more time to work out a diplomatic solution to the Syrian missile crisis in Lebanon before Israel moves forward with possible military action. In a letter to the Israeli leader, President Reagan also expresses his understanding of Israel's position that the SAM-6 missiles be removed. In addition, Reagan administration officials express frustration with Syria's unwillingness to withdraw the missiles. US officials believe that Israel will attack the missile sites soon if no diplomatic headway is made soon. [NOTE: Prime Minister Begin reportedly delivered an "ultimatum" to American and Soviet representatives at an earlier date which specified that Israel would strike at the missile sites militarily if they were not removed by a certain date. That date is allegedly today.] Meanwhile, members of Israel's parliament say that Israel will destroy the Syrian SAM batteries militarily if a diplomatic solution is not reached through a third party.
—William Claiborne, "Reagan Message Asks Begin for Calm on Lebanon," Washington Post, 5 May 1981; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Officials Fear Israel-Syria Clash," New York Times, 5 May 1981; John Kifner, "Syria is Resisting Pressure to Remove Missiles in Lebanon," New York Times, 5 May 1981; Bernard Gwetzman, "Begin is Said to Tell Reagan that Israel Face Peril as in 1967," New York Times, 9 May 1991.

5 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin indicates in a reply letter to President Reagan that Israel will hold off on responding militarily to the establishment of Syrian missiles in eastern Lebanon so as to allow a special US envoy, Philip Habib, to make a final trip to the Middle East in the hopes of resolving the crisis. Mr. Habib, a former undersecretary of state, is expected to arrive in the region later in the week. In his letter, Prime Minister Begin also compares the situation at hand with the difficulties Israel faced trying to head off a military engagement prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Indicates Israel Will Delay Moves Against Missiles Until U.S. Talks End," Washington Post, 6 May 1981; Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Envoy Ordered to Middle East," Washington Post, 6 May 1981; Bernard Gwetzman, "Begin is Said to Tell Reagan that Israel Face Peril as in 1967," New York Times, 9 May 1991.
.
6 May 1981
Syria rejects Israel's requirement that it remove its anti-aircraft missiles from Lebanon, saying the demand is "ridiculous."
—"News Summary," New York Times, 6 May 1981.

6 May 1981
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Korniyenko arrives in Damascus for three-days of talks with Syrian government officials including President Assad.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "U.S. Seen Weighing New Contacts in Lebanon," Washington Post, 7 May 1981.

6 May 1981
Syrian state-run radio and television reports that Syrian military units are conducting "large-scale maneuvers" at undisclosed sites. [NOTE: Unconfirmed reports from the Associated Press and broadcast in Israel indicate that as part of these maneuvers, Syrian troops have moved across the boundary established to keep them from deploying in southern Lebanon.] US diplomats suggest that the Syrians are signaling their military readiness to Israel in the event that the current missile crisis leads to an armed attack by the Israelis.
—Pranay B. Gupte, "High Soviet Aide Arrives in Syria as Lebanon Crisis Grows," New York Times, 7 May 1981; Jonathan C. Randal, "U.S. Envoy Arrives in Beirut for Talks on Fighting, Missiles," Washington Post, 8 May 1981.

7 May 1981
American envoy Philip Habib arrives in the Middle East.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "U.S. Envoy Arrives in Beirut for Talks on Fighting, Missiles," Washington Post, 8 May 1981.

7 May 1981
Syria reportedly brings in more tanks and troops to its missile positions in the Biqa'a Valley. Syrian troops also are reported to be digging in around their SAM-6 batteries in the region.
—Jonathan Kifner, "Special U.S. Envoy Reaches Beirut for Talks in the Israeli-Syrian Crisis," New York Times, 8 May 1981.

8 May 1981
Syria formally rejects Israel's demand for the removal of its anti-aircraft missiles from Lebanon, as US special envoy Philip Habib begins discussions aimed at settling the missile crisis. However, Syria's Defense Ministry issues a statement that suggests the missiles in Lebanon may not be required if Israel agrees to stop its attacks on targets in that region. This is the first signal from Damascus that a negotiated settlement may be possible, and it comes on the same day that the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko ends his three day visit to Syria. Korniyenko reportedly offered the promise of new military equipment to Syria during his visit. He also encouraged the Syrians to prevent an escalation of the situation with Israel, although while offering the Soviet Union's total support for the deployment of the anti-aircraft missiles in Lebanon.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Syria Seen Easing SAM Stand as Habib Mission Opens," Washington Post, 9 May 1981; Pranay B. Gupte, "Soviet Aid is Pledged," New York Times, 9 May 1981; John Kifner, "Syria Tells Israel It Won't Withdraw Missiles in Lebanon," New York Times, 9 May 1981.

10 May 1981
US envoy Philip Habib meets with Syrian President Assad. Meanwhile, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas tells a special Cabinet meeting that Syria has taken measures to "reinforce confrontation with the enemy."
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Syria, Israel Take Firm Stands," Washington Post, 11 May 1981.

10 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin says that he will order air strikes on Syria's anti-aircraft missile batteries in Lebanon if the United States fails to convince Syria to remove them. Also, a spokesperson for Prime Minister Begin denies a previous report that Begin drew a parallel between the current situation in Lebanon and the events leading up to the Six Day War in 1967.
—"Begin Says Syrian Missiles Will Be Attacked If They Are Not Withdrawn," New York Times, 10 May 1981.

11 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin says that he had directed the Israeli Air Force to attack Syria's anti-aircraft missile sites in Lebanon the day after they were introduced in the region, but poor weather prevented the attack that day. After receiving an insistent communication the next day from Washington that requested time to resolve the situation through diplomatic channels, Begin says he agreed to postpone the air attacks, first for three days then indefinitely.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Says Israel Prepared Attack On Syrian SAMs," Washington Post, 12 May 1981.

11 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister tells Parliament that the number of Syrian missile batteries in Lebanon has increased. He says that Syria has these deployed five SAM batteries in Lebanon and nine in Syria against its border with Lebanon.
—David K. Shipler, "Begin Says Syrians Have Increased Missiles in Lebanon and On Border," New York Times, 12 May 1981; William Claiborne, "Israelis Say Syria Fired SAMs at Jets," Washington Post, 13 May 1981.

12 May 1981
In two separate incidents, Syria fires SAMs at Israeli reconnaissance jets over Lebanon. Israel claims none of its planes are hit, while reports from Damascus allege that Syrian forces have shot down an Israeli plane. The missiles are fired from within Syria, according to Israeli military sources. The first of the two incidents occurs at dawn and includes two missiles being fired. The second incident occurs at noon, but it is unclear how many missiles are fired. These are the first reported use of missiles by Syria since the current Middle East crisis began.
— William Claiborne, "Israelis Say Syria Fired SAMs at Jets," Washington Post, 13 May 1981; David K. Shipler, "Israel Syrians Fired Their Missiles But Missed Aircraft," New York Times, 13 May 1981.

12 May 1981
US envoy Philip Habib arrives in Israel after conferring with leaders in both Lebanon and Syria. He is expected to return to Damascus tomorrow. Israeli officials reportedly tell Habib that Israel will offer no concessions in the attempt to remove the Syrian missiles from Lebanon. US Secretary of State Alexander Haig says that while it remains too early to predict the outcome of the missile crisis, he remains optimistic that a clash can be averted.
—Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Hopeful on Averting Mideast War," New York Times, 13 May 1981.

13 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin denies reports that the United States put forward a compromise to the current crisis which includes Israel limiting its air travel over Lebanon.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Denies U.S. Proposed A Compromise," Washington Post, 14 May 1981.

14 May 1981
Reports indicate that the Soviet Union has not pushed Syria to remove its SAMs from Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley but has encouraged Syria not to allow the crisis to explode into a full-scale war.
—Stuart Auerbach, "Syria's Shifting Of Missiles Fits Aims of Soviets," Washington Post, 15 May 1981.

14 May 1981
Syria fires SAM-6s in two separate incidents over Lebanon today, knocking down one pilotless Israeli drone but missing higher-flying Israeli jets.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Lebanese Witnesses Tell of SAM Firing," Washington Post, 15 May 1981.

15 May 1981
Soviet and American naval units are reportedly patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Lebanon.
—William Claiborne, "Mideast Crisis Draws Superpower Ships," Washington Post, 16 May 1981.

15 May 1981
After meeting with US envoy Philip Habib, Israeli Prime Minister Begin says that Israel is willing to continue exploring diplomatic alternatives for ending the crisis with Syria over its SAM-6 missiles in Lebanon.
—David K. Shipler, "Begin Vows That Israel Will Seek Diplomatic Solution on Syrian Missiles," New York Times, 16 May 1981.

15 May 1981
The United States announces that special envoy Philip Habib will travel to Saudi Arabia tomorrow in order to elicit its assistance in preventing rising tensions over Syria's missile emplacements in Lebanon. [NOTE: The Saudis have provided Syria with large scale financial backing in the past.] Senior US officials, meanwhile, say that a military conflict over the missiles could break out as soon as next week. As a result, the State Department orders a heightened pace of evacuation from Lebanon of US embassy dependents there and issues an advisory for Americans working in nonofficial capacities to leave.
—Bernard Gwertzman, "Special U.S. Envoy Will Ask Saudi Aid in Crisis on Missiles," New York Times, 16 May 1981.

16 May 1981
A senior Soviet official blames Israel for the current crisis over Syria's missiles in Lebanon. He also says that this dangerous situation requires patience to achieve a negotiated settlement.
—Anthony Austin, "Russian Says Mideast Crisis Must Be Settled Peacefully," New York Times, 17 May 1981

17 May 1981
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin meet and discuss, among other issues, the crisis over Syria's missiles in Lebanon. No details are made available about their conversation.
—"Haig and Russian Confer on Arms," New York Times, 17 May 1981.

17 May 1981
Saudi Arabia publicly announces its support for Syria amid the current Middle East crisis, but the Saudis also send a high level envoy to Damascus for discussions.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Saudis Send Envoy to Syrian," Washington Post, 18 May 1981.

17 May 1981
The Communist Party newspaper Pravda says that Israel and the United States have orchestrated the current missile crisis as part of a scheme to establish control over all of Lebanon.
—Anthony Austin, "Soviet Says U.S. and Israeli Attempt to Blackmail Syria," New York Times, 18 May 1981.

18 May 1981
As US envoy Philip Habib arrives in Damascus, Syria's ruling party newspaper Al Baath runs a front-page editorial charging that Habib has offered nothing during his previous two visits.
—Stuart Auerbach, "Syrian Tone Hardens as Habib Returns," Washington Post, 19 May 1981.

18 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin mocks the idea that Saudi Arabia could help relieve the crisis over Syria's missiles in Lebanon.
—David K. Shipler, "Begin Ridicules Idea of Saudi Help in Crisis," New York Times, 19 May 1981.

19 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin meets with US envoy Philip Habib and says after that he will organize the "proper authority" to make appropriate decisions based on what the two discussed. An Israeli government source says that the Israeli Cabinet will meet tomorrow to consider a US-proposed agreement to end the crisis and that afterwards Begin and Habib will meet again.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Sets Key Meeting of Cabinet," Washington Post, 20 May 1981.

19 May 1991
Syria claims to have shot down an unarmed Israeli reconnaissance plane over the Syrian port town of Latakia. Israel denies the report.
—Pranay B. Gupte, "Habib Meets Assad, Confers with Begin on Missile Solution," New York Times, 20 May 1981.

20 May 1981
In an interview, Syrian President Assad says that the SAMs were placed in Lebanon simply because they are necessary to protect Syrian soldiers from Israeli jets' daily over-flights. He also says that there is not yet any agreement to end the crisis, nor has he been presented with any detailed propositions by US envoy Philip Habib.
—Stuart Auerbach, "Assad Denies Accord, Says Habib Offers No Precise Proposal," Washington Post, 21 May 1981.

20 May 1981
Israeli Cabinet ministers meet to discuss US envoy Philip Habib's report. In a meeting thereafter in the Israeli parliament, Prime Minister Begin reportedly says that the Syrians offered significant concessions to Habib and he believes a peaceful resolution to the crisis can be reached.
—William Claiborne, "Assad, Begin, Cloud An Optimistic View of Habib's Mission," Washington Post, 21 May 1981.

21 May 1981
Reports indicate that the key unresolved issue in constructing a diplomatic solution to the missile crisis is getting Israel to cut back flights over Lebanon in return for a substitute US-provided method for gathering intelligence.
—John M. Goshko, "Assad, Begin Cloud an Optimistic View of Habib's Mission," Washington Post, 21 May 1981.

21 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin publicly introduces new stipulations to efforts to settle the missile crisis, now demanding that Syria not only extract its SAMs from Lebanon but also those located within Syria along the Lebanese border. In addition, Begin insists that Syria offer its assurance not to fire missiles against Israeli aircraft.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Raises Terms for Ending Missile Crisis," Washington Post, 22 May 1981.

22 May 1981
Syrian-based SAMs down an Israeli pilotless reconnaissance drone over Lebanon. The ruling Baath Party newspaper, meanwhile, says that Israeli Prime Minister Begin's new demands are "no less than a proclamation of war."
—William Claiborne, "Syrian Missiles Down Another Unmanned Israeli Plane Over Lebanon," Washington Post, 22 May 1981.

24 May 1981
Soviet military advisers are accompanying Syrian military units into Lebanon, according to Israeli Prime Minister Begin.
—David K. Shipler, "Israel Premier Says Soviet Advisers Join Syrians in Lebanon," New York Times, 25 May 1981.

25 May 1981
Another Israeli pilotless drone is shot down by Syrian missiles.
—Stuart Auerbach, "Syrian Missiles Down Israeli Drone As Habib Awaits Saudi Decisions," Washington Post, 26 May 1981.

25 May 1981
The Soviet Union denies that any Soviet advisers are accompanying Syrian military units into Lebanon.
—Serge Schmemann, "No Advisers in Lebanon, Moscow Says," New York Times, 26 May 1981.

27 May 1981
After conducting three weeks of shuttle diplomacy, US special envoy Philip Habib is summoned back to Washington to meet with President Ronald Reagan. Habib is expected to continue his work after a short time off.
—William Claiborne, "Envoy Habib Returning to See Reagan," Washington Post, 28 May 1981.

28 May 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announce plans to meet in the Red Sea port of Ophira next week in order to discuss the Syrian missile crisis as well as other regional issues.
—William Claiborne, "Begin, Sadat to Meet Next Week," Washington Post, 28 May 1981.

1 June 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin says that there is a limit to how long Israel will wait for a US-led diplomatic solution to the crisis over Syrian missiles in Lebanon, especially as Syria continues to increase its military presence there.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Says Israel Sees Time Limit For Habib Effort," Washington Post, 2 June 1981.

1 June 1981
US officials say that Syria has refused to agree to any plan that appears to have been born from Israel or the United States, thereby leaving only Saudi Arabia in a position to try to drive a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
—Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Mediation Role Rejected By Syrians," New York Times, 2 June 1981.

5 June 1981
US envoy Philip Habib leaves Washington for the Middle East in order to restart his efforts to resolve the Syrian missile crisis.
—"38 Islamic Countries Call for Cease-Fire in Lebanon," New York Times, 6 June 1981.

8 June 1981
Middle East intelligence officials believe that Israel is reluctant to conduct an air strike against Syrian missile sites in Lebanon because such attacks would require roughly 50 airplanes, with the expected loss of up to 20 of them in combat. Such losses, without US guarantees to replace them, are too high a price, according to these sources.
—"Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, 8 June 1981.

13 June 1981
An Israeli unpiloted drone is shot down by Syrian aircraft northeast of Damascus.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Habib Flies to Saudi Arabia; Syrians Down Another Israeli Drone," Washington Post, 14 June 1981.

13 June 1981
US envoy Philip Habib travels to Saudi Arabia in hopes of reinvigorating the sagging diplomatic efforts to end the current crisis.
—Jonathan C. Randal, "Habib Flies to Saudi Arabia; Syrians Down Another Israeli Drone," Washington Post, 14 June 1981.

16 June 1981
Still recovering from gunshot wounds suffered during a failed assassination attempt, US President Reagan erroneously says that Syria's defensive anti-aircraft missiles are offensive weapons; "there's no question about the direction in which they're aimed."
—"The Professional," New York Times, 17 June 1981.

16 June 1981
The Syrian government newspaper says that US envoy Philip Habib's efforts to defuse the missile crisis are no longer useful.
—John Kifner, "Saudis Call Habib 'Futile', But He Presses On," New York Times, 17 June 1981.

18 June 1981
White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that President Reagan simply misspoke and was in fact aware during a recent interview that the anti-aircraft missiles in Lebanon are defensive weapons, not offensive weapons.
—Lou Cannon, "White House Reorganizes Its Communications Staff," Washington Post, 18 June 1981.

18 June 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin promises special American envoy Philip Habib more time to seek a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian missile stalemate, but he also reiterates Israel's warning that it will use military means to remove the missiles if diplomacy fails.
—"Begin Extends Time on Missiles," New York Times, 19 June 1981.

25 June 1981
US envoy Philip Habib leaves the Middle East for consultations in Washington. He says that the risk for immediate armed conflict between Israel and Syria seems to have diminished.
—"Habib Returning to U.S. To Consult on Mideast," New York Times, 26 June 1981.

30 June 1981
Lebanese security forces take over the town of Zahle, ending the Syrian siege over Christian militiamen there which was a key event in the original spiral downward into the current missile crisis. [NOTE: Israeli jets shot down two Syrian helicopters in late April which the Israelis said were re-equipping forces atop a mountain close to Zahle. The Syrians installed SA-6 and SA-9 missiles the following day.] The militiamen leave the town. Their departure is reportedly a result of a special Arab League meeting last week that sought tactics to calm the Syrian-Israeli standoff.
—Stuart Auerbach, "Pullout Ends Siege Of Lebanese Town," Washington Post, 1 July 1981.

6 July 1981
US envoy Philip Habib meets with President Reagan in Washington.
—Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan and Habib Confer on Mideast Mission," New York Times, 7 July 1981.

7 July 1981
Syrian military forces shoot down a pilotless Israeli reconnaissance plane over Lebanon. An Israeli military spokesman denies the Syrian claim, alleging instead that the plane crashed as a result of a technical problem during a routine flight.
—"Syria says it shot down another Israeli spy plane," Christian Science Monitor, 8 July 1981.

6-12 July 1981
Joint Soviet and Syrian naval maneuvers in the waters off the coast of Syria occur. These are the first such larger-scale maneuvers between the two countries since they signed an official friendship pact last year.
—Soviets, Syrians in naval 'games'," Christian Science Monitor, 6 July 1981.

10-16 July 1981
US envoy Philip Habib returns to the Middle East for his third round of shuttle diplomacy aimed at solving the Syrian missile crisis. Meanwhile, Israeli jets conduct four days of attacks on Palestinian guerrilla strongholds in Lebanon.
—William E. Farrell, "Israeli Jets Destroy 5 Bridges in Lebanon," New York Times, 17 July 1981.

14 July 1981
Israeli jets engaged in a raid of Palestinian guerrilla strongholds shoot down a Syrian jet over Lebanon.
—David B. Ottaway, "Israelis, in Lebanon Raid, Down Syrian Mig," Washington Post, 15 July 1981.

17 July 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin announces that Israel will continue to bomb sites in Lebanon related to Palestinian guerrilla organizations.
—William Claiborne, "Begin Widens Targeting To PLO Sites in Cities," Washington Post, 18 July 1981.

20 July 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin meets with US envoy Philip Habib in Israel. Begin tells Habib that Israel will not consent to a ceasefire in Lebanon unless Palestinian guerrilla groups in the area are restrained from conducting attacks across the border.
—David K. Shipler, "Begin Tells Habib He Cannot Accept a Cease-fire Now," New York Times, 20 July 1981.

23 July 1981
US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger says in a television interview that Israeli Prime Minister Begin has twice undercut US attempts to bring about the peaceful elimination of Syria's anti-aircraft missiles from Lebanon. Weinberger also complains that Begin demonstrates a lack of respect for US concerns in the Middle East and an absence of restraint in dealing with Palestinians in Lebanon. White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes later says Weinberger's views do indeed represent the Administration's position on Israel's military actions.
—Michael Getler, "Administration Attacks Israeli Military Action," Washington Post, 23 July 1981.

23 July 1981
Israeli Prime Minister Begin expresses astonishment at Defense Secretary Weinberger's comments from yesterday, while Israel again launches attacks on Palestinian positions in Lebanon.
—William Claiborne, "Weinberger's Critical Remark Called 'Astonishing' by Begin," Washington Post, 24 July 1981.

24 July 1981
US envoy Philip Habib announces in Jerusalem that "all hostile military action between Lebanese and Israeli territory, in either direction, will cease." This ceasefire reportedly defuses the problem of Syria's SAMs in Lebanon, at least temporarily, as Israel is seen to agree not to attack the missile sites unless Syria rekindles larger-scale attacks on Lebanese troops that Israel backs.
—Charles Mohr, "U.S. Is 'Optimistic' on Mideast Truce," New York Times, 28 July 1981.

26 July 1981
US envoy Philip Habib returns to Washington amid a Middle East ceasefire that Habib helped to navigate.
—Charles Mohr, "Habib Back in U.S.," New York Times, 27 July 1981.

29 July 1981
Syrian jets and Israeli reconnaissance planes clash over Lebanon. A Syrian MIG-25 is shot down, according to Israeli military command. Israel reasserts its right according to the terms of the ceasefire to continue its reconnaissance missions over Lebanese territory.
—David K. Shipler, "Israelis Claim Syrian MIG-25 In Clash," New York Times, 30 July 1981.

Early August 1981
Israeli press reports that West German rocket company Orbital Transport-und Raketen-Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) has signed a contract to provide Syria with long-distance carrier rockets for ballistic missiles.
—Bradley Graham, "Rocket Firm's Third World Ties Test Bonn's Patience," Washington Post, 14 August 1981.

26 August 1981
Libyan and Syrian leaders meet in Damascus to discuss ways to increase their cooperation.
—"News Summary," New York Times, 26 August 1981.

9 November 1981
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon says that Israel will use military force to eradicate Syrian missiles in Lebanon unless US diplomacy offers results.
—David K. Shipler, "Israeli Warns U.S. of Military Move if Diplomacy Fails," New York Times, 10 November 1981.

9 December 1981
US envoy Philip Habib leaves Beirut during his fourth circuit around the Middle East since the Syrian missile crisis began in May. He previously visited Syria, Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
—"Habib briefs Lebanese on his Mideast mission," Christian Science Monitor, 9 December 1981.

11 December 1981
US envoy Philip Habib tells President Reagan that those involved in the Syrian missile crisis want the current more-than four-month-old ceasefire to continue.
—"Habib Tells Reagan All Sides Support Lebanon Cease-Fire," New York Times, 12 December 1981.

Missile Chronology

1982-1987

1980s
Iran is believed to have facilitated the passage of (and/or paid for) North Korean-built Scud C's to Syria. [Ed. Note: Reportedly occurred between 1980 and 1988].
––William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 336.

14 January 1982
Arab diplomats in Beirut explain that recent official Syrian visits to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, including a visit by President Assad, were conducted for the purpose of seeking aid to acquire more MiG fighter planes, SAM anti-aircraft missiles and T-72 tanks from Moscow. Abdel Halim Khaddam, the Syrian vice-premier and foreign minister, said that Syria is currently receiving $1.3 billion in aid from the Arab states. He meets today with Soviet leaders in hopes of signing a strategic cooperation agreement to counter the agreement signed late last year between the United States and Israel.
— Ihsan Hijazi, "Syria Asks for Aid to Buy Soviet Weapons," The Financial Times, 14 January, 1982; David Ottaway, "Syrian, in Moscow Visit, Seeks Closer Military Ties with Soviets," The Washington Post, 15 January, 1982.

17 January 1982
Syrian Defense Minister Mustafah Tlas reportedly says that Syria will keep its anti-aircraft missiles in Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley "indefinitely."
—"Arabs Step Up Attacks on U.S. Mid East Policy," The Financial Times, 18 January, 1982.

12 March 1982
Marshal Pavel S. Kutakov, Soviet deputy defense minister and air force commander, arrived this morning for a four-day visit, bearing a letter for President Hafez Assad from the Kremlin. Diplomatic sources in Beirut suggest that a Soviet-Syrian agreement providing Syria with new Soviet missiles and MiG airplanes has been signed. Also, replacements for Soviet experts posted to Damascus arrived a week ago.
—"Reported-Syrian Arms Agreement," Voice of Lebanon, as translated by the Broadcasting Service, 12 March, 1982; "Soviet Air Force Commander Meets Syrian President," The Associated Press, 12 March, 1982.

6 April 1982
Syria reportedly reinforces its positions in the Biqa'a Valley with SAM missiles.
—"Syrian Deployment and Missile Changes in Lebanon," Voice of Lebanon, as translated by the Broadcasting Service, 8 April, 1982.

20 April 1982
Syrians reportedly target an Israeli plane flying over the Golan Heights, in an incident described as the first missile attack within Israeli airspace since the 1973 war. Later, a military spokesman announces that Israeli reconnaissance aircraft flying over Sidon also have been fired upon, using hand-held missiles and antiaircraft guns. It appears that Israel is choosing to play down these incidents, however.
—David K. Shipler, "Israeli Planes are Attacked by Missiles," The New York Times, 21 April, 1982.

25 May 1982
Israeli planes on a routine mission have sent two Syrian interceptors crashing into the mountains northeast of Beirut. Two Syrian SA6 missile batteries located below -- placed there a year ago in response to Israel's downing of a pair of Syrian helicopters –– are not believed to have been fired. Western diplomatic sources in Damascus view the attempted interception of Israeli jets as a sign of President Assad's "refusal to abandon his self-assigned role as protector of Lebanese air space despite the Israeli Air Force's evident superiority."
—Edward Cody, "Israeli Warplanes Shoot Down Two Syrian Jets Over Lebanon," The Washington Post, 26 May, 1982.

9 June 1982
Israel claims to have destroyed Syrian missile batteries and 22 MiG aircraft today in a major battle over eastern Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley. Israel has demanded the removal of Syria's SAM-6 missiles since their installation there in April 1981. Informed sources in Damascus report that Syrian forces are pouring into Lebanon, doubling troop strength to 65,000. Estimates of Israeli troop strengths range from 20,000 to 60,000.
—"Syrian and Israeli Warplanes Wage Fierce Air Battles," Associated Press, 9 June, 1982.

9 June 1982
A communique from the Israeli Army Air Command released this evening states that Israel "had no choice" but to destroy Syrian missiles in the Biqa'a Valley, blaming Hafez Assad for having prompted the attack. In Washington, Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arens revealed that Syria had added six new sites in the Biqa'a Valley just last night, bringing the total to 19 at the time of the attack. He added that Israel's massive air attack had destroyed 17 of these and severely damaged the remaining two.
—William Claiborne, "Israelis Claim Syria's Assad Provoked Raid," The Washington Post, 10 June, 1982.

10 June 1982
Syrian officials have stated that, contrary to a statement by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, its SAM-6 missiles located in the Biqa'a Valley were not destroyed in Israeli air attacks. In a separate statement, a Syrian military spokesman listed two missile batteries among the losses suffered by Syria. Reagan envoy Philip Habib met for a third time with President Assad in Damascus, in pursuit of a cease-fire agreement; he returns to Jerusalem tomorrow.
—Henry Tanner, "Syrian Aide Asserts Troops in Lebanon Will Battle On," The New York Times, 11 June, 1982; William Branigin, "Hafez Assad Said to Insist on Pullout," The Washington Post, 11 June, 1982.
.
11 June 1982
In the wake of a "firm" message from U.S. President Reagan to Prime Minister Begin, calling for a cease-fire in Lebanon, the Israeli Government has announced a cease-fire to begin at 12 noon (6 a.m. EDT) today, after which time Israeli forces will shoot only if shot at. The Israeli statement made clear that any attempt by Syria to replace ground-to-air missiles in Lebanon will be immediately countered by every means at the air force's disposal.
—"Text of Israel's Truce Announcement," Associated Press, 11 June, 1982; "The Situation in the Middle East," The New York Times, 11 June, 1982.

14 June 1982
Diplomatic sources suggest that the arrival last night of General Yurasov, Soviet deputy air defense commander, indicates a high degree of concern on the part of Soviet military planners regarding Israeli accuracy in the recent destruction of Soviet-made missile batteries in the Biqa'a Valley. Israel's remarkable success in knocking out the SAMs without suffering heavy losses is attributed to an electronic system called "Wild Weasel," which allows them to deceive SAM radar while accurately homing in on the targeted missile. Missile batteries on the Syrian side of the border were also reportedly destroyed in last week's strikes.
— William Branigin, "Soviet General Said to Assess Syrian Losses," The Washington Post, 14 June, 1982; John Brecher, Jane Whitmore and John J. Lindsay, "Mismatch in the Sky," Newsweek, 21 June, 1982.

16 June 1982
Israeli Defense Minister Sharon claims that about 30 Syrian missile batteries were destroyed in the recent fighting, considerably more than previously reported [Note: See 9 June 1982].
—"Begin Tells Cabinet to Ignore Reported U.S. Threat," The New York Times, 17 June, 1982.

16 June 1982
Diplomatic sources reveal that Syria has installed new SAM-6 batteries on its border with Lebanon, supplied by the Soviet Union. There are also indications that a limited Soviet resupply effort is in progress. Soviet and Libyan transport planes have been sighted at Damascus airport -- three to four daily according to an Israeli radio report. Israel claims that the cargo consists of large number of MiG aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.
— William Branigin, "Syria Installs Soviet Missiles on Border," The Washington Post, 17 June, 1982; Ned Temko, "Moscow Stocks Syria but Avoids Widening War," Christian Science Monitor, 18 June, 1982.

24 June 1982
Heavy fighting is reported in central Lebanon. The Israeli Command accuses Syria of moving SAM batteries into the battle area in violation of the June 11th cease-fire agreement. Associated Press correspondent Richard Pyle has reported that Syrians fired missiles at Israeli jets during bomb runs against Syrian positions. The aircraft dropped balloon flares to "divert the heat-seeking missiles."
—Marcus Eliason, "International News," Associated Press, 24 June, 1982.

25 June 1982
Two SAM-6 missiles are reported to have been fired at Israeli aircraft in fighting today; Israel reports the planes as safe, however.
—"Israeli Battle Reports," IDF Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting System, 28 June, 1982.

26 June 1982
Syrians lost a battery (three missiles) of SAM-6 missiles today in an Israeli air strike, as they were being installed in the Biqa'a Valley.
—"Israeli Jets Strike at Syrian Missiles," Reuters, 27 June, 1982.

27 June 1982
Defense Minister Sharon announced today that the Cabinet resolved two weeks ago to view any Syrian missile battery reconstruction as a cease-fire violation. Therefore any anti-aircraft battery introduced into Lebanon would be "attacked and destroyed."
—"Israeli Battle Reports," IDF Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting System, 29 June, 1982.

30 June 1982
According to Lebanese Christian Radio in Beirut, Syria fired missiles at Israeli planes over Lebanon. An Israeli Army spokesman had no comment on the report.
—"U.S. Assures Israel on Talks in Beirut," The New York Times, 2 July, 1982.

5 July 1982
Western military experts shed light on the workings of the double-drone system used by Israel to knock out Syria's SAM batteries during its invasion of Lebanon. The first drone, a small UAV, is deployed over the targeted SAM installation to detect its missile guidance radio frequency. A second drone follows, equipped with a high explosive warhead and the ability to precisely home in on the target along the site's own radar beam. It is also capable of circling the area up to one hour if the radar is turned off in an effort to mask its location. This killer double-drone system is the result of a joint Israeli, West German and U.S. air force efforts. [See also 14 June 1992]
—Eric Gelman, "Israel's SAM Killers: Double Drones," Newsweek, 5 July, 1982.

5 July 1982
Previously unidentified missile batteries located in the areas of Sabra and Shatila, Lebanon, are reported to be firing at Israeli positions south of Beirut.
—"Israeli Battle Reports: Beirut and Operations in South," IDF Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting System, 6 July, 1982.

8 July 1982
U.S. Intelligence sources confirm that six Soviet merchant ships carrying surface-to-air missiles, among other military cargo, have unloaded in Syrian ports over the past couple of weeks, in a major attempt to replace weapons and equipment lost in battles with Israel in Lebanon.
—Fred S. Hoffman, "Soviets Supplying Syrians With Weapons," Associated Press, 8 July, 1982.

13 July 1982
An antitank missile called the AT 4, also known by its NATO name Spigot, has been recovered from the site of a recent battle between Israeli and Syrian forces, at Bhamdoun on the road from Beirut to Damascus. The missile is not previously known to have been delivered to countries outside the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. equivalent is the TOW.
—"Syrians Left New Weapon, Analyst Says," The Washington Post, 14 July, 1982.

24 July 1982
Military communiqués from both sides confirm that Syrian forces have shot down an Israeli F4 Phantom fighter-bomber following Israeli raids that destroyed three of Syria's new Soviet-made SAM-8 batteries, each consisting of four surface-to-air missiles. Reports vary as to whether a surviving SAM-8 battery on the Lebanese side or an older SAM-6 in Syria is responsible for downing the aircraft. The attack occurred in the area of Barr Ilyas, at the center of the Biqa'a Valley.

The IDF claims it was not surprised when the SAM-8 batteries were introduced to the Biqa'a Valley yesterday, stating that "it is reasonable to assume that it was the Soviets who operated the missile batteries" and further suggesting that the Soviets brought them in with the intention of testing them in combat against Israeli air force planes. The Soviet missile is mounted on a six-wheeled amphibious vehicle carrying up to three four-missile launchers (12 missiles), as well as surveillance, tracking and command radars. Upon launching the missiles, the vehicle can exit the site within seconds, thereby greatly decreasing the chances of being hit. Two missiles can be launched at any one time and at the same target, using different command frequencies. Codenamed Gecko by NATO, the SAM-8 is generally considered the equivalent of the Franco-German Roland missile.
—William Branigin, "Missile Sites Hit in Bekaa; Syria Downs Israeli Phantom," The Washington Post, 25 July, 1982; "Use of SAM-8 Missiles; Shooting From Syria," Israel Television as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 26 July, 1982; "Soviets Order SA-8s Into Action in Bekaa After Israeli Successes," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 August, 1982.

25 July 1982
In response to yesterday's actions, Israeli Cabinet Secretary Dan Meridor has warned Syria of "very grievous consequences" if it raises the level of fighting in Lebanon.
—Henry Kamm, "Israel Tells Syria Not to Introduce New Arms in Fight," The New York Times, 26 July, 1982.

30 July 1982
Prime Minister Begin advised the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that the IDF has been empowered to destroy any missiles Syria employs near the Lebanese border. He added that Israel may launch a military operation on west Beirut if the terrorists do not agree to leave; also, terrorist demands for Israeli soldiers not to be present during the evacuation have been refused.
—"Begin's Warnings to PLO and Syria," Israel Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 2 August, 1982.

10 August 1982
IDF's Tel Aviv Command reports that Israeli jets destroyed a Syrian SAM-9 missile battery in the Biqa'a Valley, moved there in defiance of Israeli warnings. The jets also attacked the PLO section of West Beirut and the Sabra, Shatila and Bourj el-Barajneh refugee camps.
—"Divebombing Israeli Jets Attacked West Beirut and Syrian Missile Sites in Eastern Lebanon," Associated Press, 10 August, 1982.

5 September 1982
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, in a letter to President Reagan, provided a complete accounting thus far of Syrian losses in Lebanon. Israel has destroyed 21 SAM-6, -8 and -9 missile batteries, 405 tanks (including nine T-72s), and 102 planes, all of which were Soviet-supplied.
—Edward Walsh, "Israel Rebuffs Reagan, Approves 3 Settlements," The Washington Post, 6 September, 1982.

8 September 1982
Israeli Air Force jets knock out a Syrian SAM-9 battery in Dahr al Baydar, Lebanon.
In a speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister Begin referred to this action, making clear a zero tolerance policy concerning the presence of such weapons. Deputy White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes expressed the Reagan administration's strong concerns about the renewed military activity in Lebanon and urged all parties to act with the "utmost restraint."
—"Israeli Government Accuse Reagan of Subjugation," Associated Press, 8 September, 1982; Loren Jenkins, "PLO Demands Israel Supply List of Its Prisoners," The Washington Post, 9 September, 1982; Edward Walsh, "Arab Leadership Said to Unite on Own Mideast Plan; Israeli Parliament Rejects Reagan Bid," The Washington Post, 9 September, 1982.

9 September 1982
A second consecutive day of air strikes by the Israeli Air Force knocks out four SAM- missile emplacements at Dahr al Baydar, in Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley. This action is a further indication of escalating tensions between Syria and Israel, following the recent capture of eight Israeli soldiers by PLO units.
—Loren Jenkins, "Israeli Jets Hit 4 Syrian Missile Sites in Valley," The Washington Post, 10 September, 1982.

12 September 1982
The Israeli military command has announced that an Israeli raid near Dahr al Baydar has taken out another Syrian SAM-9 battery. This is the third such raid in the last five days. The 'Voice of Lebanon' reported that Syrians moved three additional SAM-9 missile launchers into northern Lebanon, and that the Syrian deployment into the Biqa'a was assisted by eight Soviet military experts.
—"Israeli Warplanes Raid Syrian Positions," Associated Press, 12 September, 1982; "Israeli Attacks on SAM Missile Positions," Israel Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 13 September, 1982.

5-12 September 1982
A total of five SAM-9s, also known as Gaskin, were reported destroyed by Israeli jets in the Biqa'a Valley. These surface-to-air missiles are infrared-guided weapons mounted on armored vehicles, each capable of carrying four launchers.
—"Missile Strikes," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 September, 1982.

13 September 1982
An Israeli military communiqué today claimed 12 Israeli dead and 20 wounded in the wake of recent Syrian cease-fire violations. An Israeli air assault over eastern and central Lebanon today, thought to be the heaviest since July 22nd, is credited with destroying both Palestinian and Syrian Army targets including one SAM-9 battery, rocket launchers, armored vehicles, five Palestinian command posts and artillery positions. Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan adds a SAM-8 to the list of enemy losses, and claims that the missiles were operated by Libyans.
—"Israeli Chief of Staff on 13th September Operations," Israel Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 14 September, 1982.

4 October 1982
In an apparent retaliation action for an ambush near Syrian lines east of Beirut that left six dead and 22 injured Israeli soldiers, the first Israeli air attack since September 13th destroyed yet another Syrian SAM-9 battery in eastern Lebanon.
—David B. Ottoway, "Israeli Jets Destroy Syrian Missile Site," The Washington Post, 5 October, 1982.

14 October 1982
A 'Radio Free Lebanon' correspondent reports the emplacement by Syrian forces of a SAM-8 battery into the suburbs of the Hazirta township, last night.
—"Lebanon: In Brief; Syrian Missiles on the Biqa'a," Radio Free Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 15 October, 1982.

18 October 1982
Syrian forces are reported to have launched missiles at Israeli tanks in eastern Lebanon. Meanwhile, in a UN address, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel called for the "immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces" from his country.
—Edited by Anne Collier, "Lebanon President Makes an Emotional UN Appeal," Christian Science Monitor, 19 October, 1982.

18 October 1982
Intelligence and military officials in Damascus report than new military equipment from the Soviet Union has been arriving at the Syrian port of Tartus for several weeks now. Convoys of trucks, armored personnel carriers and trucks have been noted in convoys heading south from Homs to the Biqa'a Valley. New planes, possibly MiG-25s, are also being brought in and moved to the Syrian military base near Palmyra, 125 miles northeast of Damascus.

Officials affirm that Syria still has no adequate air defense system to protect its planes, radars and missiles, and that its most pressing war material requirement is improved electronic countermeasure equipment and the skill to use it. Syrian Information Minister Ahmed Iskandar Ahmed has said that "although we do not have the weapons balancing those of Israel, these will be secured in the near future." Syria acknowledges the loss of 60 planes and fewer than 30 missiles in military action with Israel in Lebanon [Israel claims 80 jet fighters, and 30 SAM batteries].
—James F. Clarity, "Moscow Replacing Syrians' Materiel," The New York Times, 24 October, 1982.

26 October 1982
Several Christian Lebanese radio stations have reported Syria's movement of SAM-8 batteries into the Biqa'a Valley and the Akkar region in the northeast corner of the country, as well as tanks and artillery. Israeli jet reconnaissance flights into the Biqa'a Valley have been noted making mock bombing runs. Although they were reportedly fired upon, no planes were hit.
—G.G. Labelle, "Syria Defies Israel With New Missile Launchers in Bekaa Valley," Associated Press, 26 October, 1982.

26 October 1982
Israeli sources say they do not perceive Syrian forces as an immediate danger, but are concerned about the pace of Soviet arms shipments and the apparently steady flow of SAM-8 and SAM-9s into Syria.
—Drew Middleton, "Arab's Armed Strength: Still a Worry for Israelis," The New York Times, 26 October, 1982.

26 October 1982
For the third day in a row, Israeli warplanes are reported to be intensifying reconnaissance missions over Lebanon. Both Israel and Syria are reinforcing their positions in the Biqa'a and northern Lebanon; Syria has reportedly deployed two new SAM batteries in the Biqa'a and established two missile bases near Qulay'at airport in Akkar.
—"Israel and Lebanon," The Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 27 October, 1982; Edited by Anne Collier, "Syria and Israel Bolster Forces in East Lebanon," Christian Science Monitor, 28 October, 1982.


31 October 1982
In an action described by Israeli officials as a "grave" cease-fire violation, Syrian forces located in Syria fired two surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets flying over the Biqa'a Valley in Lebanon; both missed their targets however. Israeli Defense Forces Radio said that Israelis never attacked missile emplacements within Syria, even during the war in Lebanon.
—Edward Walsh, "Syrian Forces Fire 2 Missiles at Israeli Planes in Bekaa," The Washington Post, 1 November, 1982; "Israel Says Syria Fired Missiles at Jets and Missed," The New York Times, 1 November, 1982.

7 November 1982
Syria reportedly fires a Sagger missile at an IDF position east of the village of (?Quq) from a position in Lebanon; fire was returned.
—"Sagger Missile Fired at Israelis: Increased Terrorist Attacks," Israel Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting Service, 9 November, 1982.

3 December 1982
Western military analysts surmise that Syria's formerly ineffective surface-to-air missile defense may lately have been improved with the addition of upgraded command and control systems. Evidence of advances in this area hinge on Syria's downing of an Israeli Phantom jet two months ago –– a surprise to the Israeli Air Force. There is speculation of a new, more sophisticated homing device or a possibly unjammable early warning radar.
—Loren Jenkins, "Soviets Reportedly Replace Weapons Syria Lost Last Summer," The Washington Post, 3 December, 1982.

1983
The Soviets agree to provide Syria with the SS-21 missile after Syria's June 1982 fighting with Israel in Lebanon. This is the first transfer of this missile outside of the Soviet Union. The SS-21, also know as the Scarab, is a single-stage, solid-fueled missile that is able to transport a nuclear, chemical or conventional warhead. The SS-21 is also more accurate than the FROG-7.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

4 January 1983
In an announcement thought to be politically motivated, the Israeli military command provided information regarding the construction of two SAM-5 missile bases in Syria. According to the announcement, the bases are as yet unmanned. Military officials conceded that, unlike the emplacement of missile batteries in Lebanon, Syria had a perfect right to install ground-to-air missiles within its borders.

The political motivation inherent in this announcement appears to derive from Israel's concern that Soviet rearmament of Syria lessens the likelihood of the latter's withdrawal from Lebanon; also, Israel is perhaps eager to remind the United States especially that Syria has certainly not abandoned its Syrian client and that it is in fact helping it restock with quite sophisticated weaponry of a kind never before noted outside of the USSR.
––Edward Walsh, "Israel Details Construction of Missile Batteries in Syrian Territory," The Washington Post, 5 January, 1983.

31 January 1983
In his annual report to Congress, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger alluded to Israeli successes against Syrian SAM installations in Lebanon, making special mention of the effective use of UAVs for reconnaissance and radar-jamming purposes prior to launching an attack. "We hope to improve our SAM suppression capabilities through greater understanding of such tactics," he said.
––"Israelis, British Provided Weapons Lessons," Associated Press, 31 January, 1983.

3 February 1983
Syria is reported to have reinforced its military presence in Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley, including installing new missile bases 3km southeast of Masna that were recently inspected by Soviet experts.
––"The Situation in Lebanon," Voice of Lebanon as translated by British Broadcasting Corporation, 5 February, 1983.

8 February 1983
U.S. officials confirmed preliminary intelligence reports that a third antiaircraft missile site may be being prepared in southern Syria near the Jordanian border, at As Suwayda. It is apparently intended to house SAM-5 missiles. Officials are viewing this as an expansion of Soviet military presence in the region, openly questioning whether Soviet teams are temporary or whether this is an attempt to establish a more permanent presence in Syria. Diplomatic sources reveal that the Soviet Union is sending up to 1,000 troops to man the SAM-5s, doubling the number of Soviet military personnel in the country. These same sources agree that Syrians seem not to be looking for a fight with Israel, but wish simply to upgrade their preparedness.
Syrian officials have justified the recent acquisition of SAM-5s by insisting on the necessity of restoring the strategic balance with Israel.
––George C. Wilson, "U.S. Sees Expanding Soviet Military Presence in Syria," The Washington Post, 8 February, 1983; Jonathan C. Randal, "Hundreds Are Sent to Man Missiles; Soviets Doubling Their Troops in Syria," The Washington Post, 12 February, 1983.


11 February 1983
The Voice of Israel reports that additions to the Syrian military inventory, courtesy of the Soviet Union, include shipments of new air-to-air missiles with a range of 100km.
––"Soviet Military Help for Syria," Israel Home Service by British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 February, 1983.

1 March 1983
Secretary of State Schultz and Defense Secretary Weinberger refer to the recent Soviet installation in Syria of SAM-5s, along with Soviet crews, as "destabilizing" and "serious." The administration views the situation as inflammatory, increasing the possibility of renewed fighting in the Middle East.
––Michael Getler, "Weinberger, Schultz Call Soviet Missiles in Syria Danger to Peace," The Washington Post, 1 March, 1983.

1 March 1983
Responding to U.S. administration pronouncements on the subject, the Soviet press agency TASS defended Syria's right to install Soviet antiaircraft missiles on its territory.
Israeli military sources suggested that the missiles posed a direct threat to the country's security and a potential threat to American planes operating from carriers in the Mediterranean.
––"Soviet Defends the Provision of Its Missiles to the Syrians," UPI, 2 March, 1983; "Soviet Military Equipment for Syria," Israel Radio by British Broadcasting Corporation, 2 March, 1983.

Early March 1983
Western military analysts in Damascus cite the Soviet installation of two SAM-5 missile sites as the most dramatic improvement in Syrian hardware. Each site consists of 12 missile launchers, including one missile per launcher and equipment for radar tracking and surveillance. Each is manned by 500-600 Soviet technicians. Batteries are protected by smaller clusters of SAM-6 and SAM-3 launchers. Reports of a third SAM-5 site being constructed along the Jordan-Syria border have not been substantiated.
––Thomas L. Friedman, "Syrian Army Said to be Stronger Than Ever, Thanks to Soviet Union," The New York Times, 21 March, 1983

Early March 1983
Military analysts assess Israel's cost in aircraft and personnel, should it attack the SAM-5 batteries, as detrimental –– not to mention the political costs of possibly striking the attendant Soviet personnel. A total of 4,000 to 4,500 Soviet technicians are currently thought to be in Syria, including those operating the SAM-5s. It is thought that Syria's main disadvantage in a clash with Israel would be the inability to exercise personal initiative in an atmosphere "hampered by the highly centralized and unimaginative Soviet tactics that accompany that equipment." And although Syrians have all this new hardware, they have had little opportunity to actually use it.
––Thomas L. Friedman, "Syrian Army Said to be Stronger Than Ever, Thanks to Soviet Union," The New York Times, 21 March, 1983

4 March 1983
Israeli Army Radio reports that a delegation may soon be sent to Washington to "coordinate positions" on the deployment of Soviet SAM-5s and attendant troops in Syria. Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Raphael Eytan has made it clear that Israel does not intend to attack Syria or its army, but suggested that Syria may be contemplating an attack on Israel.
––"Israel May Dispatch Delegation to U.S.," Associated Press, 4 March, 1983

12 March 1983
Syria is now believed to have over 50 SAM-5s, with a range of approximately 155 miles.
––"Soviets Pouring Arms Into Syria," Associated Press, 12 March, 1983

17 March 1983
A highly placed Soviet official informed the American government of repercussions should Israel attack Soviet-made SAM-5 missiles located in Syria. The official stressed that it is not to be inferred that the Soviet Union was looking for renewed conflict and that its demonstration of support was normal for an ally. Twelve batteries of SAM-5s are currently located on Syrian territory.
––Ned Temko, "Moscow Warns Israel: Don't Hit SAM-5 Missiles," Christian Science Monitor, 17 March, 1983

17 March 1983
Highly informed sources indicate that five SAM-6 missile bases from the areas of Turbul and Anjar in Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley have recently been dismantled and moved to locations within Syria. Dummy missiles have reportedly been deployed in their place, to confuse reconnaissance operations.
––"Reported Withdrawal of Syrian SAM-6s from the Biqa," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 19 March, 1983

29 March 1983
A highly placed Soviet official informed the American government of repercussions should Israel attack Soviet-made SAM-5 missiles located in Syria. The official stressed that it is not to be inferred that the Soviet Union was looking for renewed conflict and that its demonstration of support was normal for an ally. Twelve batteries of SAM-5s are currently located on Syrian territory.
––"Syrians Expect Israeli Attack," Associated Press, 29 March, 1983.

29 March 1983
Syrian Prime Minister Abdel Raouf al-Kasm announced in a Cabinet session today that he was confident the country was prepared should an Israeli attack occur. Major General Moshe Levy, soon to take over as Israel's chief of staff, has also stated that his army is "ready for a new confrontation with Syria in the spring or summer."
––"Syrians Expect Israeli Attack," Associated Press, 29 March, 1983.

31 March 1983
The London weekly 'Al Hawadith' suggests that Syria has taken delivery not only of advanced SAM-11 missiles but also MiG 27s from the Soviet Union. This information is not otherwise confirmed.
––"Assessment of Syrian Deployment and Equipment," Israel Radio as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 4 April, 1983.

27-29 April 1983
Radio reporting indicates that approximately 700 Syrian soldiers and Soviet experts have been noted moving missile batteries and heavy artillery between missile bases and emplacements along the Hammarah-Suwayri-Masna axis. The situation is described as noticeably tense in the Biqa'a region, in particular.
––"Military Activity and Tension in Lebanon," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 29 April, 1983.

Beginning May 1983
Israelis revealed to Secretary of State Schultz that the Russians have provided Syria with a powerful air defense and communications system. SAM-5 missile bases are established at Dumayr and Shinshar [Ed. Note: It appears that the base's name is Shinshar and the town in which it is located is Homs, which explains previous references to the base simply as Homs] and are reportedly off limits to all but Soviet personnel without express permission. The Israels claim the recent addition of SAM-11s to defend the bases, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of 15 kms. Also guarding the bases are short-range SAM-6 and SAM-8 units.
––"Syria and Russia," The Economist, 7 May, 1983.

23 May 1983
Two SAM-7 [Strella] missiles were reportedly fired at an Israeli helicopter near Amik, in Lebanon, behind the line separating Israeli and Syrian forces. It is unclear whether Syrian or PLO forces are responsible for this incident.
––Edward Walsh, "Israel Reports Syrian Planes Fired at Its Jets," The Washington Post, 25 May, 1983; David Lennon, "Syrian Jets Fire Missiles at Israeli Aircraft," Financial Times, 26 May, 1983.

26 May 1983
According to the Israeli military command, Syrian jets fired air-to-air missiles at Israeli reconnaissance aircraft over eastern Lebanon today, missing their targets. No further details about the incident were revealed.
––Edward Walsh, "Israel Reports Syrian Planes Fired at Its Jets," The Washington Post, 25 May, 1983.

Late May 1983
Recent information suggests that a large quantity of arms and ammunition has been offloaded from Libyan aircraft at the Damascus and Mazzah airports. The freight included "advanced" missiles and air-to-air missiles.
––Edward Walsh, "Israel Reports Syrian Planes Fired at Its Jets," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 31 May, 1983.

17 July 1983
Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Lapidot declared that Syrian missiles not destroyed in last year's attack have been repositioned within Syrian territory.
––"Israeli Air Force Commander on Absence of Syrian Missiles in Lebanon," Israel Television as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 20 July, 1983.

22 July 1983
Syrian claims of shooting down an Israeli UAV over the Biqa'a Valley have been refuted by Israel. According to Lebanese radio, Syrians fired a SAM-6 that missed its target.
––"Israel Denies Syrian Claim of Spy Plane Shootdown," Christian Science Monitor, 22 July, 1983.

14 September 1983
Syrian helicopters reportedly fired missiles on Aleppo Prison yesterday, killing 150 members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, three explosions rocked the city of Homs, the apparent targets being a Syrian intelligence center and two other government buildings. Two dead and seven seriously wounded are reported as a result of the strikes.
––"Syrian Operation Against Muslim Brotherhood ," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 September, 1983.

18-19 September 1983
According to Lebanese radio, the Lebanese Army clashed for the first time with Syrian forces northeast of Beirut on September 18th. The following morning, the Lebanese Army repelled a combined Syrian and Palestinian armored vehicle attack on its positions at Souk al Gharb, just 3km from President Amin Gemayel's residence. Lebanese planes also joined in, bombing the joint forces at Adey and Upper Matn. The joint forces reportedly fired on the aircraft with SAM-7s.
––"Syrian, Palestinian Forces Attack Lebanese Army," Xinhua News Agency, 19 September, 1983.

19-20 September 1983
An American military spokesman described the second day of U.S. naval bombardment as "defensive fire," after the American ambassador's residence was exposed to a rocket attack, although it was not hit. Two ships, the Virginia and the John Rodgers, are responsible for the shelling of an area known to be occupied by Syrian-backed Druse, Palestinian and Lebanese leftist militias.
––Thomas L. Friedman, "2 U.S. Warships Again Bombard Artillery Batteries Outside Beirut," The New York Times, 21 September, 1983.

21 September 1983
Syrian forces have reportedly installed SAM-5 and SAM-6s between Duhur al Shuwayr and Runwaysat Sawfar and Alayh. Antiaircraft guns have been installed to insure the protection of the missiles, in addition to distributing SAM-7s among assisting militia groups.
––"SAMs," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 23 September, 1983.

7 October 1983
According to American intelligence, the Soviet Union is shipping SS-21 missiles to Syria, marking the first time this missile will have been deployed outside the Warsaw Pact. The missile is carried on a six-wheeled transported doubling as a launcher and although capable of launching nuclear warheads, this is deemed highly unlikely in Syria, where it will probably carry conventional warheads. The SS21 is designed to replace the much older Frog 7; it is not only more accurate than the latter, its range is 70-75 miles compared to the Frog's 40.
––Michael Getler, "Latest Mobile Battlefield Weapon; Soviets Sending New Missiles to Syria," The Washington Post, 7 October, 1983; Bernard Gwertzman, "Syria is Reported Awaiting Missile," The New York Times, 7 October, 1983.

8 October 1983
President Reagan confirmed U.S. intelligence reports in his radio address on October 8th, stressing concern over Syria's recent increase in the Soviet presence and armaments. "Can the United States, or the free world, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet bloc?" said the president.
––Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Questions Buildup in Syria," The New York Times, 8 October, 1983.

13 October 1983
Reports from Damacus indicate that Syria has tested its new SS-21 missiles. Although the type of missile was not mentioned, Syrian Defense Minister General Mustafa Tlass supervised the maneuvers, which were reportedly carried out with live ammunition. A press agency dispatch from Damascus describes the event as a "total success."
––G. G. LaBelle, "International News," The Associated Press, 13 October, 1983; "Syrian Military Exercise with SSMs," Damascus Home Service as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 October, 1983.

17 October 1983
Trucks reported to be carrying launching pads then, later in the afternoon, missiles were noted in the Biqa'a Valley today. Soviet experts were observed installing the equipment at strategic locations near Tarshish and overlooking the Biqa'a.
––"Soviet Experts Install Missile System," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 19 October, 1983.

22 October 1983
The Syrian government newspaper Tishrin today published an editorial in response to President Reagan's recent reference to Syria as an obstacle to Middle East Peace. It stated that its Soviet-made missiles would not distinguish between American and Israeli targets, and claimed that Reagan "wants to terrorize Syria."
––G. G. Labelle, "Syrians Threaten to Rocket U.S. Force in Lebanon," The Associated Press, 22 October, 1983.

29 October 1983
According to Syrian TV, Soviet-made missiles widely understood to be the SS-21, were successfully launched in the fifth such test this month.
––"Syria Tests Soviet-Made Missiles," Xinhua News Agency, 30 October, 1983.

10-11 November 1983
Unspecified surface-to-air missiles were launched at U.S. jets in Lebanon on November 10th. In a statement the following day, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger suggested that there was no evidence that Syrian forces were responsible for the antiaircraft fire. He put no credence in Syria's claim that it had driven off four U.S. F-14 Tomcats.
––Farouk Nassar, "U.S. Jets Under Fire for First Time," The Associated Press, 10 November, 1983; "Weinberger Doubts Syrian Antiaircraft Role," The Associated Press, 11 November, 1983.

13 November 1983
Robert McFarlane, national security adviser to President Reagan, warned that the United States would retaliate should Syrian antiaircraft fire continue to be directed at American planes; he cited the recent invasion of Grenada as an example of the fate that may await such a decision.
––R. Gregory Nokes, "Administration Warns Syria on Antiaircraft Fire," The Associated Press, 13 November, 1983.

17 November 1983
Military sources claim that SAM-9 missiles have long been part of the Syrian arsenal emplaced in Lebanon's Biqa'a Valley. A senior diplomatic source has revealed that the deployment of advanced Soviet missiles in the Sannin hills, and in and around Za'rur, is completed. It is thought that the Soviets may gradually allow the SAM-5s to be Syrian-operated. Neither the Syrian nor the Israeli sides believe an attack is imminent.
––"Israeli Statements on Risk of War with Syria," Israel Home Service as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 November, 1983.

17 November 1983
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzaq Shamir affirmed that, contrary to recent reports, Soviets were not leaving Syria but were in fact "consolidating" there.
––"Israeli Statements on Risk of War with Syria," Israel Home Service as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 November, 1983.

19 November 1983
Israeli and U.S. military analysts suggest that Syria's manpower and quality Soviet weapons are solidifying its position as the leading Arab military power in the Middle East. Any Israeli air incursions would be sure to be met with heavy antiaircraft fire from guns and missiles manned mostly by Soviet soldiers. Only one of the four main Syrian SAM bases is currently operated by Syrians. Syrian air defense now includes 54 SAM batteries, 25 of which are SAM-6s, in addition to ZSU radar-controlled antiaircraft guns.
––"Syria Said to Pass Egypt as Power," The New York Times, 19 November, 1983.

19 November 1983
Reuters reports that in an interview with Beirut magazine Al Kifah Al Arabi, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass declared that if attacked by the United States, pilots are prepared to launch suicide missions against U.S. warships; also, that recently delivered missiles, clearly not SS-21s and with a 180-mile range, are capable of striking targets deep within Israel.
––"Syria Threatens Suicide Raids," The New York Times, 20 November, 1983.

20 November 1983
In the third Israeli strike this month against targets in Syrian parts of Lebanon, as many as 18 aircraft strafed pro-Syrian Palestinian bases in the mountains east of Beirut, in the vicinity of Falougha, Baalchmey, Bhamdoun, Sofar, Kobeih, Dhour al Obeidiah and Deir al Harf. Reporters say at least one Syrian artillery battery and anti-aircraft missiles were observed firing at the warplanes. Syria claims two planes downed; Israel reports one loss only, apparently from a shoulder-fired SAM-7 as it passed near Arbanniye, seven miles east of Beirut.
––Mona Zaide, "International News," The Associated Press, 20 November, 1983; Thomas Friedman, "Israeli Jets Bomb Palestinian Bases in Lebanon Hills," The New York Times, 21 November, 1983.

26 November 1983
A Syrian communiqué distributed by the official news agency SANA claims that U.S. jets were driven off by Syrian air defenses in Lebanon today. A U.S. Department of Defense spokesman was unable to confirm this claim.
––"Syrian Says Air Defenses 'Confront' U.S. Jets," The Associated Press, 26 November, 1983.

4-5 December 1983
In what Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger described as a "defense measure to protect reconnaissance flights," two dozen jet fighters took out Syrian antiaircraft batteries in Lebanon today. Washington confirms two U.S. planes downed in the raid; two U.S. crew members are currently believed held by Syria. The Pentagon categorized the attack as a retaliatory measure. The operation was carried out in the same area where U.S. reconnaissance flights sustained antiaircraft fire recently, east of Beirut –– this was confirmed by President Reagan.
––G.G. LaBelle, "International News," The Associated Press, 4 December, 1983; "President's Remarks on Air Attack," The Associated Press, 4 December, 1983.

4-5 December 1983
A Pentagon statement claimed "significant damage" on a majority of its "point targets": antiaircraft guns and missile batteries. The statement stresses the success of the mission while confirming that the planes were met by heavy antiaircraft gun fire in addition to at least 40 SAM-9 and SAM-7 missiles.
––"Washington Dateline," The Associated Press, 5 December, 1983.

5 December 1983
A Soviet warning transmitted by the government-run TASS news agency indicated that the U.S. air raids were "viewed as a serious threat to peace in the Middle East." Soviet head spokesman Zamyatin condemned the action against Syrian forces in Lebanon as "acts of banditry and aggression being carried out for more than a year now by Israeli forces with the assistance of the U.S. armed forces."
––Dusko Doder, "Soviets Say U.S. Attack Poses 'Serious Threat'," The Washington Post, 6 December, 1983.

6 December 1983
Syria claims two Israeli drones shot down behind Syrian lines in Lebanon today; Israel confirms one. Western military sources state that Israel employs the pilotless drones to ascertain radar frequencies, provide televised reconnaissance information, and gauge SAM battery reactions.
––Thomas L. Friedman, "Damascus Claims 2 Israeli Drones," The New York Times, 7 December, 1983.

12 December 1983
Pentagon sources confirm a list of targets in Lebanon to be bombed should further terrorist actions against American installations occur. These include Syrian-manned antiaircraft missile sites. Pentagon officials are reportedly convinced that the recent suicide bombings in Lebanon could not have occurred without Syrian assistance.
––"Domestic News," The Associated Press, 12 December, 1983.

13 December 1983
Two U.S. Navy ships shelled Syrian-controlled antiaircraft gun and missile emplacements following the shelling of U.S. reconnaissance planes. This sets into motion the new U.S. policy of "instant retaliation" in Lebanon.
––"U.S. Initiates 'Instant Retaliation' Policy in Mideast," The Washington Post, 14 December, 1983.

15 December 1983
In a second day of action, the U.S. battleship New Jersey fired at Syrian antiaircraft positions east of Beirut.
––"The New Jersey Again Opens Fire," The New York Times, 16 December, 1983.

18 December 1983
U.S. military spokesmen today acknowledged the U.S. Navy's immediate shelling of Syrian-controlled antiaircraft positions in Lebanon, in retaliation for an attack on American reconnaissance flights. Also in Lebanon, Israeli jets targeting Palestinian guerilla bases in the Syrian sector drew surface-to-air missile fire; heat flares from the attacking planes deflected the barrage.
––Terry A. Anderson, "International News," The Associated Press, 19 December, 1983.


21 December 1983
According to Damascus Radio, Israeli aircraft were "forced to retreat by Syrian missiles."
––"Israeli Air Raid on Pro-Iranian Positions in Lebanon," The Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 December, 1983.

29 December 1983
Syrian antiaircraft emplacements fired at Israeli jets engaged in mock divebombing exercises over southern and eastern Lebanon today. Reportedly, none of the jets were struck, having released heat balloons to deflect surface-to-air missiles.
––Farouk Nassar, "International News," The Associated Press, 29 December, 1983.

3 January 1984
Syria has released U.S. Navy Lt. Robert Goodman Jr. Goodman's jet had been shot down during a U.S. raid on Syrian antiaircraft positions on December 4th, as a result of which the pilot died and Goodman was taken prisoner. A Syrian statement said that the release was "intended to encourage a withdrawal of U.S. forces in Lebanon." The raid had been mounted in response to Syrian batteries firing on U.S. reconnaissance planes. Secretary of State George Shultz thanked Jesse Jackson for his efforts in gaining the airman's release which, he added, "can only be helpful to the course of relations between our two countries."
— Farouk Nassar, "International News," The Associated Press, 3 January, 1984; R. Gregory Nokes, "Release of Goodman a Peace Offering From Damascus?" The Associated Press, 4 January, 1984.

3 January 1984
Navy Secretary Lehman stated that a Soviet SAM-9 was probably responsible for downing the plane in which Goodman had been flying.
––Fred S. Hoffman, "Washington Dateline," The Associated Press, 5 January, 1984.
.
17 January 1984
On orders from Syrian President Assad, an artillery and missile group carried out a live ammunition exercise. The unidentified missiles reportedly "scored direct hits on the set targets."
—"Military Exercise With Live Ammunition," Damascus Home Service as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 20 January, 1984.

19 January 1984
Reports indicate that Syrian military trucks unloaded an estimated 200 tons of ammunitions, including Grad missiles, to Hammanah, ostensibly to be transported to nearby mountain battlefronts.
—"Reported Syrian Military Activity in Lebanon," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 20 January, 1984.

6 February 1984
President Hafez Assad is reported gravely ill, setting off a 'superpower scramble' in the Middle East to back replacement candidates, should he succumb. The Soviets, concerned that U.S. favorite Rifaat Assad would tilt Syria away from dependence on Moscow, have agreed to considerably enhance military aid to the regime, including SAM-5 antiaircraft missiles, advanced electronic warfare and MiG-27 fighters. In addition, the Soviets now declare support for Syria's position in Lebanon, stating that they will back Syria if war should break out with Israel.
—John Pearson, "After Assad: The Superpowers Scramble to Back Syria's Next Leader," Business Week, 6 February, 1984.

8 February 1984
Two U.S. Navy ships, the New Jersey and the Caron pounded Syrian and Druse missile and artillery batteries in a swath extending from Shuweifat, south of Beirut, to Shtaura, over 20 miles east of Beirut. Over 500 shells were fired. The bombardment was ordered in response to shelling directed at the capital. Most of the targets were reportedly located in the mountainous region near Hammanah, about 15 miles east of Beirut. [See: 19 January 1984].
—Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Battleship Pounds Hills Held by Syrians in Lebanon; Britain; Pulling Out Troops," The New York Times, 9 January, 1984

14 February 1984
At the request of the Lebanese command, the guided missile destroyer USS Claude V. Ricketts shelled Syrian-controlled artillery positions in central Lebanon today, blasting Druse militia positions in the mountains southeast of Beirut. In other action, surface-to-air missiles were fired at Lebanese jets flying over the Chouf Mountains.
—Farouk Nassar, "International News," The Associated Press, 14 February, 1984

27-29 February 1984
In the continuing power struggle to succeed ailing President Assad, the Defence Companies [armored brigades considered better equipped even than the regular army] commanded by Rifaat Assad took up positions directly across from an unusually heavy complement of presidential guards at the presidential palace. There was some shooting in the street and positions on both sides were reinforced in buildings throughout Damascus. Rifaat also deployed a battery of SAM-8's on a mountain overlooking the capital and blocked any opposition advance into the city. Multiple rocket launchers, tanks and artillery pointed directly on the capital.

Only when the president personally intervened with his brother on February 28th was open confrontation avoided; he also took the precaution of canceling all military leave. An all-night convocation of the regional council of the Ba'ath party on February 29th defused much of the tension, culminating in the unprecedented appointment of three vice-presidents: Rifaat, the president's brother; Foreign Minister Abdel-Hakim Khaddam; and Zuheir Masharqa, assistant regional secretary of the Ba'ath Party.
—"Syria's Shadowy Power Struggle," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 18 March, 1984

20 May 1984
Israeli aircraft bombed Syrian antiaircraft missile positions in Lebanon, just 2 1/2 miles from the border with Syria.
—"Israel Bombs Targets in Eastern Lebanon," Christian Science Monitor, 21 May, 1984

27 May 1984
Massive daily reinforcements along the front lines of the Biqa'a Valley, on both the Syrian and Israeli sides, have led to a very tense atmosphere. Observers have noted quite extensive reinforcements and fortifications of the Syrian's SAM missile network deployed along the Turbul-Kafr Zabad line, in addition to installing radar networks on higher ground. Nightly small-caliber skirmishes are reported in the narrow buffer zone (200-400m) between the two camps.
—"Phalangist Assessment of Syrian and Israeli Biqa Deployment," Voice of Lebanon as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 30 May, 1984.

29 April 1985
Western sources reveal that Soviet air defense troops that had manned Syrian SAM-5 batteries returned to the Soviet Union in October, and a third of all advisers have been returning little by little since that time. Numbers are reported to have dropped from a high of 6,000 to as few as 4,000, although another source suggests that these numbers may be much lower, dropping to 2,000-3,000.
—Christopher Dickey, "Many Soviet Advisers Withdrawn From Syria; Assad's Tight Control Seen as Factor," The Washington Post, 29 April, 1985.
.
13 June 1985
The Swedish arms manufacturer Bofors has been implicated in illegal missile and explosive sales to countries in the Middle East and Africa, among them Dubai, Bahrain, Syria, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Africa and Israel. Allegations first arose in mid-1984. There are two official investigations currently underway –– by Swedish police and customs agents. Several hundred surface-to-air Robot 70 missiles are thought to figure among the alleged contraband.
—Roland Stanbridge, "Illegal Arms Deals Alleged Against Bofors / Sweden," The Guardian (London), 13 June, 1985

22 June-5 July 1985
Syria began withdrawing its troops from Lebanon on June 22, including the last air defense unit, consisting of a single SAM-8 brigade. The missiles have reportedly been moved close to the inside of the border with Syria. The total number of troops redeployed is unknown; estimates range from 8,000 to 20,000 troops back in Syria. The remaining forces –– seven brigades or so –– are thought to be concentrated mainly in the Biqa'a Valley, in addition to a few regiments of paratroopers based in the Tripoli area. Western analysts forecast that the withdrawal will reduce tensions with Israel.
—Scott McLeod, "Syria's Troop Pullback From Lebanon Eases Tensions," Christian Science Monitor, 22 July, 1985

30 July 1985
Israeli jets raided Syrian-supported Palestinian bases located in the vicinity of Bar Elias, 31 miles east of Beirut. A Syrian communiqué reports that the planes were driven away by antiaircraft fire; the Israeli military command reported the mission accomplished and a safe return.
—"Syria Says Israeli Raid Killed Mostly Civilians," The Associated Press, 30 July, 1985

21 August 1985
Syrian-backed Druze militia launched missiles and rockets at the coast and Christian Maronite village of Tannourine, 50 km northeast of Beirut.
—Nora Boustany, "Rival Factions Pour Hail of Vengeance on Beirut," Financial Times (London), 21 August, 1985.

 

28 September 1985
North Korea denies recent news reports that the USSR "has begun shipping about 70 surface-to-surface missiles and about 60 surface-to-air missiles to Iran via Syria and North Korea." The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang calls the allegations "a wholly groundless lie" and a "fabrication of the Western trumpeters...."
—Korean Central News Agency, 28 September 1985, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 September 1985; "N Korea Denies Tehran Reports" Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 October 1985, p. 857.
8 October 1985
Syrian Special Forces are reported to have taken over the city of Tripoli and positioned missile launchers in the central streets.
—Robert Fisk, "Syria's Allies in Battle With PLO at Gates of Beirut Camp / Continuing Lebanese Dispute," The Times (London), 8 October, 1985.


Early-Mid October 1985
Syria issued an apology to Israeli regarding the firing of a SAM-2 missile at an Israeli warplane, which it missed. Syria characterized the event as a mistake, taken on the initiative of a low-ranking field officer.
—Nora Boustany, "Rival Factions Pour Hail of Vengeance on Beirut," Financial Times (London), 21 August, 1985.

19-22 November 1985
The Israeli military command reports that Syria has deployed SAM antiaircraft missiles to three different locations, including the Zabadani Heights, about 20 miles northwest of Damascus; south of the city of Homs, and south of the port city of Tartus. Future Israeli reconnaissance missions over Lebanon will therefore now be exposed not only to the SAM-2s, but also to SAM-6 and SAM-8 missiles already installed in that area. Prime Minister Peres stated that Israel is interested in "neither a confrontation nor an escalation," however Lt. Gen. Moshe Levy, the Army chief of staff, pointedly made reference to Israeli air strikes against such installations when a similar redeployment occurred in 1982. The Syrian move is thought to be in response to an aerial dogfight that resulted in the downing of two Syrian MiG-23s on 19 November. SAM-2s are the largest Soviet surface-to-air missiles, with a 25 to 35-mile range, for use against high flying aircraft.
—William Claiborne, "Israel Warns About Syrian Missile Sites," The Washington Post, 16 December, 1985; Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Says Syria Put New Missiles Close to Lebanon," The New York Times, 16 December, 1985.

15 December 1985
According to Damascus Radio, a ceremony held at an unidentified Syrian naval base formalized the Soviet transfer of an undisclosed number of naval vessels. The vessels, described by the Syrian chief of staff as "highly sophisticated technologically," may be fast attack craft equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, which are known to have been on order with the Soviets.
—Ihsan Hijazi, "Syria Receives Undisclosed Number of Naval Craft From Russians," The New York Times, 16 December, 1985.

15-16 December 1985
Again drawing parallels to the 1982 Syrian missile deployment that prompted Israeli air attacks [see 19-22 November 1985], Israeli military officials spoke "menacingly" of an "extremely dangerous situation." Defense Minister Rabin struck a softer note the following day, however, stating that there was currently no justification for a similar attack on Syrian soil.
—William Claiborne, "Israel Eases Reaction to Missiles; Rabin: No Reason to Attack Syria," The Washington Post, 17 December, 1985.

17 December 1985
The United States apprised Damascus that the November 19 action was not a signal of revised Israeli military policy and that the airspace violation had been a mistake. It has urged both Israel and Syria to "exercise restraint" in this matter. Despite appeals to remove the newly emplaced offending missiles, Syria has not complied.
––Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Asks Restraint on Missiles; Likelihood of an Israeli-Syrian Clash Appears to be Diminishing," The Washington Post, 17 December, 1985.

25-26 December 1985
Damascus Radio reveals that a message from Soviet President Gorbachev has assured Syria of its support regarding their deployment of missiles along the border with Lebanon, an event that Israel has hotly condemned [see 15-16 December]. Israeli Prime Minister Peres asserts that Syria moved the surface-to-air missiles deployed along its border with Lebanon, into Lebanon. Israel has determined, however, not to fuel an escalation with Syria over the issue.
—Ihsan Hijazi, "Moscow Backs Syria in Missile Feud With Israel," The New York Times, 26 December, 1985; William Claiborne, "Moscow Backs Syria in Missile Feud With Israel," The New York Times, 26 December, 1985.

1986 and 1987
Syria attempts to obtain from the Soviets the 900km range Scaleboard SS-12 and the shorter-range SS-23. [Moscow refuses both requests].
––Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 69.

5 January 1986
The SAM-6 and SAM-8 antiaircraft missiles that have been between Syria and Lebanon twice since a 19 November 1985 aerial incident, have been withdrawn once again inside the Syrian border.
—Don Oberdorfer, "Syria Pulls Missiles Out of Lebanon," The Washington Post, 5 January, 1986.

7 January 1986
The Israeli army command denied reports that Syrian SAM-6s had fired on Israeli reconnaissance planes flying over the Biqa'a Valley. The army announcement came soon after Prime Minister Peres commented on the likely danger of war "unless both countries behave properly."
—Ian Black, "Israel Warns on Peril of War / Premier Peres Calls for Peace With Syria," The Guardian (London), 8 January, 1986.

12 January 1986
Syria today defended its right to install antiaircraft missiles along its border with Lebanon and in the Biqa'a region of Lebanon.
—Elaine Sciolino, "Syria Defends Its Rights to Place Border Missiles," The New York Times, 13 January, 1986.

29 January 1986
Israeli planes struck at Palestinian guerilla bases located south of Sidon, in Lebanon. It is thought that this may have been an attempt to test the tacit balance of power between Israel and Syria in the region -- the planes fired within striking distance of Syrian SAM-2 batteries installed nearby.
—Joel Greenberg, "Israel Tackles Renewed Palestinian Threat in Lebanon With Return to 1982 Tactics," Christian Science Monitor, 30 January, 1986.

9 May 1986
CIA sources indicate that a shipment of 50 Stinger antiaircraft missiles reportedly headed for South Africa was hijacked and redirected to Libya, Syria and Lebanon.
—D. Costello, "Israel Warns on Peril of War / Premier Peres Calls for Peace With Syria," Courier-Mail, 9 May, 1986.

21 May 1986
Sources say that Syria is to receive "advanced weapons," to include SS-23 long-range missiles, from the Soviet Union before the end of the year.
—"New Soviet Weapons for Syria, Report Says," Associated Press, 21 May, 1986.

8 August 1986
In a speech delivered today, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres asserted that Syria is "spending large sums to acquire surface-to-surface missiles and to develop chemical warheads."
—L. Swayn, "Warning of Syrian Poison Gas Missiles," Telegraph, 8 August, 1986.

11 August 1986
In an operation described as "particularly dangerous" by military analysts, Israel passed within shooting distance of Syrian surface-to-air missiles situated just across the Syrian-Lebanese border, in Syria – as part of a preventive action against Palestinian terrorist camps. The SAMs did not fire at the jets.
—Andrew Whitley, "Israel Attacks Bases Near Baalbeck," Financial Times (London), 12 August, 1986.

12 August 1986
Arab and Western diplomatic sources indicate that Iran has in its possession 20 to 30 SCUD-B missiles provided by Libya and Syria.
—"Iran and Iraq Trade Strikes on Refineries," Associated Press, 13 August, 1986.

27 August 1986
Syria and Libya have revived an alliance directed primarily against Israel and the United States. News reports state that Syria has agreed to send air defense crews to Libya to assist in manning surface-to-air missiles and fighters.
—Ihsan Hijazi, "Assad Meets Qaddafi and Vows to Defend Libya," The New York Times, 28 August, 1986.

23 September 1986
Israeli jets attack Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrilla bases in the hills east of Beirut today. Guerrillas reciprocated by firing antiaircraft missiles and guns, none of which hit their targets.
—"Israeli Jets Hit Suspected Guerrilla Bases East of Beirut," Associated Press-Reuter, 23 September, 1986.

26-29 October 1986
A French arms deal with Syria, valued at 200 to 300 million pounds sterling and involving helicopters, tank parts artillery in addition to a large number of missiles, is said to await only the approval of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The French Government has denied the allegation of a pending arms sale to Syria.
—"Fury Over New French Arms Sale to Syria," The Times (London), 26 October, 1986; Campbell Page, "French Repeat Syrian Arms Denial," The Guardian, 27 October, 1986.

30-31 October 1986
French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond revealed that arms contracts with Syria concluded in 1982 and 1984 have been blocked. The deals were for helicopter gunships and missiles. The following day, Chirac spokesman Denis Baudoin issued a triple denial: of selling arms to Syria, of negotiating a loan to Damascus and of a truce with Arab terrorists suspected of recent bombings in Paris.
––Campbell Page, "France Halts Arms Deliveries to Syria," The Guardian, 30 October, 1986; Paul Betts, "France in Triple Denial on Links With Arab World," Financial Times (London), 31 October, 1986.

23 November 1986
Britain's Sunday Telegraph weekly reports that Libya has forwarded nerve gas warheads for Scud-B missiles to Syria and Iran.
—"Soviets Sold Nerve Gas to Libya Paper Says," Associated Press, 24 November, 1986.

27 November 1986
Jane's Defence Weekly asserts that one of the main arms pipelines to Iran, including missiles, spare parts aircraft, tanks and other war materiel, is Syria. In addition, the authoritative publication reports that Syria is producing chemical weapons in Damascus and Homs, converting surface-to-surface missiles to carry the nerve gas. It confirms earlier reports that Libya provided the nerve gas warheads for the missiles [see 23 November 1986].
—"Jane's Says Iran 'Will Take Anything'," Associated Press, 28 November, 1986; "Syrian Warheads Carry Nerve Gas," Courier-Mail, 28 November, 1986.

11 December 1986
Israeli warplanes attack several Syrian-backed Palestinian guerrilla bases in north Lebanon, including that of Abu Nidal northeast of Tripoli, bases of the Abu Musa faction, and bases just north of Nahr el-Bared -- reputedly belonging to leftist Lebanese factions and a major base for Syrian-backed guerrillas. Guerrillas fired at the jets with antiaircraft missiles and guns but no hits were reported.
—"5 Said Killed as Israeli Jets Stage Attacks in Lebanon," Associated Press, 11 December, 1986.

. 14 January 1987
Israeli Vice Admiral Abraham Ben-Shussan divulged that Moscow has furnished Syria with its first submarines, along with an unknown number of missile-equipped USSA-2 and Nanuchka vessels.
—"World Digest," St. Petersburg Times, 15 January, 1987.

27 March 1987
In a new book, Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman claims a recent deployment of SS-23 surface-to-surface missiles in Syria. [see also 21 May 1986 and 24 July 1987] Authoritative sources later suggest that "published reports" of Syrian ownership of SS-23 missiles have not been substantiated.
—"Could Syrian Arms Growth Spark War?," Christian Science Monitor, 27 March, 1987; Jim Hoagland, Patrick E. Tyler, "Reduced Soviet Arms Flow Weakens Syrian Military," The Washington Post, 25 September, 1987.

29 April 1987
Commenting on a recent visit by Syrian President Assad to Moscow, Western diplomats believe the Soviet Union will be providing Syria with more surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, in addition to tanks and jet fighters. It is also thought that Gorbachev has agreed to reschedule Syria's debt.
—Ihsan Hijazi, "New Soviet Aid to Syria Reported," The New York Times, 30 April, 1987.

24 July 1987
Diplomatic and intelligence sources reveal that the Soviet Union is denying Syria a supply of SS-23 missiles and delaying a MiG-29 delivery. These actions are thought to reflect Moscow's impatience with Syria over a number of Middle East issues, especially Premier Gorbachev's desire for better relations with Israel. The SS-23 has a more than 300-mile range, conceivably allowing Syria to strike at any target within Israel.
—Ian Black, "Moscow Steps Up Pressure on Syria by Blocking Arms Sales," The Guardian, 24 July, 1987.

24 August 1987
In the first such incident in five years, Syrian military sources claim having fired missiles at Israeli reconnaissance planes flying over the Biqa'a Valley of Lebanon, from Syrian territory. Eyewitness accounts suggest the missiles "exploded harmlessly in mid-air."
—"Syrians Say They Fired Missiles at Israeli Jets," Reuter, 26 August, 1987.

Beginning September - 6 September 1987
Italian police have apprehended 32 suspects following the interception of a Lebanese cargo vessel that revealed a cache that included Italian-manufactured weapons such as missiles, RPGs and mines, in addition to heroin and hashish. The investigation has implicated Syria as one of the main transshipment points for smuggling ring's weapons, which were usually bound for Iran.
—Roger Boyes, "Mafia Links With Tehran Shock Italy," The Times (London), 7 September, 1987.

Missile Chronology

1988-1999

1988
Syria begins to negotiate with China on purchase of M-9 missile.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 69.

1988
Syria requests that the Soviet Union provide it with the solid-fueled, shorter-range, more accurate SS-23 "Spider" missile. The terms of the 1988 INF Treaty, however, proscribe that the Soviet Union not only destroy its SS-23 missile capability, but also agree not to transfer this more advanced missile to other countries.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," Special Report from Middle East Defense News, Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992.

January 1988
Israeli officials claim Syria has acquired in its arsenal, 36 Soviet-made SS-21 and Scud missiles.
–Marie Colvan and John Witherow, "Syrian nerve gas warheads alarm Israel," London Times, 10 January 1988.

March 1988
Syria may have given to Iran SS-21 missiles.
–Edited by Charles Fenyvesi, "Scary SS-21s," US News & World Report, 24 April 1988, p. 21.

29 April 1988
Syrian forces fire a surface-to-air missile at Israeli warplanes approaching the Syrian border.
–"Israeli Troops Raid South Lebanon," The Washington Post, 30 April 1988, p. A18.

5 May 1988
Syrians carry Soviet-made Grad anti-tank missiles in fight against Israel at Machgara, Syria.
–Andrew Whitley, "Fierce fighting as Israelis Approach Syrian Position," Financial Times, 5 May, 1988, p. 1.

May 18, 1989
Despite protests by the US, China formalizes an agreement with Syria to sell 140 M-9 missiles for $170 million. Deal was reported to be financed by Libya who wanted to keep 80 of the missiles for itself.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 70.

17 May 1988
Syria is reported to have access to anti-aircraft missiles during fight between Syrian-backed Shiite Amal, and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah over control of suburbs.
–Reuter, "New fighting in Beirut breaches ceasefire call," The Toronto Star, 17 May 1988, p. A14.

21 June 1988
China is reported to be possibly close to selling Syria a shorter-range, M-9 missile.
–Michael Gordon, "Syria is studying new missile deal," The New York Times, 21 June 1988, p.6.

July 1988
The Los Angeles Times first reports that Syria has negotiated a deal to purchase M-9 (Dong Feng-15) missiles from China. The M-9 is a solid-fueled missile capable of traveling 600km. The United States rebukes China over this alleged planned sale.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," Special Report from Middle East Defense News, Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992.

6 September 1988
U.S. Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci begins talks to attempt to dissuade China from selling medium-range missiles to Syria.
–James Tyson, "Carlucci to urge Peking to curtail missile sales," Christian Science Monitor, 6 September, 1988, p.11.

October 1988
Soviet Union is alleged to be in talks with Syria over the sale of the "long-range, swing-wing Sukhoi 24 attack bomber." The Su24 is said to be comparable to the U.S. F111 fighter-bomber and can carry larger payloads than the Scud or SS21 missiles.
– David Ottaway, "Israel uneasy over word of Syria-Soviet arms deal," The Washington Post, 25 October 1988, p. A21.

1989
Israeli Deputy Chief of General Staff, Ehud Barak states Syria is building up its military capabilities including "strengthening of their strategic SA-5 anti-aircraft missile defences," and may soon acquire the Sukhoi-24 strategic bomber.
–Kenneth Kaplan, "Diplomatic Process could push Syria to war – Barak," The Jerusalem Post, 3 April 1989.

18 May 1989
Despite strong objections from the United States, China reportedly finalizes a deal to sell Syria 140 M-9 missiles. The $170 million deal is financed by Libyan leader Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi, who will keep 80 of the missiles for Libya.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

25 July 1989
According to Lebanese security sources, Syria fires five surface-to-air missiles at two Israeli fighter-jets flying low over eastern Lebanon. Reuters claims the jets were fired at from 10 kilometers from the Syrian border in what's apparently "the first time in over a year" that Syria has fired missiles at Israeli aircraft.
–"Did the Syrians Shoot?" The Jerusalem Post, 26 July 1989.

July 1989
A Soviet-made grad missile is shot by Syrian soldiers in Beirut as fighting breaks out against the Christian army and militia forces.
–"In Beirut, Death Before Dawn; Hospital Gets in Way of Lebanon's War," The Washington Post, 28 July, 1989.

31 September 1989
UAE newspaper, Al-Itihad reports China will sell Syria an unlimited amount of long-range missiles as per an agreement signed between the two countries on May 18 which also enabled Syria to receive Chinese-made M-9 surface-to-air missiles. American officials state to the newspaper that the deal provides Syria with "significant strategic deterrent power and destructive potential." The officials further state Syria has turned to China as a result of a failure to acquire Soviet-made SS-23 missiles due to the Washington-Moscow pact on limiting medium-range nuclear missiles.
–"China to sell Syria missiles," The Independent, 1 April 1989, p.8.

1989
According to a Paris-based Middle East Defence News, the Soviet-Union has supplied to Syria, surface-to-surface missiles and Sukhov-24 aircraft. The first shipment is said to have arrived one month prior during a visit by the Soviet commander of missiles and artillery to Damascus.
–"Soviet missiles to Syria," The Jerusalem Post, 17 October 1989.

23 November 1989
According to The Jerusalem Post, Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley containing "batteries of surface-to-air missiles," hold back on firing on Israel Air Force jets that attacked terrorist bases in Lebanon.
–Kenneth Kaplan, "IAF hits two Jibril bases in Lebanon," The Jerusalem Post, 24 November 1989.

29 December 1989
Israeli military sources say that Syria is approaching North Korea for assistance in the development of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) after China, under US pressure, withdrew from a similar deal. The sources also indicate that Egypt and North Korea are engaged in a project to develop a missile based on the Soviet Scud missile; part of this project is being developed in Egypt. Retired Israeli Brigadier General Aharon Levran says that published reports indicate that North Korea is assisting Iran in the development of an indigenous SSM.
–Associated Press, "Syrian Bid for N. Korea Arms Aid Reported," Los Angeles Times, 30 December 1989, p. A8; "Syria Is Reported to Seek Help from N. Korea to Get Missiles," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 December 1989; Korea Times, 30 December 1989, p. 4, in "Missile Cooperation With North Korea Alleged," JPRS-TND-90-002, 17 January 1990, p. 12.

1989
According to The Jerusalem Post, Syria and China sign a deal whereby China will sell to Syria 140 M-9 missiles for $170 million. The missiles are said to have a range of 600 km and may be able to reach Israel. French journal Le Point also claims that the Syria obtained the funds for the deal from Libya which will be retaining 60 of the missiles and leaving 80 for Syria.
–Kenneth Kaplan, "Syria, China sign missile deal," The Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1989.

1989
U.S. President George Bush makes strong remarks of agreement toward China's statement by the Foreign Ministry to "not sell missiles to any Middle East countries." The statement comes after a visit by U.S. officials to Peking by Brent Scowcroft, the U.S. President's National Security Adviser and Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, to ensure the Chinese that they "will not be isolated." Bush states he will, "keep looking for ways to find common ground" with Chinese leaders.
–"Bush welcomes China's promise on missile exports," The Financial Times (London), 12 December 1989, p. 3.

Late 1989
After their request to be supplied with the more advanced SS-23 missile was denied by the Soviets in 1988, the Syrians and the North Koreans begin negotiations for a missile purchase. The deal is reportedly held up due to the Syrians' shortage of hard currency.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

9-10 December 1989
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger make a "secret" trip to China. The Chinese reportedly move away from their plans to sell Syria M-9 missiles, and they distance themselves from any future plans to sell "medium range missiles" to the Middle East.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

Early January 1990
U.S. Whitehouse spokesman, Roman Popadiuk states China had "announced that they would not be selling medium-range missiles to the Middle East." However, according to a London-based Arabic-language newspaper, the Chinese government has officially given to Syria its commitment to continue its military support and rejected American pressures to stop selling weapons to Syria.
–Robert Pear, "U.S. easing curbs as China declares martial law over," The New York Times, 11 January 1990, p. A1.

1990s
Syria owes Russia $7-$11 billion for past arms purchases, and a total of $20 billion for both its military and civil debt.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

February 1990
Israeli Brigadier General, Aharon Levran states that Syria "has equipped several of its Scud missiles with chemical warheads," and may use it as a final resort to deter Israel from its use of non-conventional arms.
–"Syria equips scuds with chemical warheads," The Jerusalem Post, 22 February 1990.

20 March 1990
North Korean President Yi Chong-Ok travels to Damascus to sign a scientific and technical cooperation agreement with Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 72.

29 March 1990
North Korean Vice President Yi Chong-Ok travels to Damascus. He signs a scientific and technical cooperation pact with Syria during the visit.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

Late March 1990
According to Western military experts, a large shipment of Chinese ballistic missiles has been transported to Tianjin port, and may be intended to be shipped to the Middle East. China is discussing the sale of the M-9 to Syria.
–Andrew Higgins, "Chinese poised to resume missile exports," The Independent (London), 29 March 1990, p. 11.

Late 1990
Intelligence reports indicate that missile launchers have been spotted in Syria, but it is not clear whether they are for the Chinese M-9 or the North Korean Scud-C.
–Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "Algerian Reactor Came from China," New York Times, 15 November 1991.

11 December 1990
The Chinese Foreign Ministry issues a statement rejecting a foreign press report about China's plans to sell to Syria, medium-range ballistic missiles the day after a visit by US National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft to China regarding concern over the sale of weapons to the Middle East.
–Daniel Southerland, "China said to sell missiles; Shipment reported bound for Middle East," The Washington Post, 29 March 1990, P. A1.

December 1990
An Israeli official comments that Syria, using the $2 billion that it received for participation in the 1990-91 Gulf War, has purchased extended-range Scud-C missiles from North Korea as part of a program to acquire advanced weapons systems. According to Flight International, Israel claims the two-sides are "about to sign a contract" for the missiles.
–John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, vol. 30, no. 351, January 1991, pp. 22-23; "Syria 'Signed for N Korean Scuds'," Flight International, 13 March 1991; Full-scale production of the North Korean Scud-C at four to eight units per month is reached. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Ch~讪aeng (Seoul: S~譵ndang, May 1999), p. 277.

March 1990
U.S. has sought but has not obtained "assurances from China" that they will not sell medium-range missiles to the Middle East. This is in part due to the ambiguity in the definition of "medium-range" between the two countries. U.S. adheres to the internationally defined "missiles that are able to hold 1,000 payload more than 160 miles," but has not been able to have China state an agreement to it. U.S. has received unconfirmed reports that China may be planning to sell M-9 missiles to Syria through South America.
–Michael Gordon, "Beijing avoids new missile sales assurances," The New York Times, 30 March 1990, p. A7.

10 August 1990
According to the Herald, Israel tests a U.S.-financed surface-to-air Arrow missile, with which it intends to "knock Syrian and Iraqi missiles out of the sky" in order to test launch and propulsion systems.
–"Israel shows off missile," Herald, 10 August 1990.

1991
Syria contracts with North Korea to purchase more than 150 Scud-C missiles. The money to purchase these missiles comes from the approximately $1 billion that Syria receives as an aid package from Saudi Arabia and other wealthy gulf states in return for its support of the coalition effort to drive Iraq from Kuwait. North Korea ships 24 Scud missiles and 20 mobile launchers to Syria.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/.

1991
Syria receives Scud-C missiles and missile-production equipment worth an estimated $250 million from North Korea. Iran has agreed to transship about $100 million worth of the missiles to Syria.
–Bill Gertz, "Iranian-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times 10 March 1992, p. A3.

January 1991
Libya is allegedly financing a Syrian purchase of several dozen Scud-C missiles from North Korea.
–John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, vol. 30, no. 353, March 1991, p. 23; Michael Evans, "Scud Deal Caution," The Times, 7 February 1991; Charles Fenyvesi, "Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, vol. 110, no. 2, 21 January 1991, p. 16.

January 1991
The ship Al-Yarmouk, co-owned by Jordan and Syria, departs North Korea bound for Syria carrying 24 Scud-C missiles and 20 mobile launchers. The ship sails around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Suez Canal, in order to avoid inspection by Coalition Forces. The ship declares to Lloyds of London that its destination is Cyprus.
–Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs from Beijing," Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991, p. 12; John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, vol. 30, no. 355, May 1991, p. 23; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12; "Pukhan, Chungdong'e Scud Taeryangsuch'ul⾢Syria Wa 5 Ok Dollar Kyeyak," Joongang Ilbo, 12 July 1991, http://www.joins.com.

Late February 1991
Syrian Defense Minister visits Moscow on talks to purchase an SS-21.
–William Saffire, "Riyadh to Jerusalem," The New York Times, 4 March 1991, p. A17.

March 1991
According to The Independent¸ Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad is "buying improved Scud missiles from North Korea." Meanwhile, Israel becomes doubtful of any possibilities for peace talks between it and Syria.
–David Horovitz, "Crisis in the Gulf: Israel considers plan for a regional peace conference," The Independent (London), 9 March 1991, p.9.

March 1991
Syria pays North Korea approximately $250 million for 24 Scud-Cs and 20 transport-erector-launchers (TELs). Libya reportedly helps finance the deal.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

March 1991
North Korea provides Syria with 24 Scud-Cs in transaction worth $250 million with reported help from Libya.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

March 1991
First shipment of North Korean Scud-Cs arrives in kit form in the Syrian port of Latakia.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 72.

March 1991
Syria contracts for the delivery of more than 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea worth an estimated $500 million. According to Western intelligence officials, "Saudi Arabia gave Syria prior approval" for the missile purchase. The sale was supported by $2 billion that Saudi Arabia gave Syria for contributing coalition forces in the Gulf War.
–Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12; Lee Ki Dong, "'Chungdong Sae Pulssi' Pukhan Scud Missile/Miji'ga Palk'hin Ch'unggyžk'ŭi Such'ulshilt'ae," Taehan Maeil (Seoul Shinmun), 12 July 1991, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Chae Hak, "Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such'ul/Shimsangch'anh'ŭn Taechungdong P'anmaesžl," Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr.

March 1991
North Korea delivers more than two dozen Scud-Cs to Syria.
–Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus," Washington Times, 2 July 1991, p. A4.

13 March 1991The Al-Yarmouk docks in Latakia, Syria, laden with 24 North Korean Scud-C missiles and 20 launchers. The ship arrives the same day US Secretary of State James Baker arrives in Damascus to meet with Syrian President Haffez al-Assad for the first time. Syria has reportedly "contracted for the delivery of more than 150 North Korean Scud-C missiles at an estimated cost of $500 million. The money reportedly comes from $2 billion that Saudi Arabia had given Syria for supplying combat troops during the Gulf War. The missiles are capable of carrying chemical warheads. [Note: the Wall Street Journal report says there are 24 missiles, but is not clear about the number of launchers.]
–Bill Gertz, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12; Adel Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'," The Independent, 6 April 1991; "Syria 'Signed for N Korean Scuds'," Flight International, 13 March 1991.

Early March 1991
Syrian Foreign Minister, Farouk Shaara confirms shipment of Scud missiles to Syria in the last few days. Shaara states to journalists, "We are still in a state of war with the state of Israel, and Israel has so many missiles and so many types of mass destruction weapons."
–Johanna Neuman, "Don't expect an 'instant peace,' Baker warns," USA Today, 15 March 1991, p. 4A.

Early-mid 1991
North Korea ships dozens of Scud-C missiles, a modified version of the Scud-B which is capable to carrying chemical and conventional warheads, to Syria this year.
–Adel Darwish, "N Korea 'selling Scuds'," The Independent (London), 6 April 1991, p. 10.

April 1991
President Bush expresses anger over reports that China is selling missiles to Syria.
–Tom Brown, "Bush meets exile, defies China," The Seattle Times, 17 April 1991, p. F1.

April 1991
U.S intelligence issues reports over China selling ballistic missiles to Syria. This has angered Washington and may lead to trade restrictions on China as a threatening measure.
–R. Jeffrey Smith, "China aid on Algerian reactor may violate pledges," The Washington Post, 20 April 1991, p. A17.

April 1991
Syria receives 60 Scud-Cs and 12 TELs from North Korea. This is the first delivery after North Korea and Syria reach an agreement on the sale of 150 Scud-Cs for an estimated $500 million. As part of this $500 million deal, the North Koreans reportedly agree to build two missile assembly and electronics facilities in Syria—one in Aleppo and one in Hama.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," Special Report from Middle East Defense News, Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992.

April 1991
60 Scud-Cs and 12 TELs arrive in Syria from North Korea in a first shipment of 150 Scud-Cs for an estimated $500 million.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/.

April 1991
North Korea begins deliveries of an estimated 60 Hwasžng-6 (Scud-C) missiles and 12 transporter erector launchers (TELs) to Syria via Iran. North Korea and Syria conclude an agreement for long-term deliveries that continue until at least 1995. There is also a report that North Korea has agreed to build new facilities in Iran to produce three types of Scuds.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chžnjaeng (Seoul: Sžmundang, May 1999), p. 277; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, vol. 33, no. 10, 1 October 2000; Adel Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'," The Independent, 6 April 1991.

May 1991
North Korea transports 36 Scud-Cs through Yugoslavia to Syria.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/.

May 1991
According to Israeli Ministry of Defense Director-General David Ivry, Syria takes delivery of a shipment of Scud-C missiles from North Korea. The missiles were carried aboard a Yugoslavian freighter. The Jerusalem Report claims the number of Scud missiles is 36.
–Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus," Washington Times, 2 July 1991, p. A4; Leslie Susser, "How to Control the Arms Race and Stay on Top," The Jerusalem Report, 13 June 1991, p. 27.

May 1991
Syria receives 36 Scud-Cs from North Korea. The missiles are transported to Syria aboard a Yugoslavian freighter.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

7 May 1991
Israeli Defence minister Moshe Arens says North Korea is the source of Syria's Scud C missiles, rather than the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Arens states he "has heard that the Czech-Syrian arms deal has not been closed."
–Bradley Burston, "Weapons sales to be discussed," The Jerusalem Post, 8 May 1991.

May 1991
"Informed sources" state in a recent issue of the Israeli army's newsletter that Syria was seeking more Scud missiles from North Korea and a new Chinese surface-to-surface M-9 missile.
–Michael Sheridan, "Hopes fading for US peace mission," The Independent (London), 14 May 1991, p. 10.

End of May 1991
Commenting on the recent signing of the "Brotherhood" treaty between Syria and Lebanon, Israeli Government Press Office director, Dr. Yossi Olmert states to The Jerusalem Post, that "Syrians are negotiating with the People's Republic of China over the purchase of M9 surface-to-surface missiles with an effective range of 800 kilometers, as well with Czechoslovakia for the purchase of 300 T-72 tanks and with the Soviet Union to buy more Sukhoi long-range bombers, MiG 29 fighters and sophisticated tanks and air defense systems." The newspaper further states that Syria has received Scud C missiles from North Korea and is now awaiting delivery of launchers.
–David Rudge, "Rising tension on eve of Lebanon-Syria 'Brotherhood' Pact," The Jerusalem Post, 22 May 1991.

End of May 1991
According to The Washington Post, a senior Israeli military official states to reporters that, "Syria is spending an estimated $200 million to $400 million" to obtain North Korean Scud C ballistic missile launchers and Chinese M9 missiles by next year. The official further states that Syria has already obtained the Soviet Scud B and SS-21 missiles and is now trying to acquire equipment for indigenous missile production.
–R. Jeffrey Smith, "Israel to get F-15s, aid for missile program," The Washington Post, 31 May, 1991, p. A21.

End of May 1991
U.S. has opened discussions on renewing China's Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status in trade relations. One of the items in the debate over whether to approve MFN to China will be based on China having reportedly sent to Pakistan mobile missile launchers for future sale to Syria.
–Marilyn Greene, "Lawmakers open debate on renewing trade benefits," USA Today, 30 May 1991, p. 6A.

31 May 1991
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens tells visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama that Israel is concerned about North Korean missile sales to Syria and other countries. Nakayama says that Japan will ask North Korea to cease exporting Scud missiles to these countries.
–Kyodo (Tokyo), 31 May 1991, in "Japanese Foreign Minister Concludes Visit: Reviews DPRK Missile Sales," FBIS-NES-91-106, 3 June 1991, p. 31; "'Pukhan Mugisuch'ul Uryž'/Israel Kukpangjanggwan," Joongang Ilbo, 2 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

31 May 1991
A senior Israeli military official tells reporters that Syria is spending between $200 and $400 million to acquire a brigade of Scud-C missile launchers from North Korea by 1992, and is also interested in procuring "an indigenous missile production capability." [Note: This is probably just a confirmation of the March 1991 deal. Also, while the source only indicates launchers as part of the sale, given the amount of money involved, it is likely that missiles are included as well. A Soviet-style brigade would consist of 12 to 18 launchers.]
–R. Jeffrey Smith, "Israel to Get F-15s, Aid for Missile Program," Washington Post, 31 May 1991, pp. A12, A26.

June 1991
A second shipment of 30 North Korean Scud-C missiles arrives in Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 72.

June 1991
According to Bush administration officials, a large shipment of North Korean Scud-C missiles arrives in Cyprus and is transferred to smaller vessels for transshipment to Syria.
–Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast Via Cyprus," Washington Times, 2 July 1991, p. A4.

June 1991
US intelligence agencies monitor up to 10 Soviet-made Scud-C missiles being delivered to North Korea by rail. US officials believe this may be an attempt to replenish stocks depleted by sales to Syria.–Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast Via Cyprus," Washington Times, 2 July 1991, p. A4.

June 1991
According to a Kyodo report, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens says during a trip to the United States that North Korea has begun to ship Scud missiles, launchers, and production technology to Syria. On 26 June, Arens says that the shipment began 2-3 weeks before and that another shipment will soon follow.
–"Pukhan, Syria E Scud Missile Kot 2 Ch'agonggŭp," Joongang Ilbo, 27 June 1991 .

Summer 1991
The North Korean ship Mupo departs Namp'o bound for Syria allegedly carrying eight launchers and an additional missile shipment as part of the Syrian order for 150 Scud-C missiles; the first 24 were delivered in March 1991.
–Bill Gertz, "Ship with Scud Cargo for Syria Alters Course," Washington Times, 9 November 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missiles Likely on 2nd Ship," Washington Times, 10 December 1991, p. A6; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3.

Summer 1991
An unknown number of Scud-Cs are delivered to Syria from North Korea. The missiles are transported aboard a North Korean ship named Mupo then transferred in Cyprus.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

Mid-June 1991
According to senior U.S. officials, the Bush administration plans next week to put pressure on China to abide by international export control agreements, in response to intelligence reports regarding Chinese plans of selling M-9 and M-11missiles to Pakistan and Syria.
–R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. to press China to halt missile sales," The Washington Post, 11 June 1991, p. A14.

16 June 1991
US Under-Secrety of State for international security affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, arrives in Peking to warn Chinese against the sale of ballistic missiles to Pakistan or Syria. He warns that if the deal goes through, it will greatly harm US-Sino trade relations, and may end China's preferential trading status.
–"Arms sale warning to Peking," The Times, 17 June 1991.

25 June 1991
U.S. Senate Majority Leader, George J. Mitchell (D-Maine), announces a consensus amongst a Democratic proposal to renew China's MFN trade status, based on a condition that it improves human rights and trade practices, and immediately terminates any agreements to export ballistic missiles to Syria, Iran or Pakistan. Furthermore, the bill requires the president to "certify within 15 days of enactment" that China has not exported any such missiles or launchers to the three countries and if the sale does occur in the coming year, the agreement would be immediately terminated.
–Guy Gugliotta, "Mitchell ties China trade to conditions," The Washington Post, 26 June 1991, p. A9.

June 1991
Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levy states in The Jerusalem Post, Israel is continuing to monitor Syria's WMD capabilities, including "the improved Scud missiles delivered by North Korea."
–Michel Zlotowski, "Levy: When Syria okays Bush plan, talks can start," The Jerusalem Post, 26 June 1991.

June 1991
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson denies that China has shipped any M-9 missiles to Syria, although he will not comment on the potential for future sales to Syria.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

12-20 June 1991
Secretary of State James Baker tells a Senate gathering that the United States has no evidence that China has sold M-9 or other missiles to Syria. One week later, however, Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew says that China is about to sell M-9 missiles to Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

July 1991
The Chinese premier Li Peng says at a press conference that "China had not sold any [ballistic] missiles to Syria."
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/.

July 1991
According to a report from Japan's Sankei Shimbun, Israel's ambassador to Japan, Nahum Eshkol, says that the North Korean missiles recently sold to Syria have a range of 900km. According to Eshkol, the North Koreans have not reduced the size of the warhead of a Scud to extend the range as Iraq did, but instead have maintained the size of the warhead. [Note: This is most likely a reference to the Nodong.]
–"Pukhan, Sajžng 9 Baek KM Missile Kaebalsžl⾢Ilbon Kkaji Sajžnggwžnnae," Joongang Ilbo, 3 July 1991, http://www.joins.com.

13 July 1991
The Joongang Ilbo reports that the Scud-C missiles sold by North Korea to Syria earlier this year are "different from other Scud-C missiles." The report says the Scud-C missiles sold to Syria have a length of 15.1m, a diameter of 1.3m, a weight of 10 tons, and a range of 600km. [Note: The length and diameter dimensions are similar to those of the Nodong.]
–Lee Chae Hak, "Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such'ul/Shimsangch'anh'ŭn Taechungdong P'anmaesžl," Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

25 July 1991
US Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew declares in testimony before the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East that "North Korea has sold Scud missiles to Syria this year" and that "North Korea is emerging more and more as a major supplier of missiles of this type around the world."
–Federation of American Scientists, Arms Sales Monitor, July 1991, p. 2, http://www.fas.org.

Late July 1991
Syria conducts flight tests of two Hwasžng-6 missiles.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18.

September 1991
A third shipment of North Korean Scud-Cs including launchers heads for Syria but tips warning them of Israeli Navy tracking it causes delays in its shipment. [Cargo is later delivered in March 1992 to Iran and in May, Iran airlifts missile parts to Syria].
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 72.

September 1991
Reports surface that two dozen M-9 transporter-erector-launchers are seen by Western intelligence personnel in Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

October 1991
A North Korean ship, Mupo, is said to be delivering Scud C missiles and equipment to Syria, expected to arrive at the Port of Tartus by the end of the month. Israeli Defense Ministry states they are not monitoring the ship, after being allegations of preparing an attack on the ship to prevent it from unloading in Syria. The deal is alleged to be financed by Iran, "in a tri-party deal that would establish production facilities in Syria."
–Alon Pinkas, "Defense Minister: Israel not monitoring N. Korean ship," The Jerusalem Post, 15 October 1991.

23 October 1991
After signing the Cambodian peace accords today, US Secretary of State, James Baker, alludes to wanting to pursue better relations with China, but will be pending "whether Beijing responds to requests not to ship new missiles to Syria." US officials state that the halting of a reported shipment of missiles to Syria is still under talks with China.
–William Drozdiak, "U.S. moves toward ties with Hanoi; Baker meets envoys of Vietnam, China," The Washington Post, 24 October 1991, p. A42.

End of October 1991
Chinese officials show positive signs of cooperating with U.S. concerns over arms deals by indicating a possible preparedness to sign onto several arms control agreements. U.S. officials are, however, still concerned whether China will respond to their requests to not deliver M-9 missiles to Syria. [M9 missiles have a probable range of 375 miles].
–Lena Sun, David Ignatius, "Chinese officials show eagerness for visit by Baker in November," The Washington Post, 26 October 1991, p. A15.

Early November 1991
A North Korean freighter ship, Mupo, is said to arrive in the Gulf en route to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, to unload a dozen Scud-C missiles and mobile launchers that are said to belong to Syria. Israelis voice concerns over the missiles which are said to have a range of 560 miles, potentially covering all of Israel.
–Adel Darwish, "Missiles head for Iran," The Independent (London), 9 November 1991, p. 15.

12 November 1991
According to The Jerusalem Post, the Scud-carrying North Korean ship, Mupo, is altering its course and "will circle Africa rather than cross Suez Canal."
–Alon Pinkas, "Ship carrying Scuds changes its course," The Jerusalem Post, 12 November 1991.

15-18 November 1991
US Secretary of State James Baker makes a 3-day visit to China, marking the first visit by a US official to China since Tiananmen Square in 1989. Baker aims to engage in China in talks over a variety of pressing issues, including their weapons sales to countries such as Syria. After serious discussions with Chinese President Yang Shangkun, Prime Minister Li Peng, and Communist Party chief, Jiang Zemin, Baker is cited as having made "clear gains on the issues of missile proliferation and trade," but received only minimum concessions from China, to avoid harsh penalties by US. This included a commitment by China to adhere to the MTCR and to not sell M-9 missiles to Syria and M-11 short-range missiles to Pakistan on the condition that US lifts its sanctions on two Chinese technology companies that owned the licensing of high-speed computers and satellites.
–Thomas Friedman, "Baker's China trip fails to produce pledge on rights," The New York Times, 18 November 1991, p. A1.

Mid-November 1991
According to The New York Times, the Chinese are stated to not yet have delivered missiles to Syria, so far cooperating with US concerns.
–Thomas Friedman, "Arriving in Tokyo, Baker starts 3-nation Asia tour," The New York Times, 11 November 1991, p. A7.

15 November 1991
Secretary of State James Baker travels to Beijing to discuss Chinese missile and nuclear sales to Middle East customers. During this visit, Baker reportedly secures China's understanding not to sell the M-9 missile to Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

End of November 1991
According to New York Times columnist William Safire, the Chinese agree to assist the Syrians in constructing their own M-9 missiles, rather than violating the Chinese agreement with the United States by selling M-9s to the Syrians outright.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

20 November 1991
According to the Hobart Mercury, US and China are said to have differing views on the results of talks following Baker's visit to China. Baker understood that China's agreement to adhere to the MTCR would apply to sales of M-9 missiles to Syria and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, but a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's pledge was subsequently "less certain" as they had made "no reference to the lucrative sales of missiles" to Syria.
–AAP, "Same talks: different stories, James Baker: wait to see what happens to dissidents," Hobart Mercury, 20 November 1991.

21 November 1991
A Chinese delegation is arriving in Washington to give more details on some of the agreements that were made during the latest trip by Secretary of State James Baker to Beijing. Meanwhile, concern is growing in Congress that the Bush administration will "back down" on numerous trade issues involving China. US Senator Max Baucus, an influential Democrat on trade issues, states that he wants China to "go further" and actually sign onto the NPT and the MTCR.
–Lionel Barber and Nancy Dunne, "Fears grow that Bush will back down on China," The Financial Times (London), 21 November 1991, p. 9.

1992
North Korea sends 24 Scud-Cs, missile production and assembly equipment to Syria.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

1992
North Korea delivers about 50 Scud C's to Syria.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

1992
US DOD document claims Syria purchases 150 Scud C missiles (source unknown) according to Jane's.
–Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" 15 April, 2003 <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf/>.

1992
Syria enters major arms deal with Russia to provide them with 24 MiG-29s, 12 Su-27s, 3 T-72s, and T-74s and an unknown number of S-300 and SA-16 missiles. [Syria's lack of finances causes Russia to fail to carry out the deal].
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

1992
Reports indicate that the Syrians have two missile production plants under construction, one in Hama and one in Aleppo. Another report alleges that one of the plants is slated to manufacture liquid fuel for missiles, while the other will produce solid fuel.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

January 1992
US officials say that Chinese companies have shipped ingredients for producing solid-fuel missiles to Syria. Reports indicate that 30 tons of the chemical ammonium perchlorate had already been shipped, while another 60 tons were still destined to be delivered.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

8 January 1992
Israel is said to have ties to China's weapons program, and now has fears that the M-9 surface-to-surface missile that it assisted China with, may be transferred to Syria.
–Clyde Haberman, "Israeli aide's trip linked to China ties," The New York Times, 9 January 1992, p.A3.

12 January 1992
Lebanese newspaper, Al-Hayat, reports that Syria is negotiating an arms deal with Russia worth $2 billion. The unconfirmed deal is to include long-range surface-to-air, SAM-10 and SAM-11 missiles. Russian President Boris Yeltsin is cited as demanding cash for the transaction to occur.
–"Syrian warplane deal with Russia reported," The New York Times, 12 January 1992, p.11; "Revolution urged to rescue environment," The Toronto Star, 12 January 1992, p. A13

15 January 1992
In testimony before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, CIA Director Robert Gates states that, "North Korea's [nuclear and ballistic missile] programs are our most urgent national security threat in East Asia. North Korea has invested heavily in the military and depends on arms sales for much of its hard currency earnings." North Korea has sold indigenously produced Scud-Cs to Iran and Syria, and is not far from having a more advanced missile with a range of at least 1,000km (Nodong-1).
–Legislative Report for the 102nd Congress (unofficial), testimony of CIA Director Robert Gates before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, 15 January 1992; Bill Gertz, "Threat Forces N. Korea Ship to return Home with Scuds," Washington Times, 24 January 1992, p. A3.

25 January 1992
According to The Jerusalem Post, the North Korean ship, Mupo, returns home and does not carry out its intended shipment of 8 Scud missile systems to Syria, after much publicity surrounding it, and a threat of an attack by Israel.
–Allison Kaplan, "Korean ship fails to deliver Scuds to Syria," The Jerusalem Post, 26 January 1992.

31 January 1992
American intelligence reports claim China is still selling missile technology to Syria, despite statements made by Chinese officials that they would adhere to stricter guidelines on their missile exports. US officials claim that China has recently sent about 30 tons of chemicals needed to make a solid-fuel missile, and plans further to send an additional 60 tons sometime in March or April, enough to make a good number of intermediate-range missiles.
–Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, "China said to sell parts for missiles," The New York Times, 31 January 1992, p. A1.

February 1992
Syria signs a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allowing it to purchase two 24-megawatt research reactors from China. The package includes the training of Syrian scientists, engineers, and technicians on Chinese reactors. [deal is subsequently postponed].
–William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 336.

Early February 1992
According to US administration officials, the North Korean ship Tae Hŭng Ho departs North Korea bound for Syria with an unknown number of Scud-C missiles and associated production or assembly equipment, such as machine tool "parts." The shipment is worth a reported $100 million and is part of an overall missile sale worth $250 million.
–Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Tracks a Korean Ship Taking Missile to Syria," New York Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3; "Pukhan, Scud Missile Syria Ro Susongjung⾢New York Times Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 22 February 1992, <http://www.joins.com>.

Early February 1992
A Czechoslovakian freighter headed for Syria carrying 16 T-72 tanks is intercepted as spotted by the German navy. The delivery was part of a government-approved deal signed in 1991.
–Mary Battiata, "Tank seizure by Germany spotlights arms trade by Czechoslovakia," The Washington Post, 2 February 1992, p. A24.

20 February 1992
The North Korean government-owned ship, the Dae Hung Ho, is headed to Syria for a delivery of advanced missiles and missile manufacturing equipment that is possibly part of larger deal involving missiles, launchers, and technology to build a factory in Syria. U.S. officials believe the shipment, worth $100 million is a transfer of the missiles and equipment on the ship, Mupo, which stopped its delivery earlier this year after being identified in the press.
–Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. tracks a Korean ship taking missiles to Syria," The New York Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9.

21 February 1992
The U.S. State Department orders North Korea to stop a possible second-attempt to ship Scud-C missile-related equipment to Syria.
–Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. orders North Korea to stop scud shipment," The Washington Post, 22 February 1992, p. A15.

22 February 1992
U.S. lifts trade sanctions on two Chinese companies that were believed to be selling ballistic missiles and launchers to countries of threat following a notice by Beijing to restrain further sales. Meanwhile, intelligence reports show China "has contracts to sell missile and nuclear-related technology" to Iran, Syria, Pakistan and other countries in the Middle East, in deals worth over a billion dollars.
–Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. lifts sanctions against Chinese firms; Biden seeks session on reported violations,"
The Washington Post, 21 February 1992, p. A15.

23 February 1992
The Chinese reportedly deliver a written pledge to the US State Department, confirming their commitment to their verbal agreement not to sell Syria M-9 missiles made during Secretary of State Baker's visit to China in November 1991.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.

Late February 1992
CIA officials state to the US Senate that China has sold $250 million in weapons and nuclear and missile technology to several militant Arab states, including Syria and Iran over the past year, and has planned future sales worth $1 billion.
–George D. Moffett III, "Bush, Congress clash on China," Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1992, p. 1.

Late February 1992
CIA officials state to the US Senate that China has sold $250 million in weapons and nuclear and missile technology to several militant Arab states, including Syria and Iran over the past year, and has planned future sales worth $1 billion.
–George D. Moffett III, "Bush, Congress clash on China," Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1992, p. 1.

March 1992
The North Korean freighter Tae Hung Ho delivers 24 Scud-Cs, and missile-production and assembly equipment, to Syria from North Korea. Part of the shipment is airlifted to Syria from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, and the remaining cargo is transported directly to the Tartus. The manufacturing equipment is reportedly destined for suspected missile factories in Hama and Aleppo.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

March 1992
North Korea ships Scuds, including Scud-Cs, through Iran to Syria.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

10 March 1992
U.S. is still looking out for two North Korean freighters allegedly planning to carry medium-range Scud missiles to Syria. The Pentagon claims a North Korean ship may have gotten into an Iranian port.
–"Scud ships," USA Today, 10 March 1992, p.6A; The Herald (Glasgow), 10 March 1992, p.7; Reuter, "Ship eludes U.S. search for Scuds," The Toronto Star, 11 March 1992, p. A12.

11 March 1992
The Tae Hŭng Ho departs Bandar Abbas and travels through the Suez Canal to Tartus, Syria, where it reportedly delivers manufacturing equipment for underground Scud missile factories that the United States says Syria is building in Hama and Aleppo. There are two fuel plants at Hama: one liquid-fuel plant for Scud-type missiles and one solid-fuel plant for M-9 type missiles. Other reports indicate that there is a plant near Hama dedicated to guidance systems. The Tae Hŭng Ho cargo off-loaded at Bandar Abbas in Iran is reportedly destined for the Syrian liquid-fuel plant.
–George Lardner Jr., "Probe Ordered in Failure to Track N. Korean Ship," Washington Post, 14 March 1992, p. A17; Douglas Waller, et al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 1; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAe Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31.

11 March 1992
The Donga Ilbo reports that the United States is really not sure about the contents of the Tae Hŭng Ho's cargo. According to the South Korean daily, some sources are saying that there have been secret contacts between the United States, North Korea, Iran, and Syria, and that the parties have assured the United States that the ship's cargo does not contain missiles. The report says that Israeli officials told the United States that the ship is transporting missiles, and that US Defense Department officials are intentionally spreading the rumor.
–Nam Ch'an Sun, "Pukhan Hwamulsžn/Mi Kžmsaek'anhaettna Mothaettna," Donga Ilbo, 11 March 1992, p. 6, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

13 March 1992
The Iran Salam, which US officials believe is carrying Scud missiles from North Korea, docks and unloads its cargo at the Iranian port of Char Bahar.
–"Syria Blasts U.S. Over Missile Affair," Facts on File World News Digest, 2 April 1992; Eric Schmitt, "North Korea Ship Delivers to Iran," New York Times, 18 March 1992, p. A12.

13 March 1992
According to a CNN broadcast, North Korea is assisting in the construction of Scud missile production facilities in Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria. North Korea is said to be supporting the construction of a "Scud-D" production facility in Libya.
–"Pukhan, Arab Kukdŭl'e Scud Kongjang Kžnsžlchiwžn," Joongang Ilbo, 14 March 1992, http://www.joins.com.

13 March 1992
Syrian President Hafez Assad claims there were no weapons aboard the intercepted ship and blames Israel for instigating U.S. intervention. Assad further denies hat the ship was even destined for Syria while stating, "we have missiles, and we will continue to purchase the missiles we need."
–Jonathan C. Randal, "Assad criticizes Israel, U.S. in N. Korean freighter affair," The Washington Post, 13 March 1992, p. A18; Associated Press, "Syrian accuses the U.S. of trying to strip Arabs of military power," The New York Times, 13 March 1992, p. A10.

15 March 1992
U.S. intelligence reports two more North Korean ships are headed for Syria through an Iranian port and are hiding in the Bay of Bombay from the US navy.
– Citizen News Services, "Around the World," The Ottawa Citizen, 15 March 1992, p. B7.

May 1992
Iran airlifts North Korean Scud-C missiles to Syria.
–Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 73.

July 1992
The United States imposes two-year sanctions on Syria's Ministry of Defense and Scientific Research Center (CERS) for allegedly undertaking "missile proliferation activities."
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/.

July 1992
The CIA Nonproliferation Center provides information to US policymakers confirming that the cargo delivered by the North Korean ship Tae Hung Ho consisted of "missile manufacturing components" that were subsequently transferred to Syria from Tehran by Syrian aircraft. The shipment is allegedly valued at $100 million. Other information indicates that in exchange for allowing the transshipment, Iran is to be permitted to supply weapons to Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. The deal is enabling Syria to build two missile-propellant production facilities at Hamah; one plant will produce liquid fuel, and the other will produce solid fuel.
–Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; Terrence Kiernan, "N. Korea Considers Scud Export Boost," Defense News, 26 April-2 May 1993, p. 3.

July-August 1992
North Korean Deputy Premier Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam visits Syria (27-30 July), Iran (30 July-3 August), and Pakistan (4-7 August). Missile cooperation and North Korean sales of the Hwasžng-6 and possibly Nodong missiles are on the agenda.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.

Late July-early August 1992
Syria conducts two tests of Scud-C missiles acquired from North Korea via Iran. North Korean military personnel are present in Syria for the tests. Israel claims that these tests are the last tests before the missile becomes operational.
–Bill Gertz, "Israelis Say Syrians Test-Fired New Scud," Washington Times, 14 August 1992, p. A25; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 11; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to Bar Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31; Allison Kaplan and David Makovsky, "Rabin Blasts Proposed US Arms Sales to Saudis: PM Rejected US Deal," Jerusalem Post, 13 August 1992; "Syria, Ch'oech'žmdan Missile Saengsandan'gye/Israel Chžn'yžk Sajžng'gwžn'e," Chosun Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhanje Scud Missile/Syria, Shilhžmbalsa Sžnggong," Donga Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

August 1992
Israeli intelligence alleges that Syria conducted tests of two missiles, most likely Scud-Cs imported from North Korea.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

15 August 1992
According to Israeli officials, Syria is testing an advanced Scud missile.
–"News Summary," The New York Times, 15 August 1992, p. 2.

15 August 1992
North Korean engineers are said to be assisting Syria with the construction of two Scud-C production plants. Reports say one plant will produce missiles and the other will produce guidance equipment.
–"'Pukhan'gisulchadŭl Chiwžn Syria, Missile Saengsan'/Pul Pigaroji Podo," Segye Ilbo, 16 August 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Scud Saengsan'gongjang Kžnsžl/Syria, Pukhan Toumbada," Hankook Ilbo, 16 August 1992, p. 4, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

27 August 1992
The US Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration and the US State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs announce the resolution of a controversy between the two offices over export licensing requirements to overseas entities under which the State Department has imposed sanctions for missile proliferation. The State Department is given the authority to impose sanctions on missile proliferations under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990 against non-Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) countries that export goods and technology. The US State Department exercises this authority to level sanctions on five separate occasions against 11 entities in South Africa, as well as China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and India.
–"BXA Negotiates Missile Controls With State," Export Control News, 27 August 1992, pp. 17-18.

17 September 1992
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen states to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that he will not sell weapons to any country in the Middle East. Israeli officials claim that China had sold equipment to Syria for the manufacturing of M-9 ballistic missiles.
–Dan Izenberg, "Chinese FM promises 'No arms sales to Mideast'," 18 September 1992, The Jerusalem Post.

October 1992
Iran transfers half of the Scud-C shipment to Syria.
–CNS, "Iran Missile Exports," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

October 1992
A North Korean ship carrying 100 Scud-Cs departs for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. Half of the delivery is transported overland to Syria.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/.

Late October 1992
A North Korean ship laden with up to 100 Scud-C missiles departs North Korea, likely bound for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas; half of the delivery is to be transported overland to Syria, the other half is to go to Iran.
–Charles Fenyvesi, ed., "Washington Whispers: North Korea Sends Another Scud Cargo to Iran, Syria," US News & World Report, 9 November 1992, p. 30.

Early November 1992
Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General Eitan Bentsur reportedly meets in secret with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to protest North Korea's Scud-C missile sales to Syria.
--David Makovsky, "Top Diplomat Secretly Visits North Korea," The Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1992; Leslie Susser, "Peres: Korea-Bound?" The Jerusalem Post, 15 July 1993; "Israel-Pukhan Su'gyo Pimilchžpch'ok," Hankook Ilbo, 5 November 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/ >; "Puk Israel Pimilhoedam/Su'gyonon'ŭi Kanŭngsžng," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/ .

2 November 1992
U.S. intelligence reports there is a North Korean ship heading for the Middle East. The ship may contain up to 100 advanced Scud missiles and half of them are intended to be shipped to Syria while the remainder will go to Iran.
–"North Korea Scud claim," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 2 November 1992, p. 12.

Early November 1992
Israeli Foreign Ministry deputy director-general, Eitan Bentsur makes a secret visit to North Korea as an alleged attempt to deter the North Koreans from selling Scud C missiles to Syria and Iran.
–David Makovsky, "Top diplomat secretly visits North Korea," 5 November 1992.

Late 1992
According to the German news agency ADN, the freighter MS Waalhaven is seized on its way to Syria from Hamburg. In Sicily, German experts board the ship and discover 27 crates of German "machine parts" that were to be delivered to a North Korean firm involved in the export of North Korean Scud-C missiles. The shipment is said to include at least one flow forming machine without special mandrels, a revetting machine, and equipment for salt bath hardening. All of the equipment is dual use, but together it appears to be applicable for ballistic missile production. There are reportedly four German firms involved with the shipment, and two are requested "to distance themselves from further deliveries."
--PRAP confidential interview data, ADN News Agency, 16 January 1993, in "North Korea: German Firms Allegedly Involved in Syrian-North Korean Weapon Production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 January 1993; Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Agency) reports that North Korea commissioned three international shipping companies to transport "special metals" acquired on Berlin's gray market for the production of missile "launch pads," and that the materials have been shipped; Focus (Munich), 22 March 1993, p. 15, in FBIS-WEU-93-053, "BND Reports DPRK Purchases Missile Materials," 22 March 1993, p. 6.

1993
Syria begins to manufacture North Korean Scud-C [Hwasong-6] missiles.
–Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999, in "Mideast Missile Race Detailed," FBIS Document ID FTS19990903000290.

1993
Technical assistance is provided by Chinese in order to upgrade Scud B missiles.
–Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" 15 April, 2003 <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf/>.

1993
North Korea assists Syria in obtaining seven MAZ 543 chassis and unknown number of Scud-C's.
–-CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

24 February 1993
Israeli Major General, Yitzhak Mordechai shows US Secretary of State Warren Christopher maps and firepower charts showing Syria has 4,000 tanks, 600 warplanes, 2,000 artillery pieces and more than 600 missiles.
–"A geography lesson for the secretary," The Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1993.

April 1993
Jane's Intelligence Review issues a report that estimates Syria's missile capability to include approximately 250 Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, and roughly 24-36 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). The report also alleges North Korea, Iran and China have each assisted in constructing underground facilities in Syria to produce Scud-C and M-9 missiles. Syria is believed to be 12-18 months away from being able to produce Scud-Cs and 24-36 months away from producing M-9s.
—Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

April 1993
Jane's Intelligence Review cites North Korea and Iran (with help from China) helps in construction of underground production facilities for the Scud C and M-9 missiles.
–Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" 15 April, 2003 http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf/.

Late April 1993
According to anonymous analysts, Syrian production of North Korean Scud-C missiles at Aleppo and Hama begins. Some analysts believe that China also may have helped with the project.
–Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A10; "Pukhan, Syria Dŭng Chungdonggukka'e Missile Such'ul⾢WSJ Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 20 July 1993, http://www.joins.com/.

7 May 1993
Reports regarding Syria and China's cooperation on developing missiles arises from an official Israeli document that was "reportedly written last year," in a London-based newspaper. The report alleges that Syria had agreed to purchase M-9 missiles from China and that deliveries have already begun. Syria has also reportedly discussed the possibility of purchasing the CSS-1 missile [with a 1,000 kilometer range] and has concluded a $2 billion deal with North Korea over Scud B missiles.
–Douglas Davis, "Syria, China cooperating on missile development," The Jerusalem Post, 7 May 1993.

Late May 1993
China makes a promise to Israel to "show extreme restraint" on selling weapons to countries in the Middle East. Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian, states to Shimon Peres that China will not sell missiles to Syria in the future.
–"China to show 'restraint' in arms sales to Middle East," The Jerusalem Post," 23 May 1993.

19 July 1993
The Wall Street Journal reports that North Korea is assisting Libya to establish a Scud production facility near Tripoli known as the "Central Repair Workshop." The report also says that North Korea is selling Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran, Libya, and Syria.
–Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A6.

August 1993
Two Russian Condor aircraft transport an unknown number of North Korean Scud-Cs and seven MAZ 543 chassis from Sunan International Airport to Damascus. According to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, North Korea offers to stop the delivery if Israel pays $500 million.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/.

4 August 1993
Two Russian civilian Condor transport aircraft and crews, leased by Syrians, depart with seven MAZ 543 "chassis" from Sunan airfield in North Korea, landing in Damascus, Syria on 5 August 1993. According to US intelligence sources, the MAZ 543s are probably taken from Damascus to a missile plant in Nasariya for use as mobile missile launchers. North Korea reportedly has several types of missile launchers for its Scuds. The MAZ 543 chassis is manufactured in Minsk, Belarus, and is used for Scud transporter erector launchers (TELs) and heavy trucks for both military and civilian use. According to US intelligence reports, North Korea has imported vehicles from the German MAN truck company, and used them to make TELs. [Note: There are unconfirmed reports that the two aircraft carried spare parts for Scud missiles. The MAZ 543s were not complete mobile missile launchers, and may have been delivered to Nasariya for the attachment of the erector unit.]
–Jack Katzenell, Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 20 September 1993, in "Russia Did Not Transport Missiles From DPRK to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 34; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Says Russians Helped Damascus in a Missile Plan," New York Times, 12 December 1993, pp. 1, 20; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Buying Old Russian Subs," New York Times, 20 January 1994, p. A6.

8 August 1993
According to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Syria receives Scud-C missiles from North Korea via Russian aircraft, and Iran may also have received Scud-Cs in this fashion. [Note: Rabin says the shipment was on 8 August, but it is not clear if this could be the 5 August 1993 delivery of MAZ 543 transporter erector launchers (TELs) to Syria or if this is a second delivery.]
–KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 August 1993, in "DPRK Shipped Scuds to Syria on Russian Airplanes," JPRS-TND-93-027, 26 August 1993, p. 9; "'Pukhan, Nodong 1 Ho Syria'e Such'ul'⾢Rabin Israel Ch'ongni P'ongno," Joongang Ilbo, 16 August 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>; "Iran Will Soon Have Korean Missiles Able to Hit Israel: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1993.

16 August 1993
Due to reports that North Korea is supplying weapons to Iran and Syria, Israel announces that it will suspend contacts with North Korea. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states Russian planes recently carried North Korean Scuds to Syria from North Korea.
–Reuters, "Israel assailing trade in arms by North Korea," The New York Times, 17 August 1993, p. A10.

Early November 1993
Syria is reported to be cooperating with Iran on developing a low-flying cruise missile with the assistance of technology from Europe and Japan.
–Michael Evans, "Iran and Syria 'plan missile'," The Times, 12 November 1993.

13 November 1993
Iran denies claims made in The Times of London on 12 November 1993 that it is financing the North Korean production of the Nodong-1. Iran also denies allegations that it is jointly producing an advanced cruise missile with Syria.
–"Iran Denies Report on Missile Production," Moneyclips, 15 November 1993; "Iran Denies Missile Production," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 13 November 1993; Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran), 13 November 1993, in "Report on Missile Production Denied," FBIS-NES-93-21815, November 1993, p. 75.

12 December 1993
According to U.S. officials, Russian cargo planes flew equipment used for mobile missile launchers from North Korea to Syria last summer for use in Syria's Scud missile program.
–Michael Gordon, "U.S. says Russians helped Damascus in a missile plan," The New York Times, 12 December 1993, p. 1.

1994
Syria receives an unknown number of Scud-Cs and TELs from North Korea. Syria also receives an unknown number of Scud-C cluster warheads from North Korea.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

Mid-1994
Syria tests missiles believed to be Scud-Cs imported from North Korea.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

April 1994
Russia and Syria sign a cooperation agreement for "defensive weapons and spare parts."
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

1994
North Korea obtains information from Syria on missiles, missile technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Syria provides "access" to the 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) SRBM, P-35 Redut (SSC-1b Sepal) cruise missile, P-20 Rubezh-A (SS-C-3 Styx) anti-ship missile, solid-fuel motor technology, and the DR-3 Reys UAV.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 32.

1994
Russia negotiates with Syria to provide 30 Su-24s, 50 MiG-29s, 14 Su-17s, 300 T-72s and T-74s, S-300 multiple rocket launchers and S-300 missiles.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

1994
Unknown number of Scud-C's is delivered by North Korea to Syria.
–-CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

1994
Unknown number of Scud-C cluster warheards arrives in Syria from North Korea.
–-CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/.


1994
North Korea begins mass production of the Nodong missile, with a capacity of 30-50 missiles a year. It appears that North Korea will be looking to test the missile in Iran, Libya or Syria.
–Kim Yong Il, "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Missile Yangsan Chaknyžnputo 30-50 Ki Saengsan," Joongang Ilbo, 17 May 1995, http://www.joins.com.

28 April 1994
Russia signs a military cooperation agreement with Syria, resuming arms supplies to Damascus, following a visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Oleg Soskovets.
–Reuter, "Russia paves the way for arms supplies to Syria," The Jerusalem Post, 29 April 1994, p. 2A.

3 May 1994
U.S. Defense Secretary in a National Press Club meeting raises serious concern over possible consequences of North Korea's continuing to develop nuclear weapons. He further mentions that North Korea's Pyongyang is developing ballistic missiles for sale to countries including Iran and Syria.
–Thomas Lippman, "Perry offers dire picture of failure to block North Korean nuclear weapons," The Washington Post, 4 May 1994, p. A29.

27 April 1994
The Israeli Home Front Commander Major General Ze'ev Livne states that Syria is continuing to acquire Scud missiles and launchers from North Korea. He further notes that missiles launched from Iran would pose a more difficult operational dilemma for the Home Front Command.
–Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 27 April 1994, in "General: Syria Buying Scud Missiles in North Korea," FBIS-NES-94-082, 28 April 1994, p. 41.

Mid-1994
Syria conducts a second flight test of the Hwasžng-6 (Scud-C).
--Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 18-19.

14 June 1994
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau tells the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, "North Korea has in the past delivered Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, primarily to Iran and Syria. We're concerned about press reports and other intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the Nodong missile with a much longer range than the Scud-B and -C."
–Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May Be Tested in Iran This Year; Pyongyang Seeks to Avoid Increasing International Criticism," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13

22 June 1994
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states that North Korea has delivered Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Syria, as well as the means to produce them. According to Rabin, the Syrian missile arsenal poses a much greater threat to Israel than the Iraqi missile attacks during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and could potentially make Israel's Gulf War experience seem like "a children's game."
–Moshe Zak, "Just a Slip of the Tongue," Jerusalem Post, 27 June 1994, p. 6; Clyde Haberman, "Peace Pact With Syria Needed to Prevent War, Says Rabin," New York Times, 25 June 1994, p. 4; "'Interesting Proposal' Made to Syria, Peres," Mideast Mirror, vol. 8, no. 119, 23 June 1994; Karin Laub, "Rabin: Arab World Still Poses a Military Threat to Israel," Associated Press; "'Pukhan Scud Kisulto Syria'e Such'ul'/Rabin Israel Ch'ongni," Chosun Ilbo, 24 June 1994, http://www.chosun.com.

12 June 1994
According to The Jerusalem Post, Russia has entered into an agreement with Syria to provide it with $500 million worth of anti-tank weapons and radar, with a possibility of fighter planes and missiles.
–"Likud calls for reappraisal of Syria after new arms deal," The Jerusalem Post, 12 June 1994, p. 3.

4 October 1994
In testimony before the US Senate, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau says that in recent high-level talks with North Korea, the United States has requested that North Korea stop its missile exports. Pelletreau also says that North Korea has been providing technology and exporting Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria. [Note: High-level bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue began on 8 July 1994, but the talks were postponed only hours later after the delegations received the news of Kim Il Sung's death. The talks resumed on 5 August 1994.]
–Chin Ch'ang Uk, "Missile Tae'oepanmae/Mi, Puk'e Chungjich'okku/Kowigŭp Hoedamsž," Joongang Ilbo, 5 October 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Kyžng Hyžng, "Pukhanje Scud Chungdongsuch'ul Chedong/Mijung Missile Kŭmsuhyžpchžng'ŭi Taebuk Yžnghyang," Taehan Maeil, 6 October 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr.

November 1994
North Korea delivers Hwasžng-6 (Scud-C) cluster warheads to Syria. Syria conducts another test firing of the Hwasžng-6, but with a conventional warhead.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.

5 March 1995
An annual Israeli intelligence report states Syria has not rebuilt its airforce to deal with Israeli threats but "has reinforced their ground-to-air missiles," and are interested in purchasing the Russian SA-10 which Russia is not willing to provide until its debt is repaid.
–Patrick Cockburn, "Israel sets aside accord with Syria," The Independent (London), 7 March 1995, p. 12.

12 September 1995
According to The Jerusalem Post, aside from having enough launchers to fire large quantities of surface-to-surface missiles, Syria has 50 Scud C missiles, 100 Scud B missiles and between 24 and 36 Soviet-made short range SS-21 missiles.
–Alon Pinkas, "Israel, Iran have medium-range missiles," 13 September 1995, p. 1.

12 January 1996
The Jerusalem Post reports that North Korea is assisting Syria construct a missile factory. According to the report, "intelligence sources" believe the factory could be operational by 1998. The report also says that Iran and Syria are cooperating in the production of Scud-C missiles.
–Steve Rodan, "Eye in the Sky," Jerusalem Post, 12 January 1996, p. 14.

17 January 1996
The Israeli Home Front Command reports that by the year 2000, Syria will have over 80 launchers of surface-to-surface missiles, and over 1,000 Scud B, Scud C, FROG-7 and Tochka Russian missiles.
–Yedi'ot Aharanot, 17 January 1996, in "IDF predicts growth of Iraqi, Syrian missile arsenals," FBIS-FTS19960117000673, 17 January 1996.

22 February 1996
CIA Director John Deutch tells a US Senate Select Committee that North Korea is developing long-range missiles. The United States should focus on stopping North Korea from acquiring guidance-and-control technology that could make its long-range missiles more accurate and lethal. Deutch says that North Korea has sold Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Libya, Syria, and other countries. He also says that North Korea is developing a 1,000km Nodong missile that could be deployed in the near future, and that development continues on the Taepondong, which could reach Alaska and be operational after the turn of the century.
–John M. Deutch, "Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence, John M. Deutch," 22 February 1996, http://www.odci.gov/cia/.

1996
Syrian missile technicians spend two weeks training in North Korea.
–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

21 April 1996
US holds two-day talks with North Korea about its ballistic missile program and raises concerns over their export of long-range missiles to states including Iran and Syria.
– "North Korea talks," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), 21 April 1996, p. A4; Reuters, "U.S. hails missile talks with the North Koreans," 21 April 1996, p. A4.

22 May 1996
Syria offers North Korea 100,000 tons of food in exchange for weapons such as missiles.
–Michael Sheridan, "Koreans Barter Missiles for Food to Beat Famine," Sunday Times, 16 June 1996; Michael Sheridan, "N. Korea May Trade Missiles for Arab Grain," The Australian, 17 June 1996; "Syria, China to Offer Additional Food Aid to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 24 May 1996; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 June 1996, in "ROK: DPRK Said Negotiating With Syria To Exchange Missiles for Food," FBIS-EAS-96-117, 17 June 1996, p. 52.

Mid June 1996
North Koreans seek trade of missiles for food with Syria due to large famine. Syria has responded with an offer of 100,000 tons of grain for weapons.
–Michael Sheridan, "Koreans barter missiles for food to beat famine," Sunday Times, 16 June 1996.

Summer 1996
Syria tests missiles believed to be North Korean-manufactured Scud-Cs.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

July 1996
Reports circulate about deliveries of missile components to Syria from the China Precision Machinery Company, the company that manufactures the M-11 missile. Among the alleged shipments may have been "sensitive guidance equipment."
–Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

24 July 1996
According to The South China Morning Post, Syria is buying missile technology from the Chinese state-owned, China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, the country's main outlet for exporting missiles. The materials were stated to be transferred to a Syrian organization in June called the Scientific Studies and Research Centre where research is conducted on ballistic missiles. China's Foreign Ministry later denies claims as "unfounded and irresponsible."
–Simon Beck, "Missile elements 'sold to Syrians'," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 24 July 1996, p. 10; Agence France Presse, 25 July 1996, in "Spokesman denies reported missile technology sales to Syria," FBIS-FTS19960725000055, 25 July 1996.

Mid-1996
Syrian missile technicians spend two weeks training in North Korea. The visit was likely mostly concerned with the Hwasžng-6 (Scud-C) program, but the Syrians may have also been interested in the Nodong. The Syrian technicians reportedly provide information on the 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) missile to North Korea.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper no. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 19, 26, 32.

1996
North Korea provides Syria with missile expertise.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

July 1996
Unconfirmed reports claim China delivers missiles components via China Precision Machinery Company, which manufactures M-11s to Syria. [M-11 is stated to have a 186-mile (280 kilometer) range with a warhead of 1,100 pounds.]. Transaction may have also included "sensitive guidance equipment".
–Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" 15 April, 2003 http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf/.

11 July 1996
According to a military source, North Korea has exported 370 missiles since July 1987. Between July 19897 and February 1988, North Korea exported about 100 Scud-B missiles for the first time. Beginning in 1991, North Korea exported about 100 Scud-C missiles to Iran. Missiles exports to Iran, Syria, and Libya have totaled 370. North Korea is also supporting the construction of missile assembly plants in Libya, Iran, and Syria. According to the military source, North Korea is also planning to export the Nodong-1 to countries in the Middle East.
–"Pukhanjae Scud Missile 3 Paek 70 Ki Arab Such'ul," Taehan Maeil, 12 July 1996, <http://www.kdaily.com/>; "Scud Missile 370 Yždae Pukhan, Chungdongjiyžge Such'ul," Joongang Ilbo, 12 July 1996, http://www.joins.com.

August 1996
Syria ships Soviet-built, 70km-range SS-21 Scarab missiles to North Korea. If North Korea is able to reverse-engineer the SS-21's sophisticated guidance package, it could use the technology to improve the accuracy of its Scud missiles. [Note: Reverse-engineering and adapting the SS-21's guidance system would be an exceedingly difficult proposition. Also, there is speculation that North Korea might have modified a Scarab to use as the third stage for its attempted satellite launch on 31 August 1998.]
–Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," Jane's IDR Extra, vol. 2, no. 2, February 1997, pp. 1-3; Ch'oe Hong Sžp, "'[Israel] Pukhan-Chungdong Missile Connection Magara'," Chugan Chosun, 12 April 2001, http://www.weekly.chosun.com.

29 August 1996
Israeli intelligence claims Cyprus serves as a transit point for Syrian efforts to produce missiles armed with chemical warheads. Reports claim Syria has received "at least two shipments" of material from the Greek Cypriot port of Limassol. Cyprus has denied allegations.
–Steve Rodan, "Cyprus used as transit point for Syrian chemical," The Jerusalem Post, 30 August 1996, p. 22.

15-21 September 1996
Hong Kong Customs officers and police discover a shipment of 18 North Korean containers of heavy weapons destined for Syria. Two of the 12-metre containers which did not have import licenses have two unassembled howitzer guns. Later two men are arrested over the artillery parts.
–Ng Kang-Chung and John Flint, "Hunt on for arms haul mastermind; HK customs officers discover containers of heavy weapons bound for the Middle East," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 15 September 1996, p. 1.

16 September 1996
Israeli intelligence claims the Syrian army has SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles installed in mountain ranges on the Syrian-Lebanon border.
–Arieh O'Sullivan, "Army continues to monitor Syrian troop movements," The Jerusalem Post, 16 September 1996, p. 2.

25 September 1996
South Korea's Ministry of National Unification submits a report to the National Assembly saying that North Korea can produce approximately 100 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles annually, and has exported approximately 400 missiles to Iran and Syria. The report also says that North Korea has also been transferring missile production plants and missile technology to Iran and Syria. Between 1980 and 1993, arms exports accounted for approximately 30 percent of all North Korean exports. North Korea's missile exports are valued at about $500 million annually.
--Yonhap News Agency, 25 September 1996, in "Scud Missiles Reportedly Being Exported to Iran and Syria," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 September 1996; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Said Capable of Making 100 Missiles a Year," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 September 1996; Kim Yžn Kwang, "Puk, Yžn'gan Scud Paekki Saengsan/Kukkam Charyo," Chosun Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kang Yžng Chin, "Puk Missile Nyžn 100 Yžgi Saengsan Nŭngnyžk," Joongang Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 15, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; O Il Man, "Puk, 'Scud' Yžn 1 Paekki Saengsan/T'ongilwžn Kukkamjaryo," Taehan Maeil, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Dae Kun, "Puk Scud Missile Yžn 1 Paeg'yžgi Saengsannŭngnyžk/Iran Tŭng'e 4 Paekki Such'ul," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Cho Min Ho, "Puk, Missile Yžn 100 Ki Saengsannŭngnyžk/Arapchiyžk 4 Paekki Such'ul/T'ongilwžn Charyo," Segye Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Hŭng U, "Scud B-C Hyžng Missile Puk Yžn 1 Paekki Saengsan'ganŭng/T'ongilwžn," Kukmin Ilbo, 25 September 1996, p. 2., in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

16 October 1996
Jiji Press and NHK Television in Japan report that North Korea is planning to test-launch a 1,000km-range missile in the Sea of Japan. According to Jiji Press, military representatives from Iran are present at the launch site to observe the missile's performance prior to purchase. The Sankei Shimbum later reports that Syrian officials are also present for a planned test. According to military sources, North Korea has sent a frigate to the Sea of Japan for the test. Furthermore, A US satellite imagery reportedly reveals a fuel truck loading fuel into the missile. This imagery is later used to estimate the Nodong's range, which is revised upward to 1,300km from 1,000km. The United States responds by sending an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft to monitor the test, and Japan sends an escort ship to monitor the missile in its terminal phase. However, the flight test is cancelled.
–"North Korea Preparing Test-Fire Missile: Sources," Agence France Presse, 16 October 1996; "North Korea Preparing Test-Launch of Missile over Sea of Japan: NHK," Agence France Presse, 16 October 1996; "N. Korea Plans Missile Test Near Japan," Jiji Press Ticket Service, 16 October 1996; Sankei Shimbum, 11 April 1997, in "Japanese Source Says Missiles Deployed Along Sea of Japan Coast," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 April 1997; "Chžn Hyžn Il, "Puk Missile Kaebal Wihžmsuwi/Miil Kunsadangguk Kyžnggyue Kanghwa," Segye Ilbo, 14 May 1997, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "[Puk Rodong 1 Ho] Il, Howiham 1 Ch'žk P'a'gyžn," Chosun Ilbo, 20 October 1996, ; "'Puk Nodong 1 Ho Palsashilhžm Chunbi' Mi-Il Soshikt'ong," Taehan Maeil, 17 October 1996, <http://www.kdaily.com/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, "N Korea Set for More Ballistic Missile Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 October 1996, p. 5.

17 October 1996
According to a report in Hong Kong's Ming Bao newspaper, North Korea produces 4-6 Scud-C missiles a month and exports them to Middle Eastern countries such as Libya, Iran and Syria. Missile exports are said to be an important source of foreign exchange for North Korea.
–"Puk Scud C Hyžng Missile Wžl 4-6 Kae Chungdong Such'ul," Taehan Maeil, 18 October 1996, http://www.kdaily.com/.

14 December 1996
According the The Guardian (London), Iran is sending at least three containers of arms including Russian Sagger anti-tank missiles by plane to Syria each month for use by Hizbollah in Lebanon.
–"News in brief: Iran 're-arms' Hizbollah," The Guardian (London), 14 December 1996, p. 16.

Mid-late 1990's
Ukraine provides technical assistance to Syrian T-55 tank fleet and AT-14 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

13-16 January 1997
U.S threathens South Africa with reduced aid if follows through with its plans to sell to Syria weapons worth $641 million. South African President Nelson Mandela angrily rejects the US warning stating, "We will conclude agreements with any country whether they are popular in the West or not."
–"US warns S. Africa on arms sales to Syria," USA Today, 14 January 1997, p. 9A.

19 January 1997
According to The Jerusalem Post, the US Navy has detected a number of Syrian missile launches recently. Syria is said to have about 62 missile launchers and an estimated 200-300 Scud missiles.
–Arieh O'Sullivan, "US tracking Syrian Scuds," The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1997, p. 1.

1997 & 1998
Extensive arms purchasing talks are engaged with Russia.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

1997
Syria conducts several missile tests. Most are believed to be R-17s (Scud-Bs), but some may be Hwasong-6s.
–Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.

April 1997
A Russian military delegation comprised of the Russian army's Chief of Staff, Russian military experts and representatives of the government-owned corporations, Rusfuru Genet and Mappu, is said to visit Syria to discuss possibilities of reviving military cooperation. Sources state they discussed the possibly sale of antiaircraft missile system, S-300 as well as MiG-29 and MiG-31 planes.
– Amman Al-Dustur, 28 April 1997, in "Syria offered MiG-29, MiG-31 planes, missile system S-300," FBIS-FTS19970501000335, 28 April 1997.

5 May 1997
The US State Department announces that North Korea has requested the postponement of missile talks scheduled for 12-13 May due to "technical reasons." North Korea reportedly has asked that the talks be delayed for several weeks. The talks were supposed to address North Korean missile sales to Iran and Syria, as well as reports that North Korea is preparing to deploy Nodong-1 missiles. North Korea currently has deployed three Nodong missiles on its east coast and is planning to deploy seven more.
–"N. Korea Calls Off Missile Talks Set for Next Week," Korea Times, 8 May 1997, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Yu Hye Ju, "Taemihyžpsang Uwi'norin Kodojžnsul/Puk Missile Hoedam Yžn'giyoch'žng Pae'gyžng," Segye Ilbo, 8 May 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Na Yun Do, "Mibuk Missile Hoedam Tolyžn Yžn'gi/Puk Kisulchžk Iyuro...Saedalch'o Yžllildŭt," Taehan Maeil, 8 May 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

11 June 1997
U.S. and North Korea begin talks over reports that Scud missiles have been sold to Iran and Syria.
– Associated Press, "U.S. and North Korea begin missile talks," The New York Times, 12 June 1997, p. A15.

Mid July 1997
Ukraine is pressed by the US to cut its ties with states such as Iran and Syria over fear that the technology supplied may lead to a capability for ballistic missile production.
–Dana Priest, "Ukraine savors new ties with NATO; Military accord grew out of relationship fostered by Pentagon," The Washington Post, 14 July 1997, p. A15.

14 August 1997
According to The Jerusalem Post, Syria is about to sign a $3 billion arms deal with Russia which will be financed by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The deal is expected to include new surface-to-air missiles such as SAM-11s.
–Douglas Davis, "Syria discusses arms deal with Russia," The Jerusalem Post, 14 August 1997, p. 2.

26-28 August 1997
North Korea's ambassador to Egypt defects to the US and is granted political asylum. He may provide the US with information on missile sales to Iran and Syria. As a result, North Korea angrily withdraws from long-scheduled negotiations with the US over missile exports.
–Barry Schweid, "N. Korea envoy defects to US; May have key data about missile sales," Chicago Sun-Times, 26 August 1997, p. 1; Steven Lee Myers, "North Koreans quit arms talks over defections," The New York Times, 28 August 1997, p. A1.

26 August 1997
The United States announces that it will grant political asylum to two North Korean defectors, Chang Sŭng Gil, ambassador to Egypt, and his brother Chang Sŭng Ho, a trade envoy in France. Chang Sŭng Gil, the first North Korean ambassador to defect, is expected to provide the United States with information pertaining to North Korean missile sales to Egypt, Iran, and Syria. According to reports, Chang walked into the US Embassy in Cairo on 22 August and asked for asylum.
–Steven Lee Myers, "Defecting Envoy from North Korea to Get U.S. Asylum," New York Times, 27 August 1997, p. A1; "North Korean Ambassador to Egypt Defects," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 August 1997; Reuters, "N. Korea Envoy to Egypt Defects to West Seoul But Pyongyang Denies Diplomat Has Disappeared," Toronto Star, 26 August 1997, p. A21; "'Mangmyžnghžyong' Pžnbokpae'gyžng (Miro Kan Puk Taesa)," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 29 August 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

27 August 1997
North Korea cancels missiles talks with the United States after the United States refuses to return two defectors, one of whom is expected to provide information pertaining to North Korean missile sales to Egypt, Iran, and Syria.
–Steven Lee Meyers, "North Koreans Quit Arms Talks over Defections," New York Times, 28 August 1997, p. A1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "North Koreans Cancel U.S. Talks: Protesting Diplomats' Defection, Pyongyang Recalls Team on Missile Issues," Washington Post, 28 August 1997, p. A30; Norman Kempster, "U.S. Accepts 2 Defecting N. Korean Diplomats," Los Angeles Times, 27 August 1997, p. A4; US Grants Asylum to Senior North Korean Defectors," Agence France Presse, 27 August 1997; "North Korea Pulls Out of Missile Talks with US," Agence France Presse, 27 August 1997; Jennifer Hewett and Reuter, "N. Korea Demands Return of Defectors," The Age (Melbourne), 28 August 1997, p. 15; "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Interviewed," Korean Central News Agency, 27 August 1997 .

31 August 1997
According to Buffalo News (New York), the US CIA recruited the former North Korean ambassador to Egypt, Jang Sung Gil long before his defection to the US.
–Reuters, "Newsweek says defector is agent for CIA," Buffalo News (New York), 31 August 1997, p. 10A.

15 September 1997
According to the Istanbul Milliyet, Syria is reported to have placed missile ramps in Turkey for defense purposes. Syria is also stated to be making "a big effort" to produce land-to-land missile systems.
– Istanbul Milliyet, 15 September 1997 in "Israeli paper cited on Syrian Scud-C ramps near Turkey," FBIS-FTS19970915000718, 15 September 1997.

November 1996
A US intelligence report alleges that Syria and Iran are cooperating on solid fuel technology for missiles, as well as a program to adapt Syrian Scud-Bs to longer range Scud-Cs.
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/.

26 November 1997
A North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meets with a US delegation headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman at the State Department. During the six-hour meeting, various topics are discussed, including North Korea's missile development and past sales to Iran and Syria. This meeting marks the first time a senior North Korean official has held talks at the State Department.
–George Gedda, "U.S., North Korea Hold Talks," Associated Press, 27 November 1997.

February 1997
US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Toby Gati testifies before a US Senate committee. He confirms that Syria possesses "Scud-Cs from North Korea."
–Wisconsin Project, Syria: Missile Development, "The Risk Report," Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.

26 November 1997
The US and North Korea hold high-level talks in Washington over various issues including missile sales to Syria.
–"N. Korea, US conduct talks at State Dept," Chicago Sun-Times, 27 November 1997, p. 46.

18 May 1998
According to The Jerusalem Post, Russia and Syria are on the verge of signing a major arms deal worth $300-400 million as the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk arrives in Israel to meet with officials. Israeli sources claim they have been assured that the deal will not involve missiles, but mainly air defense systems such as the S-300PMU-1 (or SA-10D) anti-aircraft system.
–Steve Rodan, "For 1st time since end of Cold War, Russia, Syria near major arms deal," The Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1998, p.1.

3 September 1998
South Korea's Unification Minister Kang In Džk tells the National Assembly that North Korea told a visiting US House member on 11 August 1998 that Pyongyang wants at least $500 million in compensation to cease its missile exports. In a report Kang submits to the National Assembly, North Korea is said to be capable of producing about 100 Scud missiles a year and is continuing tests for the Taepodong-2 engine. The report also says that between 1987 and 1992, North Korea exported approximately 250 Scud missiles to countries such as Iran, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates for $580 million. [Note: Some press reports say North Korea is demanding $500 million to stop its exports, while others say the figure is $1 billion.]
–"N. Korea Demands Cash to Suspend Missile Exports: S. Korea," Agence France Presse, 4 September 1998; "North Korea Demands Money in return for Missile Test Stop," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 4 September 1998; Shin Yong-bae, "North Demands Money for Ending Missile Projects," Korea Herald, 4 September 1998; Mun Ch'žl, "Puk Missile P'ogi taiga Yogu/Kang In Džk Changgwan Palghyž," Donga Ilbo, 4 September 1998, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Byžng Ch'an and Kwžn Hyžk Pžm, "Missile Such'ulp'ogi Taega/Puk, Mi'e 5 žkpul Yogu/Kang In Džk T'ong'il Kukhoebogo," Hankook Ilbo, 4 September 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Yž Hyžn Ho, "Missile Such'ul P'ogi Taega/Puk, Mi'e 10 žk Dollar Yogu," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 4 September 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Park Tae Ch'ul, "Puk, Missile P'ogidaega Mi'e 10 žk Dollar Yogu," Taehan Maeil, 4 September 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/.

2 October 1998
US State Department Spokesman James Rubin says that North Korea could face "very negative consequences" if it conducts further tests or exports long-range missiles. Rubin expresses concern over North Korea's export of Scud missiles to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan.
--"U.S. Says Progress in Missile Talks 'up to Pyongyang'," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 October 1998.


6 October 1998
Syria has deployed Scud C missiles near the Turkish-Syrian border in expectation of a likely war with Israel.
–Istanbul Milleyet, 6 October 1998, in "They are deploying Scud missiles on the border," FBS-FTS19981006001382, 6 October 1998.

20 November 1998
North Korea has increased production of its Nodong short-range missile which US officials believe is destined for export to countries like Syria, Pakistan or Libya.
–Dana Priest, "N. Korea expanding missile programs," The Washington Post, 20 November 1998, p. A1.

1999
North Korea ships 10 tons of powdered aluminum to the Centre des Etudes de Recherche Scientifique, which is the institute in charge of Syria's missile program. The powdered aluminum originated in China.
—Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

1999
North Korea delivers 10 tons of powdered aluminum to Syria. The aluminum originally came from China, and is delivered to the Centre des Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS, Scientific Studies and Research Center), the institute in charge of Syria's missile and chemical weapons programs.
--Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.

1999
10 tons of powdered aluminum arrives in Syria from North Korea (originally from China).
–-CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

January 1999
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Syria continues to work on developing and producing a solid-propellant rocket motor capability. Aid in the form of knowledge and equipment continues to flow to support this project from foreign supporters.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

7 February 1999
According to Israeli intelligence officials, Syrian weapons are quickly becoming obsolete due to lack of funds for their maintenance. This has led to an "obsessive" search for more surface-to-surface missiles, including the S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, amongst many other weapons and artillery.
–Arieh O'Sullivan, "IDF: Syria not expected to wage war," The Jerusalem Post, 7 February 1999, p. 4.

February 1999
Syria announces plans to spend up to $2 billion on Russian armaments, including anti-tank systems, AT-5 Spandrels, thousands of AT-10s and AT-14 Kornets.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

March 1999
Jane's Intelligence Review reports that Syria has created a manufacturing facility to produce both the M-11 and M-9 missiles. The report indicates that the Syrians began work on the booster stage of M-11 production in 1996 and that comprehensive missile production will begin "soon."
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

9 April 1999
US seeks to place sanctions on three Russian companies for selling anti-tank missiles to Syria.
–Michael S. Lelyveld, "US sanctions against Russia may backfire," Journal of Commerce, 9 April 1999, p. 1A.

12 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister, Ariel Sharon meets with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for talks over weapons sales to countries such as Iran and Syria.
–Danna Harman and Liat Collins, "Sharon offers Russia increased technological cooperation," The Jerusalem Post, 13 April 1999, p. 3.

24 April 1999
Russia's Foreign Minister meets with Syrian President Hafez Assad discussing a delay in a previously proposed deal to sell anti-tank missiles to Syria.
–"Syria: Russian visits," The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), 25 April 1999, p. A10.

May 1999
Syria and Russia hold talks to expand military cooperation and arrange the sale of advanced weapons systems. [A five-year $2 billion contract is under discussion].
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 347.

18 June 1999
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak states Syria possesses 700 warplanes, 4,000 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces and surface-to-surface missiles.
–Christopher Walker, "Israel to build raised bridge to Gaza," The Ottawa Citizen, 19 June 1999, p. A8.

July 1999
Syrian President, Hafez Assad visits Moscow.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 348.

4-7 July 1999
During a two-day visit by Syrian President Assad, Russia indicates a possible willingness to forgive Syrian debt in order to renew ties with them and therefore gain a stronger influence in the Middle East.
–Douglas Jehl, "Syria's Assad sends peace signals," The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), 5 July 1999, p. A1; Sharon LaFraniere, "Russia, Syria Hint at weapons deal; U.S. 'very concerned' about possibility, threatens to cancel some Russian aid," The Washington Post, 7 July 1999, p. A16.

Late July 1999
During a recent visit by Syrian President Assad to Moscow, Syria agrees to a 1.25 billion pounds contract for Russia to replace its fighter planes, tanks and missiles. Iran and UAE have helped to finance the deal.
–Ross Dunn, "Barak exploits Russian links to Syria," The Times (London), 29 July 1999.

September 1999
Syria and Russia holds new high-level talks on military cooperation including possible purchase of the S-300 surface-to-air missile defense system, the Sukhoi Su-27 multirole fighter, MiG-29SMT fighters, T-80 tanks, and more anti-tank weapons. [contract status however remains unclear].
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 348.

1999
CIA reports that Syria is continuing work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with foreign assistance, primarily from Russia.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 544.

15 September 1999
Syria begins developments on a new longer-range, surface-to-surface missile, a derivative of the Scud C and is expecting it to be ready within six months to a year.
–Arieh O'Sulllivan, "Syrian super Scud ready soon – source," The Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1999, p.1.

15 September 1999
During a seminar in Seoul, Korea National Defense University Professor Kim Ch'žl Hwan says that since 1991, North Korea has exported 160 Scud-B missiles to Iran, 100 to Iraq, and 18 to the United Arab Emirates. During the same period, Kim says that Pyongyang has exported 42 Scud-C missiles to Iran, 150 to Syria, and 20 to India.
–Kim Kwi Kŭn, "Puk, Scud Missile 490 Such'ul," Chosun Ilbo, 15 September 1999, http://www.chosun.com/.

October 1999
According to the Washington Times, a "Pentagon intelligence agency" reports that North Korea has offered to sell Sudan a factory for assembling Scud missiles. Citing another "intelligence report," the daily says North Korea has also recently sold 10 tons of aluminum powder, which was originally acquired from China, to Syria for missile and weapon development, and that Iranian officials have recently traveled to North Korea to discuss missile cooperation.
--Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 28 October 1999, p. A1.

November 1999
A US congressional report by the nine-member Republican North Korea Advisory Group states that North Korea is looking to export intermediate-range missiles to Iran and Syria. The report confirms Asian diplomatic assertions that Pyongyang has decided to export the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1), which has a range of up to 2,000km. The report suggests that North Korea, barring any political or economic intervention, will also export the long-range missiles it is developing to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Libya. The report indicates that North Korea did not demonstrate the capability to construct re-entry vehicle that can survive atmospheric reentry when Pyongyang attempted a satellite launch on 31 August 1998. It is uncertain how North Korea acquired the solid-fuel third stage for the August 1998 test, but some analysts speculate that it could have been procured from Pakistan, China, or Iran.
--US Congress, House, North Korea Advisory Group, Report to The Speaker U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session, 1999; "N. Korea Likely to Export New Missiles to Iran, Syria," 4 November 1999, Middle East Newsline, <http://www.menewsline.com/>; "Congressional Study Says North Korea Threat Increasing," Korea Times, 4 November 1999.

29 December 1999
Syria is looking to Moscow for updated sophisticated arms to replace its old equipment.
–Judith Matloff, "Russia cranks up arms production, sales," Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 29 December 1999, p. 1.

Missile Chronology

2000-2004

February 2000
According to scholar James Cotton, US specialists maintain that North Korea is developing a longer-range version of the Taepodong missile, which could strike targets in the continental United States and much of Asia by 2003. North Korea has exported about 400 Scud type missiles to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. Cotton asserts that at present, despite having a missile development program, North Korea does not have the capability to arm its missiles with nuclear warheads.
--James Cotton, "North Korea Nuclear and Missile Nonproliferation and Regional Security," Australia and Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP) Newsletter No. 9, February 2000, http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au.


April 2000
The United States imposes sanctions against North Korea's Ch'anggwang Shinyong Company for selling missile technology to Syria.
--Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Hit With Sanctions," Washington Times, 28 June 2001, p. 1.

29 May 2000
Syria acquires an unknown number of Scud D missiles from North Korea.
–"Syria missile update, 2000," <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/>.

30 May 2000
Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reports that Syria has received new long-range Scud-D missiles from North Korea. The Scud-D has a range of more than 450km, which means the Syrians are able to hit any point in Israel from deep within its own borders.
—"Syria 'gets new Scud,'" BBC News, 30 May 2000, http://www.news.bbc.co/.

June 2000
Western intelligence sources say North Korea is helping Iraq in its medium-range missile and nuclear weapons programs. Sources said Iraq is trying to acquire its pre-1991 strategic weapons capability by increasing its oil revenue through enhanced exports. Former UN chief arms inspector Richard Butler said that Iraqi weaponization would continue to pose a threat to the United States and Israel. US experts say that, despite repeated appeals, North Korea has also continued to sell intermediate and long-range missiles such as the Nodong and Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) to Iran, Syria, and Libya. Sources say that commercial contacts are mostly used to hide the weapons transactions.
--"Iraq, N. Korea Believed Cooperating on Missiles, WMD," Middle East Newsline, vol. 2, no. 218, 8 June 2000, http://www.menewsline.com/.

5 June 2000
China is assisting Syria and Iran to develop advanced surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, missile engines and guidance systems.
–Ross Dunn, "Beijing, 'helping Syria with missiles'," The Times (London), 5 June 2000.

1 July- 31 December 2000
According to the CIA, North Korea obtains raw materials and components for ballistic missiles from "various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China." Chinese firms are also said to provide "dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to North Korea. As a supplier, North Korea is said to provide "significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa." North Korea is said to "maintain a missile relationship" with Egypt, and provide assistance and equipment for Syria's liquid-propellant missile program. North Korea is also reportedly a supplier of "missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise to Libya and Iran."
--"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," CIA, 7 September 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm#5>; "Russia, N. Korea, China Give Iran Missile Aid-CIA," Joongang Ilbo, 11 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com/>; Bill Gertz, "CIA Uncovers Missile moves by China," Washington Times, 8 September 2001, <http://www.washtimes.com/>; "CIA Says Iran Got New Missile Aid," Washington Post, 8 September 2001, p. 9.

15 August 2000
North Korean President Kim Jong Il admits selling missiles to Syria and Iran.
–Doug Struck and Joohee Cho, "N. Korean dismisses missile idea; Offer to end program made 'laughingly'," The Washington Post, 15 August 2000, p. A1.

August 2000-September 2001
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Syria continues to work towards developing and producing a solid-propellant rocket motor capability. In addition, foreign entities, including from North Korea and Russia, have continued to provide equipment and assistance for Syria's liquid-propellant missile program. The CIA also reports that Syria continues its endeavors towards building liquid-fueled Scud-C missiles, probably with a good deal of assistance from North Korea.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

September 2000
North Korea and Syria complete a contract for North Korean exports of Scud missiles to Syria.
–Eli J. Lake, "Analysis: Prospect of North Korean Missile Curbs Fade," United Press International, 6 December 2000.

23 September 2000
Syria successfully flight-tests a "Scud-D" that was acquired from North Korea. The Scud-D is said to be capable of delivering chemical and biological warheads.
–Ch'oe Hong Sžp, "'[Israel] Pukhan-Chungdong Missile Connection Magara'," Chugan Chosun, 12 April 2001, http://www.weekly.chosun.com.

2000
50 No Dong missiles and 7 TELs arrive in Syria from North Korean firm, Ch'ongchon'gang.
–CNS, "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

23 September 2000
Syria tests No Dong missile.
–Anthony Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" 15 April, 2003 <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf/>.

23 September 2000
Syria tests a 700-kilometer range Scud-D.
–Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 85.

23 September 2000
Reports indicate Syria conducts a Scud-D flight test. The Scud-D is a Syrian version of the Korean Nodong missile.
—Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>.

23 September 2000
Israeli intelligence detects Syria testing its Scud D missile.
– Jerusalem Voice of Israel Network B, 23 September 2000 in "Israel's Mufaz: Arrow radar detected Syrian Scud D launch 23 Sep," FBIS-GMP20000925000195, 23 September 2000.

24 October 2000
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to discuss bilateral relations as well as North Korea's missile exports to Syria and Iran.
–Robert Kilborn, Judy Nichols, Noel Paul and Sara Steindorf, "USA," Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 24 October 2000, p. 20.

Late 2000
North Korean firm Ch,Jongchon,Jgang delivers 50 Nodong missiles and 7 TELs to Syria.
–CNS, "North Korea Profile," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>.

28 June 2001
Israel raises concern over Israeli Derby air-to-air missile sale from South Africa to Brazil stating fears that it may reach Syria.
–Tel Aviv Globes, 28 June 2001 in "South Africa sells Israeli missile to Brazil, feared might reach Syria," FBIS-GMP20010628000163, 28 June 2001.

1 July 2001
Israel claims Syria launches a Scud missile from its Aleppo facility. Syrian Information Minister Adnan Imran states in response that the Israeli allegations have no merit.
– Jerusalem Voice of Israel Network B, 2 July 2001 in "Israeli radar detects a Syrian Scud fired from Aleppo,"FBIS-GMP20010702000117, 2 July 2001; Al-Zaman, 5 July 2001 in "Syrian Minister labels Israeli claims of Scud missile test 'trivial'," 5 July 2001.

Early July 2001
Iraq transfers missile technology expertise to Syria as part of growing cooperation between the two countries.
– Al Arab al-Alamiyah, 3 July 2001 in "Sources say missile technology transfer part of cooperation between Iraq, Syria," FBIS-GMP20010703000124, 3 July 2001.

1 July 2001
Israel alleges that Syria tests a 300-kilometer range Scud-B.
–Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 85.

3 July 2001
Syria conducts a flight-test of a Scud-B armed with a chemical warhead during an exercise. The missile flies 300km and is considered successful. It is unclear if the missile was imported from North Korea or if North Korea played in role in the test. Since Syria has purchased Scud missiles from North Korea, this test could be indicative of North Korean warhead capabilities.
–"Syria Tests Scud B with Chemical Warhead," Middle East Newsline, vol. 3, no. 274, 13 July 2001, <http://www.menewsline.com>; Ze'ev Schiff, "Syrian Scud Fired with Chemical Warhead," Ha'aretz, 13 July 2001, http://www.haaretz.co.il.

Early August 2001
US government officials and congressional sources say they suspect China has been transferring missile components and technology to Iran, Libya, and Syria though North Korea.
–"N. Korea Serves as Chinese Front for Missiles," Middle East Newsline, vol. 3, no. 324, 17 August 2001, http://www.menewsline.com.

16 August 2001
According to the London-based Al-Hayah newspaper, a Syrian delegation visits Moscow to purchase new weapons including S-300 missiles.
– Al Hayah, 16 August 2001 in "Report says Syria negotiating to buy S-300 missiles from Russia," FBIS-GMP20010816000039, 16 August 2001.

7 September 2001
The CIA releases its "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000." The report says that North Korea obtained raw materials and components for ballistic missiles from "various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China." Chinese firms are also said to have provided "dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to North Korea." As a supplier, North Korea is said to have provided "significant ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa." North Korea is said to have "maintained a missile relationship" with Egypt, and provided assistance and equipment for Syria's liquid-propellant missile program. North Korea is also reportedly a supplier of "missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise to Libya and Iran."
–"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," CIA, 7 September 2001, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm#5>; "Russia, N. Korea, China Give Iran Missile Aid-CIA," Joongang Ilbo, 11 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Bill Gertz, "CIA Uncovers Missile moves by China," Washington Times, 8 September 2001, <http://www.washtimes.com>; "CIA Says Iran Got New Missile Aid," Washington Post, 8 September 2001, p. 9.

January 2002
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Syria has hundreds of FROGs, Scuds and SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles. Syria also is able to produce Scuds mainly using domestically produced parts. Regional concerns may ultimately lead Syria to pursue a longer range missile capability, according to CIA's estimates. Further, foreign assistance has enabled Syria to augment its production capabilities and procure export-controlled technology and components.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

6 February 2002
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He states that North Korean sales of ballistic missiles and production capabilities, including raw goods, components and technical advice, has enabled North Korea to continue producing new, more sophisticated weapons to sell to clients such as Syria.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

6 February 2002
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says North Korea is exporting ballistic missiles and missile components to countries like Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. Tenet says North Korea could have a ballistic missile that could reach the United States by 2015, and that North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. According to Tenet, North Korea is using the profits from its missile exports to further develop its missiles, and probably to covertly develop WMD.
–James Risen, "A Nation Challenged: The Threat; Al Qaeda Still Able to Strike U.S., Head of C.I.A. Says," New York Times, 7 February 2002, p. A1; Associated Press, "Countries, Groups and Others that Are Considered Risks to U.S. Security," St. Petersburg Times, 7 February 2002; Han Ki Hng, "Mi CIA Kukchang ,IJPuk 2015 Ny" Mibont, Ĵo Konggy Kan.ng, Donga Ilbo, 7 February 2002, http://www.donga.com.

19 June 2002
US and Israeli officials state Syria is mass producing its longer-range version of its Scud C missile with possible assistance by North Korea and Iran.
–Steve Rodan, "Syria preparing to build extended-ranged Scud," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 2002, p. 40.

1 September 2002
US and Israel is trying to stop a Syrian-Russian arms deal for SA-18 shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
– Tel Aviv Ha'aretz, 1 September 2002 in "Israel, US said to be 'trying to hald' Russia-Syria missile deal,"FBIS-GMP20020901000002, 1 September 2002.

21 September 2002
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov states Russia is not selling the SA-18 as alleged by Israel to Syria.
– Moscow Interfax, 21 September 2002, in "Defense Minister says Russia not selling offensive weapons to Syria," FBIS-CEP20020921000026, 21 September 2002.

29 October 2002
According to The Jerusalem Post, Russia has halted its arm sale of the SA-18 ground-to-air missile to Syria.
–Nina Gilbert, "PM: Russia has halted sale of SA-18 missile to Syria," The Jerusalem Post, 29 October 2002, p. 3.

Late 2002
Four tunnels to be used as housing for Nodong launchers are hollowed out in undisclosed areas in Syria.
–Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

13 January 2003
Western sources claim that North Korea is offering Syria a "more accurate" version of the Scud B missile. The Scud C has already been bought by Syria offered at $4 million.
– Jerusalem Middle East Newsline, 13 January 2003 in "N. Korea said to market more accurate Scud-class missile to the Middle East," FBIS GMP20030113000048, 13 September 2003.

14 February 2003
A high ranking American diplomat claims that US and Russian officials stop the sale of Igla portable surface-to-air missile systems from a Russian firm to Iraq which would ultimately have been destined for Syria.
– Moscow Izvestiya, 14 February 2003 in "Russian arms company says no current Igla missile contracts with Syria," FBIS CEP20030214000176, 14 September 2003.

Early January 2004
Following various statements by American officials during Operation Iraqi Freedom in early January accusing Syria of continuing to transfer arms to Iraq, an article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz claims that Syria made an arms deal with Russia for the acquisition of 500 laser-guided anti-tank missiles and transferred it to Iraq.
–Ze'ev Schiff, "Syria has been Iraq's arms supplier," 6 January 2004, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/.

6 January 2004
The United States and Britain have stated bluntly that Syria must relinquish its weapons of mass destruction or "face ostracism – even if neighboring Israel keeps its nuclear arms." This is in response to an earlier announcement by President Bashar Assad that Syria would not dispose of its WMD until and unless Israel does the same. The two western countries have made clear to Syria that abandoning its chemical and biological weapons constitutes the price of better relations.
—Anton La Guardia, "Assad Given Weapons Ultimatum," The Daily Telegraph (London), 7 January 2004.

9 January 2004
According to National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, the Bush administration is in the process of investigating a report that Iraq spirited its WMD across the border into Syria before the U.S. invasion in March 2003. Rice adds however that "I don't think we are at the point that we can make a judgment on the issue. There hasn't been any hard evidence that such a thing happened."
—Mike Allen, "Syria Role on Iraqi Arms Is Studied," The Washington Post, 10 January 2004.

16 January 2004
Commenting on Syria, Secretary of State Colin Powell told Britain's Sky News that the United States has not characterized it "as one of the members of the axis of evil but we are concerned about some of Syria's policies with respect to supporting terrorist activity, with respect of what they might be doing with weapons of mass destruction."
—"Powell Renews Call on Syria to End Support for Terrorism, WMD," Agence France Presse, 16 January 2004.

20 January 2004
Washington officials affirm that Syria, with the help of North Korea, has designed and installed chemical warheads on its Scud B, C and D missiles.
—"Syria Uses Sarin on Scud Warheads," United Press International, 21 January 2004.

27 January 2004
Syrian ambassador Mikail Wehbe, speaking at a UN disarmament conference in Geneva, repeated the Syrian demand for a WMD-free Middle East "without exception".
—"Syria Reiterated Demand for Nuclear-Free Middle East," Agence France Presse, 27 January 2004.

April 2004
Middle East Newsline alleges that a report suggesting that WMD parts, including Scud C and D missiles, have been transported to Khartoum, Sudan from Syria since January of this year -- has been verified by sources who also contest the assertion that Sudanese President al-Bashir is unaware of the shipments.
—Jason Fuchs, "Iran's Cleric Push in Iraq as Syria Moves its WMD," Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, April 2004, p.20.

1 April 2004
Following discussions with his Syrian counterpart and President al-Assad, Foreign Minister Bernard Bot of the Netherlands affirms that the European Union expects to find a compromise on the WMD issue that will satisfy all the parties to a pending association accord.
—"EU, Syria Ready to Compromise on Banned Weapons: Dutch FM," Agence France Presse, 1 April 2004.

30 April 2004
White House spokesman Scott McClellan, speaking with reporters, confirms that the United States will not balk at implementing the Syria Accountability Act, imposing sanctions on Syria, unless there is an effort to seriously address WMD concerns and support for terrorism.
—Olivier Knox, "US: Possible Syria Sanctions "Very Soon"," Agence France Presse, 30 April 2004.

11 May 2004
President Bush enumerates the reasons the United States has approved sanctions against Syria, accusing it of "supporting terrorism, continuing its occupation of Lebanon, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining United States and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq...."
—Krishnadev Calamur, "U.S. Slaps Sanctions on Syria," United Press International, 11 May 2004.

13 May 2004
EU foreign ministers are set to resume talks with Syria on their pending trade agreement next week.
—Ian Black, "Europe to Seek Syria Trade Deal," The Guardian (London), 13 May 2004.

17 May 2004
The Syria-EU trade accord remains unsigned at a meeting for EU foreign ministers in Brussels. Britain, Germany and the Netherlands continue to hold out for tougher wording of the deal's WMD clause.
—Judy Dempsey, "Three Countries Demand Tougher WMD Clause in Syria Trade Deal," The Financial Times, 18 May 2004.

19 May 2004
According to Middle East Newsline, U.S. officials confirm that a train collision in North Korea caused the death of about a dozen Syrian technicians. The Syrians were accompanying a train car full of missiles and missile components from a facility near the Chinese border to a North Korean port; the cargo was destroyed in the subsequent explosion. The officials say there is no evidence that chemical or biological weapons were included in the shipment.
--"Explosion Foils N. Korean Missiles to Syria," Middle East Newsline, 19 May 2004.

26 May 2004
European officials approve text regarding the WMD clause to be included in the trade accord with Syria. No date has been fixed for resuming negotiations however.
—"EU Agrees Syria Deal, Plans Renewed Talks With Damascus," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 26 May 2004.

15 June 2004
According to a report published in the London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, referencing "well informed European diplomatic sources," the signing of the EU-Syria agreement has been taken off the agenda of the EU foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg today, there being no new reason to discuss it. According to these same sources, the European Union is considering sending a team to Damascus within the next three weeks to "persuade them of the need to sign the partnership agreement that includes the disputed paragraph."
—"EU Partnership Agreement With Syria Dropped From Foreign Ministers' Agenda," BBC, 17 June 2004.

4 July 2004
According to a report published by the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper, EU High Representative for WMD affairs Javier Solana will be visiting Damascus 14 and 15 July to discuss the revisions to the trade accord agreed by EU representatives on 26 May.
—"Talks to Resume on EU Association Agreement With Syria," BBC, 5 July 2004.

26 July 2004
Maj. Gen. Ze'evi Farkash, head of the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, claims that Syria is attempting to convert short-range missiles belonging to Hezbollah to carry chemical warheads. According to Farkash, Hezbollah may have access to up to 30 missiles with a 215km maximum range.
--"Hezbollah May Be Seeking Missiles Armed With Chemical Weapons, Israeli Military Intelligence Chief Says," Global Security Newswire, 26 July 2004.

15 September 2004
Contrary to previous reports alleging transfer of Syrian WMD's to Sudan, the Office of the Spokesman asserts that the U.S. Department of State "is not aware of any corroboration of the transfer of Syrian chemical weapons to Sudan."
—"Syrian Transfer of Chemical Weapons to Sudan," Question Taken at U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, 15 September 2004.

21 October 2004
A year-long dispute between Syria and the European Union is apparently resolved with agreement on a WMD clause. The clause provides for cooperation in countering terrorism and WMD proliferation, including their means of delivery. The accord must now be approved by 25 EU foreign ministers scheduled to meet in December 2004.
--"EU Agreement Allows Syria To Keep WMD," WorldTribune.com, 21 October 2004.

10 November 2004
An unidentified U.S. official reveals that the Bush administration is looking at imposing further sanctions on Syria, citing the latter's reluctance to cease support for terrorism and for its alleged WMD activities. A decision is expected within the next few weeks.
--"Bush Administration Considers New Syrian Sanctions," Global Security Newswire, 10 November 2004.

Missile Chronology

2005-2006


12 January 2005
Russian newspaper Kommersant reports that Moscow may sell the Iskander-E missile to Syria. The newspaper states that two years ago Syria asked Moscow for 18 Iskander-E missiles. These missiles were not given to Syria because the missiles were not tested. Instead, Syria was sold the Kornet-E and Metis-M missile system. Israel is trying to stop the transaction because these missiles can reach targets as far as 175 miles, deep into Israeli territory. Furthermore, Israeli military officials are afraid the missile might fall into the hands of Hezbollah.
--"Israel trying to stop missile deal between Russia and Syria," Associated Press, 12 January 2005.

12 January 2005
The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz states that Israel will talk with Moscow regarding the sale of the Iskander-E to Syria. Russia claims this trade is to restore its market in the Middle East. The Iskander-E has a range of 50 to 280km, a launch weight of 3,800kg, a payload of 480kg, high mobility, short deployment time, a concealment-under-jamming capacity, high destruction effect of conventional warheads, and a launcher which weighs 40 tons. The Iskander-E is carried by wheeled transporters, has an off-road capability, drives on all four axles, and requires a three-man crew.
--"Russian Academic Justifies Missile Sales to Syria," Global Security Newswire, 12 January 2005.

12 January 2005
Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov denies reports that Moscow and Damascus are engaged in talks regarding the sale of the Iskander-E. He also states that there are no export restrictions on the missile systems.
--"Russia has no talks with Syria on sale of missiles-DM," ITAR-TASS, 12 January 2005.

13 January 2005
Israeli Prime Minster Ariel Sharon sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin in which he asked Russia not to sell missiles to Syria. Due to the Iskander-E's Global Positioning System, which has an accuracy of 10 to 20 meters, it is capable of attacking military targets, regional commands, airports, and intelligence basis.
--"Israeli officials say Russian missile deal will not harm bilateral ties," BBC, 13 January 2005.

14 January 2005
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states that Washington will impose sanctions on Russia if it sells weapons to Syria. Unofficial reports originally stated that Russia was planning to sell the Iskander-E tactical mid-range missile to Syria. Instead, the transaction is to include 200 portable anti-air missile launchers called the Igla, costing around $20 million.
--"Game without rules," RusData Dialine, 14 January 2005.

14 January 2005
Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa denies making any missile trade deals with Russia. He stated that Israel is trying to initiate a media campaign before Syrian President al-Assad arrives in Moscow for his four-day visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
--"Russia denies engaging in secret missile talks with Syria," Associated Press, 14 January 2005.

16 January 2005
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirms that Russia and Syria will sign a contract regarding the sale of the Iskander-E to Syria. He says that "as for military-technical cooperation with Near East states, in this case Russia is closely following the accepted rules and relevant international accords."
--"Israel 'will do all it can' to stop Russian-Syrian missile deal-newspaper," Global Security Newswire, 16 January 2005.

20 January 2005
A Syrian government newspaper reports that Syria will not discuss purchasing missiles from Russia during the Syrian-Russian summit. However, Syria does have a right to defend itself against Israel.
--"Syria has right to arm itself-state paper," Jerusalem Post, 20 January 2005.

20 January 2005
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the sale of the Igla-SA 18 missile to Syria. Sharon once again stated that Syria's acquisition of the missile will cause a threat to Israel.
--"Sharon urges Russia not to sell missiles to Syria," Xinhua, 20 January 2005.

23 January 2005
Russia states that it does not intend to sell the Iskander-E weapon to Syria, commenting that Syria is a strong ally in the Middle East and has a history of purchasing arms from Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said "Our cooperation with Syria is broad and multifaceted and includes military cooperation...But it never went outside the framework of international agreements."
--"Syria's Assad to visit Moscow amid Missile 'controversy,'" Comtex News Network, 23 January 2005.

24 January 2005
Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, states that he will not discuss the acquisition of missiles from Russia during his trip to Moscow. The Russian defense minister confirms Bashar's statement.
--"0007 Syrian President denies plans to buy," Saudi Press Agency, 24 January 2005.

24 January 2005
Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad arrives in Moscow for a four-day visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
--"2nd Roundup: Syria's Assad in Moscow for Mideast, terror talksEds: Updates with arrival."Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 January 2005.

24 January 2005
Foreign media reports state that Syria would like to acquire 200 Igla missile systems, in addition to purchasing Russian upgrades and repairs to Syria's current missile arsenal. Syria currently has an estimated 4,000 Russian-made shoulder-fired missile systems, which include the Strela-2, Strela-2M, and Strela-3.
--"Russian Military Minds Differ Over Arms Sales to Syria," Global Security Newswire, 24 January 2005.

25 January 2005
Russia is denying the sale of the Iskander-E and Igla SA-18 to Syria. However, Israel states that the sale of the Igla SA-18 was part of an arms package to Syria. The Igla SA-18 is capable of destroying planes and helicopters.
--"2nd Roundup: Syria and Russia boost economic and military tiesEds: Adds reduction of Syrian debt," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 January 2005.

26 January 2005
Syrian President al-Assad states that he will not discuss the sale of the Iskander-E with Russian President Vladimir Putin on his four-day visit. On January, President al-Assad stated to university students in Moscow that, "Syria has the right to defend itself and its airspace." He added, "If Israel is against us acquiring them [missiles], it's as if it were saying, 'We want to attack Syria but we don't want them to protect themselves.'"
--"Russia, Syrian President Evasive About Buying Russian Missiles..," Global Security Newswire, 26 January 2005.

30 January 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin states that there is a chance that Russia will sell anti-aircraft missiles to Syria and believes these missiles will be used for defensive purposes without disrupting the military balance of the region. Putin said: "We understand our responsibilities. We have not taken a single step to disrupt the balance of forces and we will follow that pattern in the future."
--"Putin Says Missile Deal with Syria Is Possible..," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 January 2005.

8 February 2005
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Arial Sharon meet and discuss Syria's purchase of shoulder-mounted missiles from Russia.
--"Sharon and Abbas to meet with Bush," International Herald Tribune, 8 February 2005.

9 February 2005
It is reported that Russia will sign an agreement with the United States to restrict control of portable anti-aircraft missiles, but not sales of other weapons. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice will sign this deal in Bratislava, in a summit meeting between President Vladimir Putin and President George W. Bush on February 24th.
--"Arms trade chief: Moscow agrees to limit portable missiles but defies U.S. pressure on other weapons sales," Associated Press, 9 February 2005.

12 February 2005
During the 41st annual Munich Security Conference, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov states that Moscow and Damascus will not discuss the sale of the Iskander-E missile systems. He said, "although, in international law, there are no limitations on the supply of this and other similar weapons, Moscow was not and is not engaged in any negotiations on this subject with Damascus. Nor have there been any talks on the supply of man-portable air defense missile systems to Syria."
--"Russian Defence minister restates denial of missile talks with Syria," BBC, 12 February 2005.

15 February 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin informs Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon that they will sell anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.
--"Sharon accuses Russia of going ahead with missile sales to Syria," Xinhua, 15 February 2005.

16 February 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov confirms the sale of the short-range anti-aircraft missile system, known as Strelets, to Syria. Simultaneously, Iran announces its commitment to support Syria against threats posed by the United States.
--"Iran to aid Syria against threats," BBC, 16 February 2005.

16 February 2005
Russia states it will forgive Syria's $13.4 billion debt, which is likely to strengthen military relations between the two countries.
--"Russia negotiates sale of anti-aircraft missile systems to Syria,"Associated Press, 16 February 2005.

16 February 2005
Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon wrote a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin requesting that Russia halt the sale of weapons to Syria. Sharon's request is rejected by Putin, who states that he will go ahead with the sale.
--"Sharon calls Lebanon 'center of terror,'" Daily Star, 16 February 2005.

16 February 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said "Damascus would be supplied with 'Strelets' (Archer) short-range air defense systems that are not subject to any international restrictions." The Strelets is designed to shoot stinger-type Strelets missiles. The Strelets system can be mounted on land, sea, and air based carriers, four modules can be mounted on a carrier, each module consisting of two missiles. The Strelets can be fired in single shots or in salvos (two missiles at one target). The Strelets system functions within a radius of 4-5 kilometers.
--"Russia to sell anti-aircraft missiles to Damascus," Press Trust of India, 16 February 2005; "Russia announces plan to supply short-range air defence systems to Syria," BBC, 16 February 2005; "Russian Defence Minister/Remarks," Qatar News Agency,25 February 2005.

18 February 2005
On 14 February 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that Russia would not be supplying Syria with the long-range versatile Iskander-E systems.
--"Russia confirmed plans to sell short-range air defense systems to Syria," RusData Dialine,18 February 2005.

18 February 2005
On 17 February 2005, U.S National Security advisor Stephen Hadley expressed concern over Russia's sale of the Strelets to Syria. He said, "we've raised [concerns] with the Russian government in an appropriate way, and other countries have raised their concerns as well, and we are hopeful and confident that the Russians will take them into account."
--"U.S. objects to Russian sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Syria," Knight Ridder,18 February 2005.

21 February 2005
Russia states it will forgive $10 billion of Syria's $13 billion debt. Russian officials say this will help Syria purchase weapons from Russia.
--"Algeria rejects new Russian weapons contracts without debt relief," BBC, 21 February 2005.

24 February 2005
In a summit meeting in Bratislava, Slovakia, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement that allows better oversight of portable anti-aircraft defense weapons. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov states that this deal defines portable anti-aircraft defense systems and requires both sides to tell the other of the transfer of portable air defense systems to a third country. However, the agreement does not stop the trade of portable air defense systems.
--"RF, US to cooperate in control over portable antiaircraft systems," ITAR-TASS,24 February 2005.

25 February 2005
U.S. President George W. Bush expresses concern during the Russian-American summit over Russia's plan to sell the Strelets to Syria.
--"News Analysis: Shadows still hang over US-Russian ties amid conciliatory talks," Xinhua,25 January 2005.

1 March 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov states that Russia will only sell the Strelets to Syria if both countries agree on the price of the missile. Ivanov further states that in order for the sale to go through, Syria has to agree to mandatory site inspections by Russia to monitor the use of the Strelets.
--"Russia only to sell missiles to Syria if the price is right-Defence Minister," BBC, 1 March 2005.

1 March 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov states that terrorists cannot use the Strelets. He said, "it is not a manpack air defense system, which is portable. Strelets is a rather massive and complicated system not to be carried in the mountains." He added that Syrians want to acquire this missile in order to protect small facilitates within Syria.
--"Russia to check how Syria uses antimissile defense systems Strelets," RIA Novosti,1 March 2005.

4 March 2005
Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Muallem visits Russia. A Russian Foreign Ministry release states he may negotiate an arms deal with Moscow.
--"Syrian deputy FM in Moscow to discuss Lebanon troop withdrawal," Press Trust of India, 4 March 2005.

7 March 2005
Russian Defense Minster Sergey Ivanov states that the inter-governmental agreement signed during the Russian-American summit monitors the sale of shoulder-fired air missile systems. However, the agreement does not restrict Russia from selling the Strelets to Syria which is a short range surface-to-air missile system.
--Russia's ties with Syria and Latin America an irritant to Washington," BBC, 7 March 2005.

8 March 2005
Washington lawmakers have proposed the "Lebanon and Syria Liberation Act." This act would enforce tougher sanctions against Syria. In addition, U.S. foreign aid would be suspended to countries suspected of helping Syria in acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
--"Lawmakers propose new Syria sanctions," Agence France Presse,8 March 2005.

13 March 2005
Russian National Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov reports to Channel 1 of Israeli TV, that the sale of the Strelets to Syria would not jeopardize Israel's security.
--"Russian Security Chief tells Israel arms for Syria purely defensive," BBC, 14 March 2005.

15 March 2005
Russian National Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov said to Israel TV that Russia will allow Israeli officials to inspect the Strelets before it is sold to Syria. He added that Russia can show Israel the capabilities of the Strelets which would prove that the missile is not a threat to Israeli territory.
--"Russia's Ivanov reassures Israel on sale of Missiles to Syria," BBC, 15 March 2005.

31 March 2005
Syria and Russia will discuss strengthening trade relations in Damascus at the Russian-Syrian standing commission for trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. This conference will take place from April 2 to 5.
--"Russia, Syria intend to increase trade," RIA Novosti, 31 March 2005.

15 April 2005
Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said "that it was dangerous for the international world as a whole to sell weapons to countries such as Syria that support terror."
--"Israel moving towards 'normalization' with Arabs, says foreign minister," BBC, 15 April 2005.

21 April 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin reports to Israel Channel 1 that Russia has finalized the deal to sell the Strelets anti-aircraft weapon to Syria. Putin also states that these missiles will make it harder for Israeli low-flying planes to fly over the home of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.
--"Russia will sell antiaircraft missiles to Syria," Christian Science Monitor, 21 April 2005.

21 April 2005
Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon said that Russian President Vladimir Putin's explanation of the anti-aircraft missiles not being able to be converted into a shoulder-fired rocket is not convincing. He believes that Syrian sponsored groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah guerillas or Palestinian militants can get a hold of these missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon said Israel "can't intervene in Russia's sale of weapons to other countries." However, he will urge President Vladimir Putin to stop the sale of ant-aircraft missiles to Syria during his visit to Israel.
--"Sharon to lobby against Russian missile sale to Syria," Associated Press, 21 April 2005.

26 April 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin begins his visit to the Middle East. He will visit Israel and meet with Israeli President Moshe Katsav and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Besides discussing the topic of Russia's sales of the Strelets to Syria, the leaders will sign documents on mutual protection of investments, cooperation in space exploration and military-technical cooperation.
--"Vladimir Putin begins a visit to Egypt and Israel," RusData Dialine, 26 April 2005.

26 April 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said "the delivery of the Strelets missiles to Syria has been blown out of proportion by the media...Israel easily has the upper hand over Syria militarily." The number of missiles that will be sold to Syria is unknown.
--"Ivanov says Russia stands behind missile deal with Syria," Deutsche Press-Agentur, 26 April 2005.

26 April 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said Russia has demonstrated to Israel that the Strelets is not man-portable.
--"Russia reassures Israel on arms sale to Syria-report," AFX, 26 April 2005.

26 April 2005
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reports to Al-Arabia television that the sale of the Strelets to Syria "is an exclusively peaceful deal." He adds that Russia "is ready to sell such kinds of defensive armaments to interested countries if the deals do not contradict Russian international commitments."
--"Russia-Syria missile deal peaceful-foreign minister," ITAR-TASS, 26 April 2005.

27 April 2005
Officers from the Russian General staff show documents to Israel that describe the Strelets to have many Iglas fastened together. These Iglas cannot be separated to be used as man-portable launchers. The Strelets can only be fired if it is fixed onto a motorized launcher.
--"The First Coming of Putin," Defense and Security Russia, 27 April 2005; "Russia asserts itself in Mideast," Christian Science Monitor, 28 April 2005.

28 April 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Israel. In a three-hour meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a difficult time persuading Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the sale of the Strelets to Syria would pose no threat to Israel.
--"Putin struggles to allay Israeli fears over Syria, Iran deals," Agence France Presse, 28 April 2005.

28 April 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin stopped the sale of the Iskander missiles to Syria. These missiles have a range of 300 km. In a joint news conference Putin said: "I have vetoed the deal. We cannot be described as irresponsible partners; we do take due account of the concerns and wishes of our partners and do everything not to break the balance of power in the region." Russian arms sales to the Middle East are estimated to be $500 million per year.
--"Putin banned sales of 300-km Iskander Missiles to Syria," RIA Novosti, 28 April 2005.

28 April 2005
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Israel would only be affected by the Strelets if Israel comes within their range which would require Israel to attack Syria.
--"Putin defends arms sales to Syria, Iran," Associated Press, 28 April 2005.

28 April 2005
During a visit to Jerusalem, Russian President Vladimir Putin admits Moscow intended to sell Iskander missile systems to Syria. Kommersant first published a report about this incident back on January 12, 2005. The Iskander missile is a highly accurate and mobile system which can overcome air defense systems. President Putin defends his plans to sell weapons to Syria and acknowledges Israel's concerns. "However, these concerns are groundless. . . . The missiles we sold to Syria are short-range antiaircraft missiles. They do not threaten Israeli territory. For these missiles to hit you, you will need to enter Syrian territory," Putin adds.
--"Russia: Report Highlights Putin's 'Sensational' Comment on Syrian Missile Deal," Kommersant, 29 April 2005, in FBIS Document CEP20050429019001; Molly Moore, "In Israel, Putin Defends Syria, Iran Deals," Washington Post, 29 April 2005.

Early 2005
The three Scud missiles used in a test launch on May 27, 2005 by Syria, consisted of an older Scud B with a range of 185 miles (300 kilometers), and two Scud D missiles with a range of about 435 miles (700 kilometers).
--"The Growing Syrian Missile Threat," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005.

28 May 2005
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announces Syrian missile parts from an explosion were found in Kirikhan. The Syrian embassy apologizes and says the accident occurred when a missile failed during military training. The MFA statement indicated there were no casualties. Israeli military officials say the Syrian missile tests consisted of one Scud B and two Scud D's capable of delivering mid-air chemical weapons. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official, on the condition of anonymity, says relations between Syria and Turkey were positive and have been improving over time.
--"Turkey Asks Syria to Explain Fallen Missile Parts," BBC, 29 May 2005; "Syria Test-Fires 3 Scud Missiles, Israelis Say," New York Times, 3 June 2005; Amy Teibel; "Syria Test-Fired Scud Missiles," Associated Press, 5 June 2005. 4968

5 June 2005
Information Minister of Syria, Mahdi Dakhlullah, denies Israeli reports that his country's missile testing had hostile intentions.
--"Syria Refutes Israeli Comments on Missile Test," Xinhua, 5 June 2005. 4968

10 June 2005
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov says his country will supply Syria with Strelets air defense missile systems. Minister Ivanov denies that Russia will supply Iskander operational tactical systems to Syria. "We are watching the balance of power in the whole region and are not interested in further escalation of tension there. We never planned to supply Iskander to countries in the Middle East," Minister Ivanov adds.
--"Defense Minister Says Russia to Supply Strelets Missile Systems to Syria," Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 10 June 2005.4968

19 September 2005
Yuval Steinitz chairman of the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense committee states that North Korea supplied missiles based on the North Korean Nodong missile to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya.
--"Knesset chairman says North Korea nuclear decision good news for Israel," BBC, 19 September 2005.

29 September 2005
On a four day visit to Russia, Syrian Army's Chief-of-Staff General Ali Habib met with Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov. Ivanov said "[they discussed the] maintenance and modernization of Syrian military equipment with Russian experts, the training of Syrian military in Russian military academies, and potential purchase of Russian weapons." Furthermore, the Syrian General visited a weapon's factory located in the Tula region south of Moscow which specializes in high-precision anti-tank rockets.
-"Syrian army chief mulls Russian arms purchases," Agence France Presse, 29 September 2005.

26 October 2005
Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 26, 2005. A political source states that during this meeting Shalom plans on voicing his objection to Russia signing a new arms deal with Syria. The same source said, "any cooperation with [Syria], especially when it comes to sensitive issues such as the supply of weapons, will cause more instability [in the region]."
--"Russia-Syria arms deal worry Israel," Haaretz, 26 October 2005.

7 November 2005
According to Focus magazine (Germany), 15 Russian industrial companies and research institutes based in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Samara, are alleged to be sending German missile technology from German producers illegally to missile making enterprises in Iran and Syria. The German government has warned these German producers of the transactions. It is also alleged that Syria may have used the technology provided by these Russian companies and institutes to improve their obsolete Scud missiles.
--"German Technology Exported to Russia allegedly sold by Agents to Iran, Syria," BBC, 8 November 2005.

4 January 2006
A 55-page intelligence assessment report formulated by British, French, German, and Belgian agencies states that Syria and Pakistan have been purchasing technology and chemicals which are used to enrich uranium and create their rocket programs.
--"Secret services say Iran is trying to assemble a nuclear missile: Documents seen by Guardian details web of front companies and middlemen," The Guardian, 4 January 2006.

6 March 2006
A senior Russian engineer of the Engineering Design Bureau and designer of the Strelets short range air defense missile system, Valery Kashin, states that devices have been added to the Strelets missiles to prohibit them from being used as shoulder-launched missiles by terrorists.
--"Russia: Designer Says Shoulder-Launched Use of Strelets Missiles Impossible," Interfax, 6 March 2006, in FBIS Document CEP20060301027152.

13 May 2006
On 13 May 2006, a de-classified report to the U.S. Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004 indicates that in 2004, Syria "continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability." The report further states that Syria's "liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance--primarily from North Korean entities," and that "Syria was developing longer range missile programs, such as the Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran."
--"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January–31 December 2004," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13 May 2006.

15-20 July 2006
USA Today reports that an Iranian cargo plane suspected of containing missiles and launchers for Hezbollah was blocked from reaching its destination in Syria with the aid of U.S. allies Iraq and Turkey. Satellite photographs depicting Iranian crews loading three missile launchers and eight crates housing C-802 Noor missiles onto this aircraft confirmed an earlier tip to U.S. intelligence of an impending shipment of fresh supplies to be used in battle against Israeli military forces during the 34-day war. Iraqi air controllers denied the plane access to Iraq's airspace while Turkish officials offered permission contingent on an inspection of the plane's cargo on Turkish soil.
--John Diamond, "Officials: U.S. blocked missiles to Hezbollah," USA Today, 17 August 2006.

18 July 2006
In an interview with Charlie Rose, Syrian Expatriates Minister Buthaina Shaaban assures that "Syria has never and is not sending any missiles to Hezbollah," despite Israeli claims of evidence to the contrary.
--Transcript of The Charlie Rose Show, "A Discussion With a Representative of the Syrian Government; Some Context on Conflict in Mideast and Its Wider Implications," Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 18 July 2006.

31 August 2006
Israel alleges that post-war analysis of artillery shells reveals that rockets supplied to Hezbollah were manufactured in Syria. Tel Aviv, with support from Washington, has called for international peacekeepers to be deployed to the Lebanese-Syrian border to patrol and prevent further delivery of short-range missiles to Hezbollah.
--Peter Spiegel and Laura King, "Israel Says Syria, Not Just Iran, Supplied Missiles to Hezbollah," Los Angeles Times, 31 August 2006.

6 October 2006
According to Israeli media, a high-ranking official working for Moscow-based Rosoboronexport Arms Trading Company was fired after Israeli authorities inquired about exporting of weapons to Syria. A spokesman for Rosoboronexport denied such claims and asserted that the company abided by Russian and international laws banning the supply of weapons to parties in conflict zones.
--"Russian Arms Exporter Denies Firing Official over Weapon Supplies to Syria," Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 6 October 2006.

4 December 2006
The Jerusalem Post reports that in the four months since the end the war between Hezbollah and Israel, weapons convoys carrying short-range, long-range, and advanced anti-tank missiles have crossed into Lebanon from Syria at night. Israeli Defense Force surveillance contends that most of Hezbollah's long-range missiles were in battle during the summer and that any such missiles used in future attacks will be smuggled through the border.
--Ya'aqov Katz, "Syria Re supplying Hizbullah with Long-Range Missiles," The Jerusalem Post, 4 December 2006.

Updated May 2006

Missile Chronology

2007-2009

4 January 2007
The United States freezes the American assets of three Syrian government organizations that it accuses of helping to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The US Treasury Department said it had designated the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory as proliferators under an executive order aimed at combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The three institutions are subordinates of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). The SSRC claims to promote civilian research for Syria's economic development, however, Western sources allege that the SSRC engages in independent weapons system development for the military. It is also responsible for the production of strategic weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles and rocket systems as well as chemical and biological warfare agents.
--"U.S. Slaps Sanctions on 3 Syrian labs over WMD proliferation concern," Japan Economic Newswire, January 4, 2007; Robin Hughes, "US freezes assets of three Syrian organizations," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 January 2007.

22 January 2007
The Jerusalem Post reports that Syria has test-fired a 'Scud D' short-range ballistic missile that is capable of striking anywhere in neighboring Israel. Israel's Arrow Weapon System detected the launch and tracked the test. Agence France Presse further reports that the 11-meter (36-foot) missile has a range of 700 km (440 miles) and was originally Russian-built but has been improved with North Korean technology. Janes's Defence Weekly adds that the missile was manufactured in Syria and is alleged to be fitted with a chemical warhead.
--"Israeli media says Syria has tested Scud," Agence France Presse, 2 February 2007; Alon Ben-David, "Syria test fires 'Scud D' missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 2007.

23 January 2007
Russia's state defense export Rosoboronexport denies that "new" deliveries of the Strelets short-range air-defense system have been made to Syria. According to Sergey Chemezov, director general of Rosoboronexport, the negotiations concerning the ground-to-air missile system are complicated. A contract concerning the delivery has not been signed and it is not clear when it will be signed, he stated through the Russian state information service RIA Novosti. It is unclear whether Chemezov was referring to an entirely new contract or part of a previous agreement, signed between Russia and Syria in 2005. The news agency further says that Valeriy Kashin, head of Strelets manufacturer, Kolomna KBM, had confirmed that Russia had met all its commitments in 2006 under the contract to supply Syria with the Strelets system, confirming the delivery of equipment under the 2005 contract.
--Keri Smith, "Rosoboronexport denies claims of Strelets deal with Syria," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 2007; "Russia-Syria deal on short-range air defence missiles not yet complete," Itar-Tass, 23 January 2007.

21 February 2007
Jane's Defence Weekly reports that intelligence sources indicate that Syria is developing maneuvering capabilities for its Scuds, as well as seeking to acquire the Russian Iskander-E (SS-X-26). [Note: The SS-X-26 is a solid-fuel road-mobile ballistic missile with a range of 400 km.]
--Alon Ben-David, "Arrow destroys target simulating a Shahab," Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 February 2007; Raytheon, Missile Systems of the World, Lexington, Massachusetts: AMI International, 1999, p. 526.

11 March 2007
A senior Israeli military source says that an AFP report from 9 March 2007 about Syrian deployment of missiles is inaccurate. The report stated that Syria had deployed thousands of long-range and intermediate-range missiles along the borders to Israel. On Voice of Israel Network B the military official says that "there are no movements by Syrian forces, nor is there any information regarding offensive intentions on the party of the Syrian Army."
--"Israeli 'source' denies AFP report on Syria deploying missiles along border," Voice of Israel Network B, Open Source Document GMP20070311735001, 11 March 2007; "Israeli source denies report on Syria deploying missiles," BBC, 11 March 2007.

19 September 2007
Syria and Iran abort a joint development program to weaponize Syrian Scud B, C, and D missiles with chemical warheads. This follows an explosion on a Syrian military complex in Aleppo last month. The explosion occurred during an attempt to equip a 500-km-range Scud C with a mustard gas warhead.
--Robin Hughes, "Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria," Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 September 2007; "Syrian blast was chemical warhead glitch-magazine," Reuters, 19 September 2007; "Blast at secret Syrian missile site kills dozens," Times Online, 20 September 2007.

26 September 2007
Syria purportedly acquires an intermediate-range ballistic missile from North Korea. The missile is believed to be a variant of the North Korean No-Dong missile.
--"Israel: Western intel ‘sources’ say Syria acquires N. Korean No-Dong missiles," Middle East Newsline, 26 September 2007, Open Source Document GMP20070926740011.

26 November 2007
Reports allege that North Korean engineers specializing in surface-to-surface missiles have been visiting Syria. This comes amid growing speculation that there is active cooperation in the nuclear and missile related fields between Syria and North Korea.
--"Japan: Source reveals DPRK missile engineers Secretly visited Syria mid-Nov 2007," Sankei Shimbun, 26 November 2007; "Tokyo daily: Source says 3 DPRK missile experts died in Syria Scud test explosion," Sankei Shimbun, 6 October 2007, Open Source Document JPP20071008026001.

27 February 2008
Israel’s Mossad claims Syria is accelerating its ballistic missile program with North Korean help, doubling manufacturing capability in the last two years. Mossad chief Meir Dagan, tells the Israeli Knesset that Syria has increased the range of its SCUD-D missiles from 650-700 km to 800 km, and has also improved the accuracy of its SCUD-C arsenal.
--David C. Isby, "Syrian ballistic missile, rocket capability gets a boost," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 March 2008.

13 March 2008
Syria is believed to be seeking S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air systems from Russia, though there is no indication a deal has been finalized or that missiles have been delivered. The S-300PMU-2 system is designed to counter both aircraft and ballistic missiles.
--Tim Ripley, "Opportunities and risks: Middle East security," Jane’s Defense Weekly, 13 March 2008; "Syria seeks Russia missile deals," Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 March 2007; Jeremy M.Sharp, "Syria: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, updated 1 May 2008.

15 April 2008
Reports allege that a Syrian delegation is visiting Russia to inspect the first batch of Pantsyr-S1 (NATO designation: SA-22 "Greyhound") short-range air-defense systems for delivery. The Pantsyr-S1 is a hybrid gun/missile air-defense system capable of being installed on a variety of platforms, including tracked vehicles and surface ships.
--"Syria is getting Russian air-defense system," Reuters, 15 April 2008, <http://ru.reuters.com:80>; Miroslav Gyurosi, "Details emerge of Pantsir-S1E hybrid air-defense system," Jane’s Missile and Rockets, 1 March 2008; Robin Hughes, "Iran set to obtain Pantsyr via Syria," Jane’s Defense Weekly, 23 May, 2007.

19-22 August 2008
Reports of a pending missile deal accompany Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s first meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Asked about the reports, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expresses openness to a deal but seems to exclude the surface-to-surface Iskander from the equation: "We are ready to deliver weapons to Syria that are used for defense only and are not violating the strategic balance in the region." The Syrian state news agency SANA more explicitly denies that the Iskander is on al-Assad and Medvedev’s agenda. The Iskander’s range and accuracy have made it of particular concern to Israel. Other systems under discussion reportedly include the surface-to-air S-300, some versions of which have anti-ballistic missile capabilities.
--"Syria: We’ll host Russian missile system," Russia Today, 19 August 2008; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Syria denies accepting Russian missile deployment," Reuters, 22 August 2008.

20 November 2008
Russia will not export Iskander missiles to Syria or other countries until the Russian military is fully supplied with them, according to Russian news agency Novosti. The Russian military is not expected to receive the missiles it has ordered for a number of years because of production capacity limitations.
—Yaakov Katz, "Russia will not sell Iskander missiles to Syria in near future," The Jerusalem Post, 20 November 2008; Dmitry Solovyov and David Cutler, "Key facts about Russia's Iskander missile," Reuters, 28 January 2009.

3 February 2009
Israeli defense officials worry that Syria will transfer anti-aircraft missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon while the IDF is preoccupied in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak asserts, "We [Israel] are also keeping an eye on the weapons smuggling from Syria to Hezbollah and there are a number of systems that we view as breaking the balance of power that cannot be allowed to be transferred." Barak maintains that in the event of an attack by Hezbollah, Israel would "need to consider its response" but would hold the Lebanese government responsible.
—Ya’aqov Katz, "Israel Fears Syria Might Aid Hezbollah," referenced in "Israel Concerned That Syria Will Give Hezbollah Anti-Aircraft Missiles," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 February 2009.

Updated February 2009

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Last Updated ( Saturday, 15 August 2009 )
 
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